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Abstract
The CREED Costa Rica project conducted an exhaustive quantitative inquiry into the economic factors
that determine land use in the Río Chiquito watershed of Lake Arenal, Costa Rica, and found that
livestock production is likely to produce positive hydrological externalities. This paper integrates these
results into an application of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework that is informed
by a participatory process conducted with watershed stakeholders. The paper identifies physical
measures, institutional arrangements and incentive mechanisms to stimulate improved watershed
management in Río Chiquito by expanding the analysis beyond just the internalisation of hydrological
externalities, to consideration of the larger “bundle” of goods and services provided by the watershed.
In so doing it provides a refined vision for the Action Programme drafted by stakeholders. The latter is
evaluated using IAD criteria and appears to be a promising improvement on current arrangements.
Not surprisingly, the findings suggest that the public good characteristics of a number of the watershed
goods and services produced in Río Chiquito imply the need for institutional arrangements beyond that
represented by markets. However, the results suggest that simply labelling such goods and services as
public goods is too simplistic an approach. In the Arenal case, although upstream landholders may find
it difficult to exclude others from consuming the downstream benefits of land use decisions already
made, the possibility remains that they may retain rights of exclusion over future land use decisions.
Given the private good characteristics of downstream hydrological products this suggests that there
does exist a basis for a market-driven, polycentric arrangement between upstream producers and
downstream consumers. Thus, the advantage of investigating the public good natures of the myriad of
goods and services produced by watersheds is that it provides an analytical basis for the suggestions of
the types of institutional arrangements that might be most appropriate for the management of these
goods and services.
As an incentive mechanism for implementing a polycentric scheme to improve watershed management,
it is recommended that the inter-institutional commission, called for under the Action Programme,
develop a two-way sealed bid auction system of allocating contractual arrangements. Producers would
agree to undertake management improvements in return for compensatory resource transfers (or
projects). External stakeholders wishing to obtain off-site services would not only contribute funds but
also assist in establishing priorities for the awarding of contracts, up to and including establishing their
willingness to pay for specific measures in specific geographic areas. Ideally, producers would likewise
set their offer price for specific measures in specific geographic areas. The respective sealed bids
would be sorted and matched in a cost-effective, optimising manner by an independent committee
organised under the commission. The hydrological and economic information developed in the CREED
project could be used to establish both hydrological and carbon storage priorities, while the offer price
for the measures would be best left to the individual producers to decide.

Resumen
El proyecto CREED Costa Rica realizó un estudio cuantitativo exhaustivo sobre los factores
económicos que determinan el uso de la tierra en la subcuenca hidrológica Río Chiquito del Lago
Arenal, Costa Rica y encontró que la producción ganadera parece generar externalidades hidrológicas
positivas. Este documento integra estos resultados en una aplicación del Marco de Análisis
Institucional y de Desarrollo realizada por medio de un proceso participativo conducido por varios
grupos de actores interesados en la cuenca.
El documento identifica medidas físicas, arreglos institucionales y mecanismos de incentivos que
estimulen mejoramientos en el manejo de la cuenca hidrográfica de Río Chiquito, por medio de la
expansión del análisis más allá de la internalización de las externalidades hidrológicas hasta a la

consideración de un amplio rango de bienes y servicios provistos por la cuenca. Este proceso provee
una visión redefinida para el Programmea de Acción esbozado por los grupos de interesados. Este
último fue evaluado utilizando el criterio IAD y se encontró que constituye un mejoramiento promisorio
sobre los arreglos actuales. No es sorprendente que los resultados sugieran que las características de
bien público de un número de los bienes y servicios producidos por la cuenca Río Chiquito implican la
necesidad de arreglos institucionales más allá de aquellos representados por los mercados. Aun así, los
resultados sugieren que simplemente designar dichos bienes y servicios como públicos es un
procedimiento muy simplista. En el caso de Arenal, aunque para los propietarios río arriba sea dificil
excluir a otros de consumir los beneficios río abajo generados por previas decisiones de uso de la tierra,
existe la posibilidad de que ellos mantengan derechos de exclusión de futuras decisiones de uso de la
tierra.
Dadas las características de de bien privado de los productos hidrológicos río abajo, ésto sugiere que
debe existir una base para un arreglo de mercado, policéntrico , entre productores río arriba y
consumidores río abajo. De esta manera, la ventaja de investigar la naturaleza de bien público de los
innumerables bienes y servicios generados por las cuencas hidrográficas es que provee una base
analítica para las sugerencias sobre los tipos de arreglos institucionales que podrían ser más apropiados
para el manejo de estos bienes y servicios.
Como un mecanismo de incentivos para la implementación de un esquema policéntrico que mejore el
manejo de las cuencas hidrográficas, se recomienda que una comisión interinstitucional, designada bajo
el Programmea de Acción, desarrolle un sistema de subasta sellada de dos sentidos para colocar
arreglos contractuales. Los productores acordarían llevar a cabo mejoramientos en el manejo a cambio
de transferencias de recursos (o proyectos) compensatorios. Actores externos interesados en obtener
servicios fuera de sitio no solamente contribuirían con fondos sino que asistirían en el establecimiento
de prioridades para la entrega de contratos, incluyendo además el establecimiento de su disponibilidad a
pagar por medidas específicas en áreas geográficas específicas. Los montos sellados respectivos serían
mezclados y comparados siguiendo un proceso de optimización costo-eficacia, por un comité
independiente organizado bajo la comisión. La información hidrológica y económica desarrollada en el
proyecto CREED podría ser utilizada para establecer prioridades tanto hidrológicos como de secuestro
de carbono, mientras que el precio ofrecido por las medidas sería dejado a consideración de los
productores individuales.

Abrégé
Au Costa Rica, le projet CREED a réalisé une enquête quantitative exhaustive sur les facteurs
économiques déterminant l'usage des terres dans le bassin versant du Río Chiquito, le lac Arenal, et a
découvert que l'élevage peut avoir des retombées hydrologiques externes favorables. Le présent
document intègre ces résultats à une application du cadre d'analyse et de développement institutionnels
(ADI) alimenté en informations par un processus participatif mené par des ayants droits du bassin
versant. Le texte repère les mesures matérielles, les dispositions institutionnelles et les mécanismes
incitatifs susceptibles de stimuler une meilleure gestion du bassin versant du Río Chiquito; il y parvient
en poussant l'analyse au-delà de la seule internalisation des retombées hydrologiques externes
favorables, jusqu'à prendre en considération l'ensemble global des biens et services tirés du bassin
versant. Ce faisant, il offre un tableau affiné de la situation, destiné au Programme d'action établi par
les ayants droit. Ce dernier est évalué à l'aide des critère ADI et l'on découvre qu'il représente une
amélioration prometteuse par rapport aux dispositions actuelles.
Il n'est pas surprenant que les résultats de cette recherche suggèrent que, de par la nature publique d'un
certain nombre de biens et services de bassin versant produits dans la région du Río Chiquito, il existe
un besoin implicite de dispositions institutionnelles au-delà de celles des marchés. Mais ils suggèrent

aussi que se contenter d'apposer sur ces biens et services la simple étiquette de «bien public» serait par
trop simpliste. Dans le cas de l'Arenal, les propriétaires fonciers situés en amont risquent d'éprouver des
difficultés s'ils tentent d'empêcher la jouissance, par d'autres, des avantages tirés, en aval, de décisions
déjà prises en termes d'utilisation des terres. Ils n'en gardent pas moins la possibilité de préserver leur
droit de veto sur toute décision future en ce domaine. Étant donné la nature privée des produits
hydrologiques d'aval, tout cela suggère l'existence d'une base pour des arrangements polycentriques
animés par le marché, entre producteurs d'amont et consommateurs d'aval. L'intérêt d'étudier la nature
publique de la myriade de biens et services produits par les bassins versants tient au fait que cela
fournit une base analytique pour suggérer les types de dispositions institutionnelles convenant le mieux

À titre de mécanisme incitatif pour la mise en application d'un schéma polycentrique d'amélioration de
la gestion de bassin versant, on recommande qu'une commission interinstitutionnelle, que le Programme
d'action appelle de ses vœux, mette sur pied un système d'appels d'offres anonymes pour la répartition
des dispositions contractuelles. Les producteurs accepteraient d'entreprendre des améliorations de
gestion en échange de transferts de ressources compensatoires (ou de projets). Les ayants droits
externes désireux d'obtenir des services ailleurs que sur place seraient non seulement appelés à apporter
leur contribution financière mais aussi à aider à l'établissement de l'ordre des priorités pour la
répartition des contrats, jusqu'à, et y compris, la confirmation de leur désir de payer le coût de mesures
particulières destinées à des zones géographiques spécifiques. Dans l'idéal, les producteurs devraient
pareillement fixer leur prix d'offre pour des mesures particulières destinées à des zones géographiques
spécifiques. Les offres remises sous enveloppes cachetées seraient triées et mises en correspondance, de
manière économique et efficace visant à l'optimisation, par un comité indépendant organisé sous l'égide
de la commission. Les informations hydrologiques et économiques développées dans le cadre du projet
CREED pourraient servir à décider des priorités, tant en termes hydrologiques qu'en termes de stockage
du carbone, alors qu'il vaudrait mieux laisser les producteurs individuels décider du prix d'offre pour
ces mesures.
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Introduction
The conversion, fragmentation and disturbance of tropical forest ecosystems in developing
countries over the last few decades are well documented. Increasing recognition of the role
that the economic importance of intact forest ecosystems may play in providing incentives for
the conservation of these forests has led economists to study the non-market benefits that are
lost when intact forests are modified or converted. These benefits include locally consumed
non-timber products, biodiversity prospecting, ecotourism, carbon sequestration, soil and
water conservation, and option and existence values. This line of research serves to illustrate
the importance of conservation and, ideally, to flag developments that although possessed of
considerable market potential will adversely affect the non-market goods and services
provided by intact tropical forest ecosystems.
A second and, again, ideally complementary line of research has explored the “incentives” for
and against deforestation, focusing on market, political and institutional forces that drive
deforestation. This research typically also explores the means by which conservation values
can be made explicit in decision-making, through a mix of the creation of new markets,
institutions and enabling policies/legislation. Despite the emphasis on deforestation it is worth
noting that the problem can be viewed from either of two perspectives: that of preventing
forest degradation or that of encouraging watershed protection (through soil conservation,
reforestation or forest regeneration) once ecosystems are disturbed or converted to other uses.
Thus, the type of problem faced will vary depending on whether or not the locale under
scrutiny has reached the post-agricultural frontier stage in its development.
The CREED project “Economic Incentives for Watershed Protection” explores these issues
with respect to soil and water conservation in the Río Chiquito watershed in Costa Rica. The
watershed is located in north central Costa Rica on the Atlantic side of the continental divide.
With an area of 9,000 hectares, Río Chiquito is one of three watersheds that form the upper
Arenal watershed that provides the majority of the water supply to Lake Arenal. The lake
serves as the reservoir for the country’s largest hydroelectric facility and irrigation scheme. Río
Chiquito has seen over 60% of its area converted to pasture, with some 150 producers
currently engaged in ranching, dairy and mixed dairy/ranching activities on the deep volcanic
soils that layer the mountainous slopes of the watershed. Within the Holdridge Life Zones
system the watershed falls within the Premontane to Lower Montane zones and ranges from
Wet Forest to Rain Forest. The watershed extends from 500 m.a.s.l. near the lake to over
1800 m.a.s.l. at its upper reaches. Large areas of cloud forest are found in the latter areas
where strong winds force moisture over the continental divide, particularly during the dry
season.
The adjoining areas in the upper watershed are largely forested and in the hands of
conservation organisations. As far back as the 1970s, during the design phase of the reservoir
and hydropower complex in Arenal, the conservation community began voicing its concern
regarding the national importance of maintaining a hydrological function in Río Chiquito.
Previous analysis suggested an extreme mismatch between land use capability and actual land
use in much of the watershed. Thus, Río Chiquito has long been targeted for action by
conservationists and remains an area of considerable debate and conflict in this regard. Given
that Costa Rica is at a post-agricultural frontier stage in its development, Río Chiquito
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exemplifies the incentives problem faced in the local context and was chosen as a focal point
for the study.
In the case of watershed protection (or soil and water conservation) the development of effective,
workable and cost-effective incentives relies on more than simply an analysis of behaviour or
responses to differing incentives. Economists have argued that soil erosion in and of itself is not
“bad” and that all too often soil conservation measures (as designed) are ignored by farmers
because they are too costly in comparison to expected benefits. Hydrologists have long
acknowledged that deviation from “normal” downstream hydrological function as caused by forest
disturbance and removal is not unequivocally (and significantly) “bad” in biophysical terms. Once
the sign and magnitude of subsequent economic effects are taken into account it is equally clear that
the downstream impacts of changes to hydrological function caused by land use change are not
necessarily negative. In other words, a significant misallocation of resources may occur if
incentives for watershed protection are not grounded in biophysical and economic “valuation” of
the effects of land use change.
Not all such programmes require a detailed research programme. However, given the paucity of
comprehensive studies of this nature, particularly with regard to downstream effects, the validity of
proposed incentives in the Arenal case study hinges on demonstrating the economic value of the
hydrological impacts associated with livestock production. The first half of the CREED study, as
reported in Aylward et al. (1998a), suggests three important results: (1) that livestock production in
Río Chiquito is economically viable; (2) that erosion and associated on-site productivity losses are
neither serious nor widespread; and (3) that the positive external effects of gains in water yield
under pasture outweigh the negative effects of increased sedimentation.
In the second part of the CREED Costa Rica study, a parallel research inquiry investigated the
options for improving institutional arrangements and incentives for watershed management in
Río Chiquito. This paper presents the results of this investigation. Assuming that there
existed important on- or off-site environmental problems (principally hydrological in nature)
initial efforts were aimed at identifying and evaluating incentives for watershed protection
using the environmental-economic relationships developed in the quantitative evaluation.
However, a review of the evaluation reveals that while the quantitative approach would be
useful in identifying more “efficient” land uses in the study area, it would not necessarily
uncover practical solutions to the problem uncovered. More to the point, it would not resolve
the social and institutional aspects of an incentives schemes, aspects shown to be of critical
importance by the literature. The focus of the investigation, as reported here, is therefore
broadened so that the project might be able to identify incentives and institutional
arrangements that would be feasible on the ground. Although the primary objective remained
the internalisation of hydrological externalities, the focus on feasibility also implied the need to
expand the focus beyond a narrow focus on hydrological factors to a consideration of the
larger “bundle” of goods and services provided by watersheds.
The study employs three methodological approaches: (1) an institutional approach; (2) an
environmental-economic approach; and (3) a participatory-stakeholder approach. In reality all
three approaches are integrated with the institutional approach providing the theoretical
umbrella. The institutional approach is based on an application of the Institutional Analysis
and Development (IAD) framework put forward by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues at the
Workshop in Political Theory and Political Analysis of Indiana University, Bloomington. The
framework has its roots in classic political economy, neoclassical microeconomic theory,
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institutional economics, public choice theory, transaction-cost economics and noncooperative
game theory (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994).1 Key concepts from the field of economics
are, thus, embedded in the IAD framework.
However, the advantage of the IAD framework is that it spreads its web much wider.
Considerable emphasis is placed on the issue of transaction costs. These costs are typically
disregarded in standard (quantitative) economic analyses, as exemplified by the evaluation of
market and policy incentives conducted in the other half of the CREED Costa Rica study. The
IAD framework also incorporates non-economic and non-quantitative factors into the analysis.
In particular, the institutional analysis feeds off qualitative information produced by local-level
inquiry such as the participatory-stakeholder approach employed in this study. The latter
therefore serves a dual function of informing the IAD analysis and of initiating an action
process within the local context.
This paper begins with a brief presentation of the conceptual framework and methodologies
employed in the study. It continues with a summary of the problematic that underlies the issue
of land use in Río Chiquito viewed from the perspective of the stakeholders, the
environmental-economic approach to valuation of Aylward et al. (1998a) and an analysis of
existing institutional arrangements and incentives. The discussion of alternatives begins with a
presentation of the Action Programme as originally devised by the stakeholders. It then
undertakes a detailed analysis of the public good nature of watershed goods and services, with
particular reference to Río Chiquito and Arenal. In the ensuing section the IAD Framework
and the information from the environmental-economic approach and the participatory process
are used to assess physical measures for improving watershed management and to identify a
consistent set of institutional arrangements. With the practical measures and institutional
environment defined, the next section presents proposed modifications to the Action
Programme and puts forward proposals for a new incentive scheme involving contractual
arrangements and compensatory resource transfers. In order to provide a preliminary
validation of the proposals developed in the paper, an evaluation of the modified Action
Programme is undertaken employing the criteria set for in the IAD approach.

1

The framework has been applied to a variety of topics, although the framework is probably most commonly
associated with research into common-pool resource problems.
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Methodology
This section provides a brief overview of the Institutional Analysis and Development
Framework that guided the intellectual approach to the work. Readers wishing more detail
should consult Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994). The manner in which the environmentaleconomic valuation work and participatory-stakeholder approach are integrated into the IAD
framework is also briefly discussed.
IAD Framework
The IAD framework relies on an analysis of the “action situation” and the “action arena.” The
action arena is the basic analytical unit in the IAD framework (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker
1994). The action arena incorporates the action situations and the actors as principal
components. The action situation constitutes a special space in which individuals interact,
interchange goods and services, are involved in activities of appropriation and provision, and
encounter conflict and resolve problems. Although at times different action situations are
subtly mixed in the various action arenas, it is useful to separate them in order to facilitate
study. On the other hand, although one action arena alone could include large numbers of
participants and complex chains of action, it is inescapable that social reality is made up of a
multitude of action arenas, linked together in a sequential or simultaneous manner. In order to
analyse a given action situation the IAD approach calls upon three types of knowledge
regarding the action situation: (1) attributes of the physical world, (2) attributes of the
community and (3) applied rules.
A strength of the IAD approach that is exploited in this study is its utility in identifying the
institutional arrangements and incentives suited to the desired objectives of a policy. In this
study the objective is to identify arrangements and incentives for improving watershed
management in the Río Chiquito watershed.
In the first instance, institutional arrangements should reflect and be appropriate to the types
of goods and services that are “produced” by the communities living in, and managing, the Río
Chiquito watershed. The conceptual framework of the IAD presupposes the presence of
patterns of incentives inherent in the attributes of all the goods and services, which influence
the conduct of individuals towards them (Thomson 1992). Consequently, this paper places a
large emphasis on identifying and understanding the attributes of these goods and services,
within the context of the local communities and production systems. As the topic is watershed
management it is also necessary to include downstream stakeholders that are affected by
changes in upstream land management. The IAD approach adopts the theory of public goods
as a means of understanding the attributes of goods and services and analyzing the incentives
inherent to the characteristics of these goods. In particular, the attributes of excludability and
rivalry lead to a classification of goods and services that is very useful in the analysis of
particular situations of action.2

2

Beyond the categories of exclusion and rivalry, the IAD provides for several other attributes of importance in
an institutional analysis, such as whether there is storage in the system, whether resource units are movable or
stationary, predictability, etc.
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As institutions are basically groups of people that interact according to specific norms, it
becomes crucial to identify those norms as well as the incentives or disincentives (economic or
otherwise) through which they take effect and shape the actions of those involved. Ostrom,
Schroeder and Wynne (1993) distinguish between three types of institutional arrangements for
managing goods with public goods characteristics: centralised, decentralised (or dispersed)
and “polycentric”. In principle, the latter seem to be the most promising, in that they are the
result of a pragmatic and flexible mix of commercial and hierarchical incentives, and collective
action. Background and details of these institutional arrangements are presented in Annex 1.
Once institutional arrangements are identified, particular incentives, or pay-offs, that may be
offered to attain policy goals may be developed. In the IAD framework pay-off rules are an
element of the action situation by which benefits and costs are assigned to actions and
outcomes. Although at times a pay-off is considered as an implicit part of an outcome, in
reality it is useful to distinguish between the two. A pay-off differs from an outcome in that
the pay-off is the method for assigning positive and negative weight to outcomes, and hence to
the actions themselves. This is where the concept of incentives arises as it is through the
determination of these costs or benefits (who wins, who loses and by how much) that
institutions shape human behaviour. Ostrom and her colleagues use a broad notion of
incentives in this respect: “incentives are more than just financial rewards and penalties. They
are the positive and negative changes in outcomes that individuals perceive as likely to result
from particular actions taken within a set of rules in a particular physical and social context”
(Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne 1993: 8).
The IAD framework also puts forward a set of criteria for evaluating the varied institutional
arrangements that either exist or could exist for the provision of all goods or services. Four of
these criteria are general in character (economic efficiency, equity, accountability and
adaptability) and two are intermediate (transformation and transaction costs). An additional,
preliminary criterion is the degree of compliance that exists, or could exist in the analysed
arrangements (Blomquist 1992). Blomquist also introduces the criterion of efficacy;
distinguishing between efficiency (in the use of resources) and efficacy (in the achievement of
objectives).
The Río Chiquito Case Study
As stated above, application of the IAD framework relies on developing an understanding of
the attributes of the physical world and of the community that are relevant to the action
situation. Second, the rules that govern the action situation must be known. In the Río
Chiquito case study this understanding is developed using the participatory-stakeholder
approach, the environmental-economic valuation analysis and a number of the standard
methodologies from the IAD toolkit. Each of these is reviewed briefly below.
The participatory-stakeholder approach consisted of a series of consultation and interactions
with the principal institutional actors and stakeholders involved in the management of Río
Chiquito and Lake Arenal. The particulars of the process are described in detail in Annex 2.
The participatory process informs and enhances the application of the IAD framework in three
ways. First of all, the process provided a valuable window into the perspectives of different
stakeholders. Through the process, information was collected (and shared amongst
stakeholders) regarding different stakeholders’ views as to which aspects of existing

CREED Working Paper Series No 21

5

management of the watershed were problematic; that is, which watershed goods and services
were over-produced and which were under-produced. More broadly, the process also yielded
useful information about more generic challenges and opportunities that the communities in
the watershed face in the struggle to achieve social and economic development. The
interaction with stakeholders not only provided important background on biophysical and
community issues, but it assisted greatly in documenting and unraveling the history of
institutional development and of past incentives schemes in Río Chiquito and its environs. A
summary of the knowledge base emerging from the participatory approach is reported in the
next section, and a detailed description and analysis of existing institutional arrangements and
incentives governing watershed management in Río Chiquito and Costa Rica more generally is
presented in Annex 3.
The participatory process also serves the purpose of providing the research effort with a first
approximation of an action programme for improving watershed management in Río Chiquito.
This programme, presented at the end of the next section, serves as a “point of departure” for
the ensuing analysis, which is nothing more than an analytically directed search for a set of
rules that will yield a superior outcome to that achieved at present in the watershed. Clearly,
the latter process could occur (and usually does) in the absence of a plan of action drafted by
stakeholders as part of a participatory process. That said, having in hand a plan that has been
cooperatively developed by the stakeholders themselves is extremely useful to the analyst as it
provides a realistic idea of what solutions the stakeholders view as reasonable and feasible
given existing circumstances. The analyst must then agree or disagree with the overall
structure and objectives of the plan and, ultimately, proceed with filling in the details based on
technical data and analysis.
The third way in which the participatory process adds to the IAD application is very indirect in
nature. To the extent that the researcher is an objective and external observer it will always be
difficult to gather the sorts of “insider” information that can be very useful in designing useful
institutional arrangements and workable incentives schemes. While participatory methods
offer an excellent opportunity to gather this information they also exact a responsibility in
return. Prospective participants will always be keen to know “what is in it for them”. The
participatory process undertaken as part of the of the Río Chiquito case study (as described in
Annex 2) brought together stakeholders in the watershed’s future for a face-to-face meeting
for the first time. Further, the development of the action programme led to the initiation of a
Bridging Committee to take forward the agenda as reflected in the programme. While the
principal benefits of this aspect of the participatory approach are garnered by the stakeholders,
this outcome not only contributes to the realisation of the objective of the CREED project to
make a substantive contribution to policy development, but demonstrates how the application
of the IAD framework may provide tangible benefits to the communities involved.
At the other extreme from the participatory process is the environmental-economic analysis
carried out as part of the first half of the CREED project. Purely technical in nature, this
effort relies on a number of technical studies in the area of soil erosion, forestry, and
hydrology as well as extensive survey work conducted amongst landholders and producers in
Río Chiquito. This information is combined in a phased cost-benefit analysis that underpins a
traditional neoclassical analysis of market and policy incentives. The analysis seeks to answer
a series of questions related to the financial and economic profitability of livestock production
when viewed simply in terms of livestock production, in terms of livestock and
erosion/productivity interrelationships and in terms of downstream hydrological externalities.
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As this analysis is presented in full in the companion CREED paper by Aylward et al (1998a)
the results are summarised only briefly in the next section, in order that subsequent references
may be clearly understood.
The environmental-economic analysis complements the IAD framework in a number of
important ways. First of all, it provides a useful contrast with stakeholder perspectives in
determining the crucial problems that an Action Programme might seek to solve. Second, the
geographic referencing of the scientific and economic information and, indeed, of the costbenefit analysis itself, enables the derivation of a set of landscape-based physical measures that
are consistent with the Action Programme and that would yield economically efficient
outcomes. Here the environmental-economic analysis begins to blend into the IAD framework
as it contributes in many ways to the analysis of incentive compatibility for these measures and
to the evaluation of different institutional arrangements using the IAD criteria.
Thus, the participatory and environmental-economic methodologies greatly inform the next
section which provides background on the challenges and opportunities presented by
watershed management in Río Chiquito. The application of the IAD framework begins in
earnest in the subsequent three sections which analyse institutional arrangements and
incentives for improving watershed management in Río Chiquito before turning to an
evaluation of a revised Action Programme. The first step in the IAD framework is to
understand the attributes of the relevant goods and services. The text begins, then, by
summarising the conclusions of an extended analysis of the public good characteristics of the
full set of watershed goods and services produced in Río Chiquito (as reported in full in Annex
4). The relevance of these goods and services to the different stakeholders is reflected in the
costs and benefits associated with their production. By integrating the information on costs
and benefits with that on the public good nature of watershed goods and services it is possible
to not only define a set of physical measures that will improve watershed management, but to
create an analytical basis for arguing in favour of specific types of institutional arrangements
for the provision and production of these goods and services. This is achieved by an in-depth
analysis of the incentive compatibility of different measures.
With recommendations for a defined set of physical measures and institutional arrangements in
hand the Action Programme can then be revised for consistency in light of these findings.
Attention is then turned to the issue of prospective incentive mechanisms and organisational
arrangements. These mechanisms are discussed in light of the action situation in Río Chiquito
and an appropriate selection, that of contractual arrangements and compensatory resource
transfers, made. Focus then turns to developing a plan for how these contracts and transfers
may be operationalised. Having outlined the practical details of such a scheme it is then
possible to assess the prospects of the Action Programme utilising the criteria developed under
the IAD approach. This is done by subjecting the measures, institutional arrangements and
incentives of the Action Programme to an evaluation vis-à-vis the status quo.
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Background: Stakeholders, the Environment and
Institutional Arrangements
This section presents background material on the action situation as it exists in Río Chiquito
with regard to watershed management. The emphasis is on describing the perceptions of
different stakeholders, summarising technical findings relating to the management of the
watershed and clarifying the institutional challenges and opportunities. The latter effort is
complemented by the detailed review of existing institutional arrangements and incentives for
watershed and environmental management in Río Chiquito, Arenal and Costa Rica (in Annex
3). The section closes by presenting the Action Programme for Río Chiquito as developed at
the final stakeholder workshop. The Programme provides a first look at the options that exist
for improving the management of Río Chiquito. Subsequent sections build on this
introductory section by providing an analytical basis for revising this Programme and
discussing options for its implementation in terms of institutional arrangements and incentives
schemes.
Stakeholder Diagnosis
The stakeholder consultations produced a list of environmental and economic problems
associated with the management of the Río Chiquito watershed (and more widely with the
entire Arenal watershed) as perceived by different stakeholder groups (CINPE 1996). Annex
2 lists the various types of stakeholders in disaggregated form. However, it is possible to place
the majority of these stakeholders in one of four groups with regard to their position and role
insofar as watershed management is concerned:
1.

Conservationists (ACM, ACA, CCT, SENARA and other environmental NGOs) who
feel that livestock production is a marginal economic activity and that the Río Chiquito
watershed needs to be protected and, indeed, reforested, the latter, primarily as a
function of the forest’s role in preventing the sedimentation of Lake Arenal and
downstream effects on hydroelectric production and the Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation
Project.

2.

The Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) which is not convinced that land use has
any impact on hydroelectric power production, fearing only the impact of geologic
factors such as earthquakes and eruption of the Arenal Volcano as natural factors
impinging on operations.

3.

Producers (i.e. landholders involved in livestock production) and the local municipality
who are concerned about on-site impacts of land use (including on-farm erosion and
local water supply from springs) and feel that they should receive some form of
compensation from ICE as it is their land that “provides” the water used to make
electricity.

4.

“Providers,” i.e. a group of cooperatives and government agencies that would be likely
to be involved in the implementation of any watershed management programmes.
Their interests are practical, with their allegiance divided between the conservationists
and the producers.
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A number of points appear to be generally accepted, based on both the positions of the
stakeholders and available scientific information.3 Other points are clearly debatable. Certain
producers claim to be experiencing losses in productivity due to the erosion that results from
establishing pasture on areas that are extremely susceptible to soil loss (and perhaps with
limited soil depth). The scientific evidence suggesting that high rates of erosion can be
expected from particular land use units supports this assertion. An application of the
Universal Soil Loss Equation suggests that about one-quarter of pasture areas have erosion
rates of over 50 tons/ha/yr (Saborío and Aylward 1996). However, survey data and available
statistical analysis suggests that in the deep volcanic soils found in the watershed this problem
is not of such concern that farmers are investing in significant soil-conserving measures.
Producers support this conclusion by reporting that they consider only a portion of their
holdings (20-30%) to be of marginal productive value.
With regard to sedimentation, expectations on the part of ICE and conservationists have been
at opposite ends of the spectrum. However, recent empirical work and modelling efforts
support the view that the truth lies in between these two views. Best estimates are that
pasture in the watershed does generate considerable sedimentation (approximately 90,000
tons/yr). However, the valuation work carried out under the CREED project (as reviewed
below) suggests that the implications of significant levels of sedimentation are not as dire as
previously expected by conservationists.
Reports by producers of problems with water supply from springs and the suggestion that
reforestation has ameliorated these problems require further investigation, given that the
science on this matter is ambiguous. The possibility exists that long-term rainfall trends may
be as important as land use in this case. The intricate relationship between land use and water
supply to Lake Arenal identified by the CREED project went essentially unreported by locals
and ICE. Interestingly, however, part of the friction that exists between local producers and
ICE stems from the perception on the part of local residents that ICE has historically failed to
assist in the socio-economic development of the upper watershed, thereby failing to
acknowledge the role of local producers in water supply.4
In addition, the general feeling of the stakeholders was that there was little or weak
coordination of existing institutional actions and incentives aimed at correcting the problems.
Two specific difficulties were noted in this regard by participants. Larger farmers typically do
not live in the area and therefore do not participate in local organisations and events. Second,
poor communication exists within the watershed due to the absence of any telephone (or
postal) service. The only medium of “mass” communication available in the watershed is the
tarro fax. Messages can be delivered daily amongst farmers selling milk to Monteverde by
attaching “faxes” to the milk jugs that are transported to and from the Monteverde Cheese
Factory. Ranchers, however, must physically attend meetings, meet-up individually or send
messages by messenger in order to communicate with other producers. Thus, communication

3

See Aylward et al. (1998b) for a full history and review of the development of scientific and economic
information on the management of Río Chiquito.

4

That said, it remains unclear precisely what claim producers are making here. The issue of incentive
compatibility in this regard, however, is examined in detail later in this paper

CREED Working Paper Series No 21

9

and integration between the different types and sizes of producer is a problem for institutional
development and coordination in the local community.
The relatively low level of socio-economic development and poor provision of public services
to the Río Chiquito area was cited as an important socio-economic factor, one that also
detracts from community organisation. Cooperatives, health services, government services,
banking services, telecommunications, etc are all located, at best, on the fringes of the
watershed, if not at regional centres that are even further away. Using such services is
therefore, time-consuming, inefficient and always takes the producer away from the watershed
instead of towards it. Local residents and producers lay much of the blame with ICE, and
locals have, thus, acquired a reputation for being distrustful of outsiders (particularly
government employees) and uncooperative with outside and agencies agendas. Recent
developments, particularly the programme of land purchase by the Monteverde Conservation
League in the neighboring Caño Negro watershed and general finger-pointing by
environmentalists (local and international) at ranchers as the cause of the deforestation
problem, have beleaguered local producers even further. This new source of conflict affects
the larger farmers perhaps more than the smaller farmers, given that they are more involved in
national-level debate and more cognisant of changing international trends that affect beef
exports.
In sum the diagnosis reveals that there are two limiting factors to working towards improved
watershed management in Río Chiquito. First there is the lack of a clear stakeholder
consensus on the nature and degree of environmental problems that is bolstered by the
available scientific information. Second, the level (and history) of socio-economic and
institutional development places serious obstacles in the way of the development of
cooperative, stakeholder-based solutions to these problems.
Environmental-Economic Analysis of the Value of Watershed Goods and Services
Conventional wisdom amongst environmentalists holds that the cutting of tropical forest for
livestock production leads to large and sustained increases in erosion and sediment flows,
increasing flood risk, a decrease in dry season flows and even a drop in precipitation. It is also
believed that livestock production is itself an activity that provides little benefit to the
economy, particularly as erosion eats away at productive yields over time. In the first half of
the CREED project, Aylward et al. (1998) conduct a comprehensive analysis of these issues in
the case of Río Chiquito. The results stand conventional wisdom on its head, suggesting that
ranching, dairy farming and their associated downstream hydrological effects on hydropower
production represent important values to the Costa Rican economy.
The study finds that the economic returns to livestock production are considerable in the case
of large producers, with dairy operations producing the largest returns, followed by mixed
dairy/ranching and ranching operations. Smaller mixed dairy/ranching and dairy producers
generate less significant, but still positive, returns. Only small ranching operations appear to
operate at a net economic loss, though still providing a positive cash flow to the rancher given
the extensive use of family labour. Analysis suggests that the incentive to engage in livestock
production would increase with trade liberalisation as input distortions are removed. Removal
of trade barriers on milk product imports would reduce the profitability of dairy operations,
however, the larger operations would remain viable businesses. The analysis also argues that
there is little economic rationale for claiming that Costa Rican milk producers are “inefficient”
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given large subsidies received by OECD milk producers. Finally, even a moderate increase in
beef prices from the depressed levels encountered during the study would greatly increase the
profitability of beef production.
Alternatives to livestock production in Río Chiquito are limited. An analysis of the
profitability of forestry options, including natural regeneration, forest management and
plantation forestry, suggests that the area has marginal potential in this regard. Meanwhile,
problems of access to markets and biophysical conditions in the area have typically limited the
attractiveness of agricultural options in the watershed. Ecotourism (or agroecotourism) has
potential, but the Monteverde/Santa Elena area that adjoins the watershed to the south already
provides a range of fairly sophisticated ecotourism experiences.
Due to the deep, volcanic character of the soils in Río Chiquito the CREED project (unlike
previous efforts) did not expect to find a significant relationship between soil erosion and
pasture productivity. Anecdotal reports of problems with soil fertility, however, led to both
qualitative and quantitative efforts to establish the existence of an excessive pattern of
intertemporal soil loss. Neither analysis offered evidence in favour of the hypothesis that soil
erosion and subsequent losses in productivity are severe and widespread in the watershed. It is
likely that some landholders are experiencing problems, but in the majority of cases the actual
level of erosion is probably less than that previously reported and of little economic
consequence given the volcanic nature of the soils.
With regard to hydrological externalities, the study clarifies that in the case of a large
hydroelectric reservoir such as Lake Arenal, sedimentation and annual water yield are likely to
be the most critical hydrological functions, with the seasonal distribution in water yield playing
a minor role as well. The removal of forest in favour of pasture will increase sedimentation
and water yield, although the direction of the effects on dry season baseflow will be sitespecific. In cloud forest areas, the situation typically runs more in favour of forest cover,
which serves to precipitate moisture from the clouds (fog drip). Changes in peakflows during
storm events are of little consequence in the case of large reservoirs. Outside the Congolese
and Amazonian basins little evidence exists to suggest that land use change alters precipitation.
However, it is a remote possibility that land use change in the lower Río Chiquito watershed
has raised the level of cloud cover in the upper watershed. This could reduce the amount of
fog drip captured by the cloud forest.
Economic valuation of the hydrological externalities associated with pasture in Río Chiquito
suggests that the water yield effect will lead to increased hydroelectric power production of an
order of magnitude higher than the decrease in power production expected as a result of
changes in sedimentation. The results are not very sensitive to a potential change in the
seasonal distribution of water inflows to the reservoir. In the lower watershed, the expected
gain in water yield is large and varies only slightly with location. Howevr, the estimates rely on
the expected difference in evapotranspiration between pasture and forest across the three
ecological life zones found in Río Chiquito.
In the cloud forest, experimental results from Río Chiquito suggest that the added capture of
fog drip may put mature forest at a par with pasture in terms of water yield, i.e. that the they
may have similar rates of evapotranspiration in cloud forest environments. However, the
results also show that substantially higher amounts of fog drip are captured in cloud forest
fragments, thus, supporting the belief that by maintaining a patchy mosaic of forest and
pasture much higher water yields may be achieved than in a landscape dominated by either
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forest or pasture. Further, the bulk of this fog drip capture occurs during the dry season when
water is more valuable for hydroelectric production. Expected gains in water yield in the
cloud forests of Río Chiquito will, thus, vary considerably depending on the patchiness of the
landscape. Interestingly, in the upper watershed where small dairy producers are most
numerous the landscape is exceedingly patchy and, thus, pasture in this area can be expected
to produce the largest positive hydrological externalities.
In other words, the research suggests that it would be imprudent to pursue large-scale
watershed protection schemes in Río Chiquito. At the same time, the results suggest that
altering land use or management practices on particular landholdings may generate economic
gains if the relationships between vegetative cover and sedimentation and water yield are
properly understood and combined with knowledge of the economic productivity of different
types of livestock production. The physical measures for improving off-site externalities
presented later in this paper, therefore, represent a practical extension of the valuation work in
Aylward et al. (1998a).
Existing Institutional Arrangements and Incentives
The institutional arrangements that exist for improving watershed management in Río Chiquito
suggest that there is an important institutional transition occurring at the local level; a
transition that follows the larger transition to polycentrism observed in Costa Rica. Production
of environmental services in Río Chiquito appears increasingly to be of mixed character,
following the definition of Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne (1993). Part of the production is
directly in private hands, while another part is developed through, or with the support of,
public agencies. The more detailed review of existing institutional arrangements and incentives
that appears in Annex 2 is summarised in this sub-section and conclusions are drawn on the
challenges and opportunities that exist.
A range of actors is involved in pushing the agenda for watershed management in Río
Chiquito, including various levels of government, cooperatives and other producer
organisations, private firms, NGOs and private individuals. In a sense these actors can be seen
to have been extending their “territory” towards Río Chiquito, starting from the three defined
areas of influence: (1) the Santa Elena-Monteverde area (ACM and the Monteverde Cheese
Factory), (2) the Tempisque area (COOPELDOS, COOPETILA, AGUADEFOR, ACT) and
(3) Tilarán (MAG-FAO, Ranchers Association). The respective cultures of these regions
clearly influences the packages that are being brought to Río Chiquito: a serious conservation
interest from Monteverde; a coffee and smallholder forestry production perspective from
Tempisque (on the Pacific side of the continental divide); and an emphasis on sustainable
production and soil conservation from the ranching town of Tilarán.
Although many initiatives exist in surrounding areas, ongoing efforts at watershed protection,
reforestation and soil conservation within the boundaries of the watershed are few. These are
limited to the recent participation of a number of landholders in the government’s Forest
Conservation Certificate (CPB) incentive programme, ICE’s reforestation scheme, the
Monteverde Conservation League’s (ACM) “Forests on Farms” programme and initiatives
undertaken spontaneously by producers. Efforts designed to improve conservation through
the intensification of production is limited to the technical assistance offered to dairy
producers selling to the Cheese Factory and that sub-contracted by ICE for participants in its
scheme. Note here that there may be substantial overlap between the latter two efforts as both
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have their largest concentration in the upper watershed area adjacent to Santa Elena. In
general, ongoing initiatives can be characterised as representing two types of institutional
arrangement: centralised provision with decentralised production, and polycentric
arrangements of provision and production.
In the case of the ICE programme, an arm of the central government is providing for the
activities but much of the actual work is contracted to local institutions (COOPELDOS for
seedlings and Dos Pinos for technical assistance on livestock production) or carried out by
individual landholders. Production is, thus, decentralised although provision is centralised. In
the case of the CPB incentive programme again the provision is arranged centrally but the
actual production is carried out via a number of local cooperatives (AGUADEFOR,
COOPETILA and COOPELDOS) and the landholders themselves.
The recent initiatives begun under the Watershed Management and Recuperation Programme
of ICE may at last reflect a change in ICE’s attitude towards the area. However, there can be
no doubt that the population would prefer infrastructure and services to seedlings. Indeed,
one interviewee cites the concern of locals upon being contacted by the reforestation effort. It
transpires that they feared that having flooded the best lands in the area in creating the
enlarged Lake Arenal, ICE was now embarking on an agenda to reforest and expropriate the
upper watershed. This reaction speaks to the considerable difficulties created in working
towards improved watershed management when the institution involved has historically used
its dominant, centrally-derived power to command and control natural resources in the area,
with little to no corresponding pay-off for the community.
At the same time the ACM and Cheese Factory initiatives (as well as unassisted efforts by
landholders) are characterised by their non-centralised nature. Private groups (an NGO and a
firm, respectively) have involved themselves in offering assistance in watershed management.
Although it has not succeeded to date, the proposal to develop a research and demonstration
project on “sustainable ranching” on the part of the Tilarán Ranchers Association would fit
into this category as well. The Cheese Factory initiative would be the most purely private
initiative of the three, given that the other two initiatives involve relationships with either
government agencies (the Ranchers Association would team up with the Ministry of
Agriculture and Livestock) or a large international constituency of environmental NGOs that
are themselves managing government funds (ACM). Finally, there are the producers that have
engaged in conservation activities (either explicitly or implicitly by leaving their land in forest)
purely on their own motivation.
The Project for the Conservation and Development of Arenal (PCDA) working as part of the
conservation effort in the Arenal Conservation Area (ACA) has also served as an important
stimulus for decentralisation and uptake of polycentric arrangements in the Arenal area. In
particular, plans to develop a centre for experimentation in sustainable development on the
part of PCDA and other local actors may prove to be an important initiative. The centre will
investigate, systematise, disseminate information regarding and encourage local and regional
experiences of sustainable development.
Recent state efforts by other agencies of central government to change current land use
practices are well intended, but flawed by their centralist and technocratic bias. According to
local producers, this is the case with the Ministry of Environment and Energy’s (MINAE)
presence in the form of ACA, where policies were initiated with a strong top-down
environmental approach even when specifically providing for consultation with local
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institutions and organisations, and allowing for developmental concerns; this, despite the
apparent success of ACA’s institutional partner PCDA in achieving a more participatory and
polycentric outlook. The soil conservation projects undertaken jointly by the Ministry of
Agriculture and Livestock and the FAO, and by the Institute for Agrarian Development and
the FAO are also considered to be very much top-down in nature.
Further evidence of the staying power of centralisation in the local context is the prohibition
on land use change in forest areas under the new Forestry Law. The imposition of such a legal
mandate represents very much of a traditional command and control (from the centre)
approach to land use management. Further, the CCB incentive programme that provides for
payments for environmental services to landholders who place their forests under conservation
management and for reforestation incentives is not very encouraging. Although the
implementation of these incentives is decentralised, the centralised nature of their provision
remains a serious flaw. It is doubtful that an incentive programme that prescribes a single
reforestation incentive or payment for environmental services across a country with as varied
an ecological and economic landscape as Costa Rica will promote efficient resource use.
Thus, the vestiges of centralisation remain, even as “experiments” are conducted with more
flexible polycentric approaches. These experiments in the provision and production of
environmental goods and services are nonetheless an important emerging trend towards
differentiated marketing. It is also worth noting that these experiments may be considered to
be part and parcel of the transaction costs involved in moving towards better institutional
arrangements and more efficient use and production of natural resources and environmental
services in the area. This suggests that future transaction costs involved in implementing new
incentives schemes will be lower as progress is made up the institutional learning curve. The
next sub-section considers this point in greater detail.
Of fundamental importance is the increasing level of inter-institutional coordination between
actors that is demonstrated in existing initiatives. This suggests the possibility of a polycentric
arrangement for management of the watershed, and in general, for the management of the
existing natural resource base where, as suggested by Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne (1993),
there is a special jurisdiction emerging for the provision of these goods and services. Also of
importance in this respect is the emergence of user groups that complete the differentiation of
the market on the side of the demand for environmental services.
A number of recent experiences serve to document this tendency towards inter-institutional
coordination. First, a number of inter-institutional committees (such as the Regional
Environmental Commission) have been formed as part of the development of the Arenal
Conservation Area. Second, the Ranchers Association’s effort to develop a project on
“sustainable ranching” involved significant inter-institutional linkages. Third, an interinstitutional commission was created in Tilarán at the beginning of 1996. This commission
brings together in an informal fashion representatives of a mix of public agencies and private
organisations interested in developing new initiatives for the development of the Lake Arenal
watershed. Initial efforts of the Commission are directed at a diagnostic exercise and the
design of potential options for taking advantage of opportunities identified by this process.
Finally, the participatory process undertaken as part of the CREED project led to the creation
of the Bridging Commission for Río Chiquito. The commission was formed in response to the
interest expressed by the various stakeholders present at the final workshop of the project.
The commission includes representatives of a variety of public and private organisations
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working on watershed issues in Río Chiquito, and is charged with developing plans for
institutional development within the watershed. In addition, the Commission aims to develop
(fundable) watershed management projects that address the concerns of stakeholders, as
represented by the Action Programme for Río Chiquito, which is summarised at the end of this
section.
Historical Roots of the Problem: Transaction Costs and Externalities
The preceding discussion suggests that a number of polycentric arrangements already in
operation in Río Chiquito have the aim of conserving existing forest and planting additional
forest. These arrangements reflect a number of perceived values of forest goods and services,
particularly reduction of sediment delivery and carbon storage. In this sub-section the
upstream and downstream transaction costs involved in initiating collective action (and
deriving a polycentric institutional arrangement) between ICE and producers in Río Chiquito
with respect to watershed hydrological services are examined. This discussion takes a
historical perspective to examining the reasons why it has taken ICE so long to involve itself in
watershed management in Río Chiquito and, in the process, clarifies the opportunities now
available in this regard. In a sense, this takes the quantitative analysis of Aylward et al.
(1998a) one step further by explicitly considering how transaction costs have altered, and are
altering, the perceived net benefits of investing in watershed management.
Historically, ICE has taken little or no action regarding land use in the Arenal watershed. It is
also clear that ICE is the principal user of the hydrological services provided by the watershed.
The question therefore is: why has ICE done nothing? In terms of the Coase Theorem it
would be expected that were true Pareto efficiency gains available, ICE already would either
have reached a mutually beneficial agreement with Río Chiquito landholders to produce more
of the desired hydrological services (or less of the undesirable ones) or have simply purchased
all the land and turned it to the preferred land use. The latter, after all ,was almost identical to
the proposal made by CCT in 1980 for the upper Arenal watershed upon studying the problem
(CCT 1980).
There are two possible reasons why such actions might not have been perceived as
worthwhile: (1) the transaction costs associated with either course of action were too high, or
(2) the benefits of such action were not viewed as worth the effort. Two elements of
transaction costs might be of particular importance in this case: the characteristics of the
parties to the transaction, and the availability of technical options and implementing capacity
to undertake reforestation and regeneration. The first factor affects the prospects for initiating
collective action and the second factor affects the possibility of implementing collective action.
With regard to the perception of benefits, the role of information regarding the impacts of land
use on hydroelectric production appears to be central to the perceptions of different
stakeholders.
Transaction costs reflect the difficulty of fostering and implementing collective action between
relevant actors (or groups of actors) in order to produce goods or services with public good
characteristics (or to curtail the production of public bads). The characteristics of these
groups that are expected to influence the magnitude of the transaction costs are the size, the
geographic location and the degree of diversity of the group. In the case under analysis there
are two grouping levels worth considering. First, there is the distinction between ICE and the
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producers and, second, it is important to consider the characteristics of different groups of
producers and the nature of ICE as an institution.
The historical antipathy between ICE and the producers who inhabit the area or live in local
towns is well documented. The culture of top-down, centralised planning in the historical
development of the Arenal area has no doubt engendered anger and resentment in the
producers. Such a planning process has typically placed ICE and its personnel in the position
of telling producers what will happen, rather than consulting with them regarding alternatives.
For the largest producers in the area, who have the societal status that comes with being large,
successful ranchers, one-to-one communication with ICE representatives is possible.
However, for the smaller producers the socio-economic and cultural differences involved have
no doubt impeded any attempt to communicate in either direction. It is difficult to conceive of
representatives of ICE, an institution staffed by engineers and bureaucrats and based largely in
San José, travelling to Río Chiquito to discuss a contractual arrangement with producers who
are on a much lower educational and socioeconomic level.
As far as the group of producers is concerned, the difficulty of reaching a cooperative
agreement to resolve externalities associated with livestock production (whether positive or
negative) can be expected to be high. Although reduced in recent years, there are a large
number of individual producers in the watershed. The 1995 census conducted for the CREED
Costa Rica project suggests 165 holdings, whereas in 1987, over 300 holdings were found
(Aylward et al. 1998b; Matamoros 1988). The geographic location and surroundings of the
watershed in which the producers operate and the degree of diversity between producers are
also important obstacles to collective action. The poor state of road infrastructure and
telecommunications clearly impede communication between producers. There are large
commercial landholders and small subsistence holders who have little in common. In
particular, the tendency for larger producers to live well outside the watershed further impedes
the ability of the group to reach any common understanding. The diversity of production
methods employed in the watershed leads to further segregation amongst the producers. Only
in the case of the relatively tight-knit group of dairy producers who sell to Monteverde and
communicate by means of the tarro fax can it be said that these smaller groups might lower
transaction costs.
As suggested, the high transaction costs of developing an agreement between ICE and the
producers have probably been sufficiently large as to dissuade ICE from getting involved in
any form of contractual arrangement between parties. In addition, in the late 1970s and early
1980s there was little in the way of established organisational capacity in the area to carry out
soil conservation or reforestation projects, and no experience with incentive programmes to
stimulate such efforts. In other words, there was little knowledge of how to ameliorate
negative hydrological effects while enabling livestock production to continue (i.e. without
wholesale evacuation of the area).
It is also probable that the cost of expropriating the land and turning Río Chiquito and, indeed,
the entire upper watershed into a protected area was quite high. The donors for the Arenal
dam project did not feel that this was a high priority at the time. There was probably very
little institutional energy and enthusiasm on the part of ICE for further expropriation of land
(following that required to build the dam). Nor could it be expected that such an effort would
go without resistance on the part of producers who had lost their lands to ICE once before.
Undertaking such a step would also have involved considerable costs in inter-institutional
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coordination. ICE’s mandate does not include establishing or managing protected areas.
Cooperation between ICE and the National Park Service would have been necessary in this
respect, although both fall (and fell) under the power of the Ministry of Environment and
Energy (and its previous incarnations). Thus, even if the benefits of acting unilaterally were
considered significant, the substantial transaction costs may have impeded action.
In sum, high transaction costs were probably sufficient in the past to bar the spontaneous
emergence of any market-driven institutional arrangements to internalise hydrological
externalities in Arenal or Río Chiquito. However, it is also a possibility that ICE viewed the
benefits of acting as marginal and, thus, was loath to get involved in Río Chiquito.
Historically the debate has raged over the importance of the increased sediment generated by
pasture. The perceived importance of this problem varies dramatically depending on the
figures employed. ICE’s internal data suggested sedimentation rates of minimal magnitude
while the CCT claimed rates ten times these levels in its 1980 study.5 If ICE was basing its
decision on its own data the lack of action would probably have been justified by the
(imperfect) information it had developed.
It is, however, interesting to note the historical lack of debate over the relationship between
land use and water yield, given the overwhelming importance of the potential gains in
hydroelectric production due to water yield gains coming from pasture areas, as illustrated by
Aylward et al. (1998a). This can be explained in one of two ways. It may be that ICE was
simply unaware of these potentially positive externalities of livestock production. The model
used by ICE to predict inflows into the lake is an extremely accurate model, but it does not
explicitly incorporate land use as a variable and represents a practical data mining approach to
forecasting and is, thus, of little use in developing an understanding of causal relationships.
Alternatively, ICE may have known or suspected that this relationship existed but acted
strategically in not discussing it in public.6 This presumes that ICE’s strategy was to be
content with the level of deforestation already in existence in Río Chiquito (and the entire
Arenal watershed) by the late 1970s and to settle for resisting any efforts to alter land use
patterns in favour of forest.
Finally, it is also worth questioning the extent to which a parastatal bureaucracy and its staff
are actually concerned with longer-term issues of economic efficiency, particularly where they
concern raising the operating efficiency of existing installation versus simply making new
additions to the capital stock. The ability to squeeze more generation out of ARCOSA in the
face of rising demand is clearly a long-term issue. Changes in water yield may also have a
short-term impact, but both sedimentation and water yield changes have implications over a
much longer time frame. However, if these changes are viewed as small and distant in terms
of their potential impact, and if institutional incentives do not reward attention to such details
it might be difficult to table the issue of land use. In this case the centralised nature of the
provision and production of electricity may count against ensuring efficiency at the watershed
or project level.

5

See Annex 5 of Aylward et al. (1998b) for a review of studies of erosion and sedimentation in Lake Arenal.

6

ICE personnel were no doubt aware of the joking claim that the most efficient land use for a hydroelectric
watershed (with storage) is pavement (i.e. no sediment and no evapotranspiration).
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Future Opportunities: Intertemporal Analysis of Transaction Costs
Attempts to explain the historical rationale behind ICE’s refusal to involve itself in the land use
debate in Arenal or Río Chiquito remain speculative as the real reasons will never be known.
In light of recent ICE efforts to initiate reforestation projects in Río Chiquito it is perhaps
more meaningful to assess how developments over the last two decades may be altering the
situation. Interestingly, ICE’s current rationale for this intervention appears to be mistaken,
based as it is upon the notion that reforestation would produce large benefits in terms of both
carbon and sediment reduction. Nevertheless, the precedent is important and it raises the
question of whether it is simply a matter of a re-evaluation of the benefits that has engendered
action or is it also possible that the transaction costs have also been lowered in recent years?
The changes in factors that influence the transaction costs for ICE and for producers in the
area are briefly discussed below.
As noted above the livestock producers in Río Chiquito continue to be a large and
heterogeneous group. The only change in the last decade has been a concentration of land
holdings, reducing the number of producers in the watershed. While this trend may have
improved conditions for collective action on the part of producers, serious obstacles remain in
effecting action of this nature. In particular, the change in land tenancy has led to the control
of an increasing share of the watershed by larger landowners that reside outside the watershed.
Not surprisingly, this trend means that there has been little impetus for a change in the poor
level of infrastructure in the area, which in turn continues to impede communication and
organisation amongst those producers resident in the area or its surrounding communities.
In recent years, the continuing poor performance of beef prices has undoubtedly reduced the
attractiveness of ranching to the point where conservation or reforestation opportunities that
involve the possibility of cash compensation are increasingly attractive. Nevertheless, it
remains clear that for ranchers the transaction costs of organising to exploit such opportunities
are very high, limiting action on this front.
In the case of ICE a number of factors mentioned above have changed in the last decade. In
particular institutional development within public agencies (ACA, SINAC, MINAE), private
organisations (COOPELDOS and COOPETILA) and NGOs (ACM and CCT) during this
period have greatly improved local capacity in protected area management and reforestation.
All of these organisations are currently working in areas that surround the Río Chiquito
watershed and some have already entered the watershed. In addition, the development of
ACA has also led to a an increasingly decentralised planning process capable of coordinating
inter-institutional initiatives that include both state and private organisations.
Thus, as opposed to just a few years ago, it is now possible to use the infrastructure, technical
knowledge, human resources and institutional capability of these organisations to initiate
conservation or reforestation programmes in Río Chiquito. In other words, the transaction
costs of producing watershed services through these programmes have declined considerably.
In essence, new initiatives may free-ride on the efforts and investments made in nearby areas,
investments principally undertaken by NGOs and cooperatives (albeit in some cases with
government funds). For example, the new programme developed by ICE is directed by a
former employee of ACM and employs a number of ideas and methods developed under the
ACM reforestation programmes. In this case, ICE did not have to pay the up-front costs of
developing the personal capability of this professional nor did it have to pay for the technical
knowledge of forestry in the area (use of native species, etc). Perhaps even more important is
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that by “piggy-backing” upon the ACM experience, ICE obtained access to personnel with
technical expertise in forestry and also practical experience in establishing a constructive
dialogue with producers from the area.
Assuming a unilateral change in intent by ICE to provide for increased watershed services in
Río Chiquito, then the transaction costs of implementation have been greatly reduced in recent
years. Such a change in intention does appear to be occurring. The increasing consciousness
at the national level regarding the importance of the environmental services provided by
forests has no doubt filtered down into ICE operations. The creation of the new watershed
unit at ICE reflects this changed attitude. To date, this consciousness remains centralised and
top-down in origin and approach (the intent filtering down the executive chain of command
from the President, to the Minister in charge of MINAE, and from there to ICE, which is
under MINAE’s direction).
Two difficulties with this unilateral change and two opportunities may be mentioned in closing
this sub-section. First, such a technocratic approach from the executive branch is susceptible
to changes in administration. For the change to have a lasting effect it must take root within
the institutional structure of ICE as well as with the producers themselves. As long as the
process is unilateral, a change of heart at ICE or in MINAE could end the entire process. In
other words, until the provision of watershed services is decentralised, or, better still, becomes
polycentric in nature, the entire process is held hostage to the whim of centralised authority.
Thus, the issue of transaction costs and producer organisation in the watershed remains crucial
to success in the long run, even though the short-term outlook is positive based on a
centralised impetus for provision and reduced transaction costs of producing.
A second difficulty, as indicated in this report, relates to the need to reach a scientifically
defensible consensus on what constitutes an optimal land use pattern for the watershed. Until
the objective is clear and agreed upon, institutional arrangements, organisational developments
and incentives will be open to criticism and may lead to less efficient instead of more efficient
allocation and use of resources in the watershed.
In this regard, it is hoped that the companion paper by Aylward et al. (1998a) provides an
opportunity to settle the debate over the importance of sedimentation and to turn attention
towards the issue of water yield and water regulation. A further opportunity exists in the
current atmosphere of uncertainty regarding the future of ICE and the private/public balance
of future power generation in Costa Rica. Traditionally, ICE has taken a supply side approach
to meeting electricity demand. Once a project is built it is essentially forgotten as additional
increments in demand are forecasted and additional supply projects are planned to meet this
increase in demand. The option of improving management of existing facilities does not enter
into system expansion planning; such facilities are essentially exogenous to the modelling
exercise (ICE 1996).
However, current interest in demand management amongst the technocratic elite of the
country, increasing pressures on sources of large project finance and the potential for
increasing competition from private generation sources may be interpreted as providing an
opportunity for a reassessment of the traditional approach taken by ICE. Under such a reevaluation perhaps ICE (in conjunction with local landowners, NGOs and other public
agencies) might take a closer look at the related issue of how to increase production from
existing hydroelectric facilities through a cooperative approach to coordinating land use
activities in the watersheds that feed these facilities.
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Action Programme for Improved Watershed Management in Río Chiquito
The Action Programme reflects the stakeholder diagnosis of environmental and institutional
problems and the agreement reached by stakeholders at the final workshop in June 1996. The
six principal working objectives of the Action Programme are detailed below.
Forest conservation and regeneration. This proposal consists of efforts to conserve existing
primary forest and to continue the process of natural regeneration where already established in
Río Chiquito. This would be achieved within the guidelines and incentive mechanisms of the
new forestry law. The intention of this objective would be to assist landholders to avail
themselves of the CCB programme. Landholders not interested in participating in this
programme would have the alternative of obtaining approval from the authorities for a
management plan designed to ensure a sustainable harvesting cycle.
Land use change in marginal pasture areas. A change in use of pasture to forest is proposed
for areas within holdings that are of only marginal productivity. Natural regeneration of forest
and the formation of biological corridors through reforestation would be the principal
activities.
Improving livestock technology. The Programme proposes to support land use change on
marginal areas by promoting technological improvement of production processes on remaining
productive areas to intensify production on these areas and raise their profitability.
Community development. A wide range of measures is proposed to improve the level of
social and economic development of the watershed. These measures include the construction
of infrastructure (roads, schools and health centres) and provision of social services
(electricity, telecommunications, education, etc.). It is also proposed that a new district
(including the main towns in the Río Chiquito watershed) be formed that would respond to the
needs of the watershed.
Development of local ecotourist projects. It is proposed to take advantage of improved
management of the watershed by internationally marketing an ecotourist experience that is
centred on the concept of a mixed forest/pasture landscape and sustainable ranching and dairy
production. This follows on from efforts by ACA to attract international ecotourists to a
series of rustic ecotourist lodges that have received subsidised credit from PCDA.
Inter-institutional coordination. Under this proposal an inter-institutional mechanism for Río
Chiquito would be created, in which all interested sectors would participate, that would
administer the resources and incentives (both new and existing) which would support the
Action Programme.
These ideas have since been taken forward by the Bridging Committee formed at the
workshop. Within the framework of the six proposals presented under the Action Programme
the Bridging Committee plans two principal strategic elements for action in the medium term
(2 to 3 years): (1) an initial nucleus of demonstration projects, and (2) the extension of the
programme to other potential users. The Bridging Committee also formulated six activities
for completion in the short term: (1) completion of an inventory of producers; (2) establish a
zoning of the watershed; (3) extension of the CCB incentives to interested landholders as per
the zoning; (4) establishment of a demonstration project for improved pasture management
combined with reforestation; (5) extension of existing environmental education projects of
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ACA and ICE to Río Chiquito; and (6) design of a joint implementation project for carbon
The Action Programme as originally envisioned and subsequently developed under the
Bridging Committee is a laudable attempt to confront the issue of watershed management in
Río Chiquito. However, two findings embodied in the companion paper by Aylward et al.
(1998a) imply the need to return to the underlying justification for the proposals under the
Programme in order to reassess the exact nature and dimensions of the plan. The first finding
regards the determination that the relative economic importance of the increase in water yield
associated with livestock production significantly exceeds that of the rise in sediment delivery.
The second, and admittedly preliminary, finding suggests that outside of carbon storage values
there is little reason to suspect the existence of other significant negative externalities
associated with livestock production. Further, the positive hydrological externalities of
increases in water yield appear to be significantly larger than the negative externalities
associated with carbon storage, even given a fairly generous value for stored carbon. Finally,
the implication of positive hydrological externalities is the combustion of additional fossil
fuels. Thus, the existence of any claim on a “carbon credit” for reforestation activities in the
watershed is weak at best.
These two findings are somewhat surprising considering previous diagnoses of watershed
issues in Río Chiquito, and are potentially at odds with the prevailing understanding among
stakeholders who were involved in the consultative process that produced the Action
Programme0. These findings, therefore, raise questions about what type of reforestation or
natural regeneration (and how much) is actually “good” in terms of managing the watershed
for the provision and production of the range of watershed goods and services described
earlier in this paper. The commitment of public funds to the watershed or, more broadly, the
undertaking of collective action by society relies on the justification that only by doing so will
a “bundle” of watershed goods and services be produced that optimises the provision of goods
with both private and public good characteristics. It is, therefore, useful to return to an
analysis of these goods and services, their public/private nature and their relative importance in
Río Chiquito in order to validate the objectives and proposals set forward under the Action
Programme. At the same time it is possible to propose and assess the incentives and
institutional arrangements that might be useful in improving watershed management in the
area. These tasks are undertaken in the remainder of the paper.

CREED Working Paper Series No 21

21

Institutional Arrangements for Watershed Management
In this section an analytical basis is developed (and applied) for recommending institutional
arrangements appropriate to the provision of physical measures for improving watershed
management in Río Chiquito. Fundamental to this analytical process is the integration of the
quantitative information on the value of watershed goods and services in Río Chiquito, with a
qualitative assessment of the public good characteristics of watershed goods and services.
Analysis of who gains and who loses from the production of these goods and services leads to
an understanding of the compatibility of existing rules and incentives with the larger objectives
of economic efficiency. This in turn generates a set of fundamental observations regarding the
justification for improved institutional arrangements, the likely objectives of such arrangements
(practical measures for improving watershed management) and the form that such
arrangements might take.
This is an applied yet theoretical exercise, given that a set of institutional arrangements already
exists for the provision of watershed goods and services in Río Chiquito (although they are not
necessarily an efficient set). In cases where institutional arrangements already exist they can
be compared to “ideal” arrangements to assess the efficiency of the current arrangements and
suggest future opportunities for improving these arrangements. In cases where arrangements
do not currently exist, the analysis suggests appropriate arrangements. At the end of the subsection the “derived” measures for improving watershed management can then be compared
with those envisioned under the Action Programme to suggest modifications to the
Programme or changes in emphasis.
The Public Good Nature of Watershed Goods and Services
“Watershed management” in its largest sense encompasses a vast range of environmental and
productive goods and services. Typically, productive goods are private in nature and
environmental goods have public good characteristics. Annex 4 presents an analysis of the
degree of excludability and rivalry of watershed goods and services produced in Río Chiquito.
As with the rest of the study, the focus is on hydrological impacts, particularly externalities,
with a secondary focus on other externalities and values consistent with watershed protection.
In Figure 1, an effort is made to summarise the classification of these watershed goods and
services according to their public good characteristics for the case of Río Chiquito. As far as
is possible, doubts regarding the classification are noted with a thin arrow, and a thick arrow
denotes future possibilities for movement from one category to the other.
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Figure 1. Exclusion and Rivalry of Watershed Goods and Services in Río Chiquito
Rivalry

Non-excludable (low)

Non-Rival (low)
Public goods and services
sediment delivery
water yield
water regulation
flood risk reduction
biodiversity prospecting⇓
existence value

Rival (high)
Common-pool goods and services
⇐sedimentation
carbon storage⇓

Toll goods and services

Private goods and services
←soil productivity
on-site extractive uses
annual flows
dry season baseflow

Exclusion

Excludable (high)

With regard to hydrological services, the spatial nature of production (upstream by
landholders) and consumption (downstream by a range of different users) makes it useful to
distinguish between the status of the services as produced by the landholders and the
disposition of the downstream (or instream) product as seen from the perspective of potential
users. The analysis, therefore, makes a distinction between (1) sediment delivery rates and
sedimentation, (2) water yield and annual flows and (3) water regulation and seasonal flows
and flooding. This distinction is most relevant in the case of the characteristic of exclusion.
That is, the extent to which upstream landholders can exclude downstream consumers from
the upstream service and the degree to which downstream consumers can exclude each other
from access to the instream resource. Rivalry is only relevant as a characteristic of the
downstream product.
This distinction accounts for the upstream and downstream nature of land use/hydrology
relationships. Typically, the function and the output are controlled by different actors and, as
noted in the Figure 1, may demonstrate differing levels of excludability and rivalry. For
example, the water yield function is very much a public good as it is not possible for the
landholder to exclude downstream users from changes in water yield associated with land use
change. As discussed in Annex 4, the only exception to this rule is when downstream benefits
would be created (or costs avoided) by a change in land use that is not in the interest of the
landholder. In such a case the landholder excludes the downstream beneficiary by not altering
the land use. This exclusion is referred to as ex ante exclusion as opposed to ex post exclusion
implicit in the aforementioned difficulty in excluding downstream consumers from benefits
already created by a change in land use.
As far as downstream annual flows are concerned, ICE’s legal mandate and physical control
over Lake Arenal enables it to exclude others from the benefits of changes in these flows and
to fully consume the potential energy attribute of the water held in the lake. Thus, the annual
water inflow arriving at Lake Arenal from Río Chiquito is essentially a private good. That
these inflows are private becomes of particular significance in the case of ex ante exclusion as
the possibility of achieving a Coasian solution to the problem are greatly enhanced if the
downstream hydrological product has private, rather than public, characteristics.
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Public Goods, Watershed Management and Institutional Arrangements
Improving watershed management is typically considered to have as an objective an
improvement in the level of environmental goods and services offered by watersheds. There
is, however, no a priori reason to suppose that the net effect of such management will lead to
a decrease in “production”, although this might be the conventional assumption. For example,
improved watershed management might imply an increase in the area dedicated to
environmental pursuits relative to “productive” pursuits and, at the same time, an
intensification of production on lands remaining in production. Unless the objective is to fully
protect the watershed most watershed management schemes will often have both a
conservation and production component. This suggests the need to consider the effects of
such schemes on the whole range, or “bundle” of goods and services produced by watersheds.
Traditionally, environmental management, or the improvement of environmental quality, has
been considered as a public good. For instance, Thomson (1992:10) suggests that that is the
case for environmental management in arid areas because such improvements increase the
resilience and productivity of the natural systems, and the benefits are available to all with the
consumption by some not impeding the enjoyment of others. Nevertheless, in the case of
watershed management, the analysis of public good characteristics suggests that this is not the
case when viewed from either the level of individual goods and services or the aggregate level
of watershed management as a whole. The complexity of both individual components and the
entire “bundle” of goods and services suggests that watershed management solutions may
need to be considerably more complex than a simple one-dimensional approach predicated on
the “public good” assumption.
As revealed in the analysis of the public good characteristics of watershed goods and services
in Annex 4, a range of factors will affect the excludability and rivalry of each and every such
good and service. These factors include:
•

the range (spatial, temporal or economic) in which the good is available (i.e. local,
national or global)

•

the biogeophysical environment (in the case of hydrological services topography and
climate will be very important)

•

the institutional arrangements for administering each good, in particular existing and
enforceable property or use rights

•

the relationship between supply and demand for each good (relative values of different
products) and the technologies employed in their production

As a result, the classification of a given service may vary between one particular set of
circumstances and another set of circumstances. In view of the range of possibilities it is,
therefore, difficult to generalise about the classification of a particular good or service. A
further implication is that an incentive programme or institutional arrangement that succeeds in
providing or producing the good in one site may not be appropriate to another.
At the aggregate level, the complexity of individual interactions supports the contention of
Cornes and Sandler (1986) that an agent producing or consuming a private good, may
simultaneously be contributing to the production or consumption of a second good, of public
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good character. Amongst other examples, these authors cite the case of expenditure on
education and health, which produce private benefits but also contribute to the overall welfare
of the population. Alternatively, of course the production of a private good may lead to the
production of public bads. In general, then in the presence of joint production it would be
difficult to generalise to the point of labelling environmental improvements as public goods per
se, although frequently such improvement will involve the production (intended or otherwise)
of goods that have public good characteristics.
Implicitly, therefore, an understanding of the public good characteristics of the full range of
goods and services produced (or whose production is altered) should inform the analysis of
incentives and institutional arrangements. Positive and negative production feedback loops
between different goods and services must also be noted to fully analyse the “bundle” of goods
and services. An example from Río Chiquito illustrates this process. For example, a rancher’s
investment in a physical soil-conserving technology such as infiltration ditches may have the
knock-on effect of lowering sedimentation without affecting water yield. Given that soil
productivity is essentially a private good the rancher may choose to implement such a
technology without reference to the impacts it will have on downstream users. It is logical for
the rancher to ignore the downstream impact as the rancher has no means of excluding ICE
from exploiting this reduction in sediment delivery. In this simple case no incentive is required
and existing institutional arrangements may be considered more or less optimal.
However, the degree of rivalry that exists with regard to the sedimentation downstream
suggests that it may be considered a common-pool resource. As ICE is a single beneficiary of
the ranchers proposed actions this suggests that there may be room for an institutional
arrangement that would change existing incentives and enable this process to be managed in
common so as to increase the benefits to both parties. In other words, in return for
compensation the rancher might be encouraged by ICE to construct more infiltration ditches
than would be profitable from the perspective of improving on-site production. Although the
nature of the interchange between upstream producer and downstream user is local and
potentially market-driven in nature, the involvement of ICE, an agent of central government,
suggests a polycentric arrangement.
Similarly, in the case of reforestation initiatives, where the on-site benefits might not be clear
or decisive the public good nature of role of downstream hydrological impacts may also be of
importance. In the case of reforestation, both sediment delivery and water yield would be
likely to be affected. As noted in Figure 1, an increase (or decrease) in annual inflows to the
Lake Arenal are a private good. It has also been shown that changes in land use in Río
Chiquito may lead to relatively important changes in the value of hydroelectric production
(Aylward et al. 1998a). Once again, the incentive for the user of the downstream product,
ICE, to be actively involved in a polycentric arrangement to provide incentives for an
improvement in upstream watershed management is clear.
How ICE might become involved would vary depending on whether the holding is sited in a
cloud forest area or not. In a cloud forest area, the installation of contoured windbreaks
would not only alleviate soil loss and sediment delivery problems, but the windbreak would
strip water from the clouds, increasing water yield. Again, as annual flows are a private good
in Arenal this suggests the theoretical possibility that the rancher might approach ICE on this
matter. The rancher could suggest that the institution assist with the increased costs of the
windbreak (relative to the infiltration ditches) given the ability of ICE to capture the (relatively
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larger) benefits of increases in water yield. In a non-cloud forest area the installation of a large
windbreak would increase evapotranspirative losses. Thus, the incentive might be for ICE to
suggest to the rancher that they assist in some manner with the infiltration ditches so as to
avoid producing water yield losses that might outweigh the improvement in sediment delivery.
It is important to note that the identification of the downstream products as private goods and
common-pool resources leads to a search for local solutions to the problem, of involving the
producers and consumers in considering ways of managing these resources in common.7 Were
the products true public goods, the inclination might be to fall back upon some broader form
of centralised collective action, such as top-down government intervention, as a means of
ensuring the production of these services, instead of a market-driven polycentric arrangement
as suggested here. Thus, an understanding of the characteristics of the goods and services
involved, their inter-relationship and the different ““bundles” of jointly produced goods and
services associated with different courses of action lead to suggestions regarding the types of
institutional arrangements and incentives that might be appropriate.
This discussion also highlights the usefulness of having a clear picture regarding the physical
interactions that govern production, and the economic consequences of such production. As
demonstrated above, the consequences of reforestation being a good thing in one case and a
bad thing in another leads the analysis in different directions regarding potential outcomes. It
does not change the general nature of the arrangement as a form of common property
management, but it certainly may affect the types of incentives and instruments employed.
Ideally, such matters might be left to the participants who are assumed to know what is in their
best interest. However, if outside interests are involved in footing the initial costs of
developing such transactions and if information is imperfect, than a failure to understand these
physical and economic impacts may be disastrous. Further, it becomes clear that in order to
have a meaningful and conclusive discussion regarding potential institutional arrangements and
incentives, an understanding of the transaction costs associated with collective action becomes
of paramount importance.
The preceding sub-sections have illustrated the public good nature of the watershed goods and
services produced in Río Chiquito and discussed in general how these characteristics underpin
the incentives and institutional arrangements for their provision and production. The
following sub-sections combine the technical information from the environmental-economic
analysis of the CREED project with this approach in a search for landscape-based physical
measures that will yield net benefits to society. Detailed consideration of the public good
nature of the “bundle” of watershed goods and services provided by these measures sheds light
on the incentive compatibility of the measures and suggests appropriate institutional
arrangements for their provision and production.

7

It is interesting to note that the water yield externality is the more compelling issue, both from the standpoint
of its value (relative to sedimentation) and relative to its public good nature. As noted in the analysis,
downstream sedimentation may become a public good in the future as demand increases for the water supplied
from the reservoir, implying that arriving at arrangements for internalising the externality would have higher
transaction costs.
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Measures, Incentive Compatibility and Arrangements for On-Site Goods and Services
Under the existing structure of land use in the Río Chiquito watershed, livestock production
generates direct costs and benefits for producers. The net benefits of these activities appear to
vary considerably across the watershed, although when viewed at the watershed level they are
on average significantly positive. The direct inputs and outputs of this activity are private
goods and, consequently, the producers have every incentive to engage in the production of
these “watershed” goods.
The potential exception is that of soil productivity, which is an asset, owned by producers and
employed in producing output. Producers may have difficulty in fully appropriating the
potential value of this asset, particularly when it comes to the tradability of the asset at the
point of sale (of the land).8 Nevertheless, both theoretical concerns and the opinions
expressed by stakeholders suggest that the conservation of this resource is largely a private
concern.
Clearly, the balance between the degree of incentive required will vary with the extent to
which the outcome of the process in terms of goods and services is appropriable by the
producers, that is, with the private/public nature of the goods and services. Non-vegetative
soil conservation measures lead directly to the enhancement of soil productivity in the area
treated and, subsequently, to increased livestock production. Such benefits are largely
appropriable by the producer. Short-term vegetative fallowing using leguminous plants would
also be appropriable by the producer, although such measures are not practised in the study
area. Soil conservation involving reforestation provides wood products derived from the trees
(i.e. fenceposts) and improves productivity in the surrounding, non-treated area. In Río
Chiquito this productivity improvement results from the windbreak effect and from improving
surface hydrology. The latter might involve increasing infiltration and thereby lowering
surface run-off and erosion, as well as serving as a barrier or filter for sediment flows.
Productivity enhancements will be appropriable by the producer subject to the issue of its
value in asset markets. Typically, wood produced by reforestation is a private good and will
be appropriated by the producer. This may, however, vary depending on the manner in which
reforestation is engendered. If reforestation is developed under a conservation easement, for
example, the private nature of a reforested stand of trees would be greatly reduced. The
producer will not be able to appropriate the wood benefits of the trees. In rare cases
reforestation may provide other appropriable services. For instance, by building an ecotourism
lodge or a restaurant near the stand a producer may be able to capture an additional set of onsite benefits associated with the trees.
As suggested by Aylward et al. (1998b), reforestation of pasture for commercial wood
production in Río Chiquito is not likely to generate large economic benefits. Reforestation on
a smaller scale for on-farm wood use in fencing may however generate reasonable benefits in
terms of the opportunity costs of purchasing fencing materials. Meanwhile the establishment
of fully protected forests through reforestation or regeneration schemes is expected to be fairly
costly when implemented at a large scale. At the sub-holding scale, the direct costs of such

8

See Annex 4 for a full discussion.
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efforts may be fairly insignificant. However, as pointed out in the case of easements, the
benefits that might be captured by producers engaging in full protection would be minimal.
On the basis of on-site values, the private character of the inputs and outputs used in livestock
production is likely to be sufficient to encourage watershed management activities with only a
minimal requirement for collective action and external inputs into the watershed. Producers
will be able to capture either the benefits of directly or indirectly caused productivity
enhancements and may also garner benefits from wood products that result from investments
in small scale reforestation.
Intervention might, therefore, be restricted to the provision of technical assistance and activityspecific inputs that are not well known or widely available in the watershed. At least initially,
obtaining access to these items and educating producers on their use represent a transaction
cost for producers in the watershed. The costs of learning about silviculture, starting up a
nursery and purchasing all the required inputs is probably quite large compared to the benefits
that would be garnered by a single producer. As the producer’s holdings and intentions with
regard to reforestation increase it can be expected that the benefit-cost ratio will improve.
Clearly, there will be some scale at which the aggregate benefits to producers are likely to
outweigh the transaction costs (as well as the direct costs). By grouping together and acting
collectively, therefore, such a set of producers could resolve the collective action problem.
To the extent that the benefits of investments in soil conservation are not appropriable, soil
productivity becomes a toll or club good. Theory then suggests that collective action for the
provision and production of soil productivity would be likely to take the form of a club to
which producers contribute (fees, labour or other contributions) in return for obtaining access
to technical assistance and inputs. This, of course, closely resembles the function of a
producer cooperative.
Currently, there is no such club providing such services within the watershed. On the fringes
of the watershed two cooperatives of coffee producers, COOPETILA and COOPELDOS, do
provide these services and in the case of the ICE reforestation programme they are providing
such services to producers in Río Chiquito. The key difference is that the transaction costs
involved have been borne by ICE’s Programme in Watershed Management. The producers
involved in these programmes devote resources to the programme, but only in so far as they
bear a portion of the direct costs of reforesting their holdings. They do not contribute to the
administrative costs of the programme as a whole and, thus, do not share in the costs of
developing or providing these services to others. In the case of the soil conservation
programme sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAG) and FAO,
centralised provision of these services is available in the Arenal area. This might represent a
much larger concept of a “club”. The need for such a scale in order to surmount the
transaction costs involved is probably not necessary. Economies of scale in a reforestation
programme can probably be attained at the district level. Indeed, the scale and centralisation
of such an effort suggests a susceptibility to standardisation that might lead to obstacles to the
efficient serving of local clientele as reported earlier (in the case of MAG).
The lack of action to internalise the potentially public good nature of soil productivity in Río
Chiquito, thus, leads to one of three conclusions. First, the biophysical problem itself is not of
sufficient severity to have important effects on economic productivity. In other words the
transaction costs outweigh the perceived benefits of collective action. In this case, it is
difficult to justify the existing attempts to provide these services to the watershed based simply
CREED Working Paper Series No 21

28

on on-site considerations of soil productivity. These efforts are publicly funded and as such
the transaction costs incurred represent an opportunity cost to society. If these expenditures
are not generating significant benefits in terms of soil productivity then they are effectively
wasting valuable economic resources.
A second possibility is that the economic problem posed by the erosion of soil productivity is a
significant one but the appropriation problem is sufficiently marginal that producers do not
suffer from an incentive compatibility problem. The suggestion made earlier that a number of
producers do have significant erosion and productivity problems and are making investments
in soil productivity of their own accord suggests that this may be the case in the watershed. In
this case, polycentric or centralised arrangements for the provision and production of soil
productivity are not necessary. A differentiated market in which buyers and sellers can
equilibrate demand and supply for soil productivity and investments in soil conservation is
sufficient. In all likelihood a differentiated market will be more efficient in allocating resources
than a polycentric arrangement. Although an improvement over a centralised arrangement, a
polycentric arrangement will still involve the transfer of a certain amount of planning and
decision-making regarding resource use to centralised (or decentralised) functionaries.
Presumably they will not be as informed as producers themselves and will, therefore, make
mistakes that lead to inefficiencies in production.
A third possibility is that although the underlying problem is significant, the scale at which
collective action becomes possible is not reached at the watershed level. In such a case by
assuming at least a portion of the transaction costs, the ICE programme is making a positive
contribution to the economy. At the same time it is worth noting the theoretical result
obtained earlier, that a producers’ club would be the appropriate institutional arrangement for
providing this service. This suggests that it would be worth investigating ways in which the
existing programme could be converted to a club in which participants are charged a fee (or
toll) that supports the administrative and development costs of the programme. This has the
benefit of contributing to the financial sustainability of the programme and ensuring that the
investment is indeed providing real economic benefits to participants.
The recommendation emerging from the applied analysis suggests that there may be little
motivation for investing public funds in enhancing soil productivity in Río Chiquito. Given the
range of goods and services currently available with respect to reforestation the transaction
costs of undertaking reforestation must now be regarded as relatively low. Thus, it is likely
that producers can either respond to this problem as individuals or as part of a group, or club,
within the bounds of an increasingly differentiated market. The picture with regard to nontree-related soil conservation technologies is less clear given the lack of experimentation with
such activities in the watershed. However, in a recent review of soil conservation projects in
Central America, vegetative barriers and changes in land management are generally regarded
to be superior to mechanical or physical conservation technologies (Lutz, Pagiola, and Reiche
1994). In other words ranchers are reluctant to invest in technologies that only provide soil
conservation benefits and do not produce other usable products.
The exception to this analysis would be the case of producers with little access to land and
capital. For these smaller producers, such investments, either in terms of the opportunity cost
of lost production in the short-term or the up-front investment costs, may be too high to bear
given the uncertainty and experimental nature of such treatments.
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In sum, this analysis coincides with the opinion voiced by Lutz, Pagiola and Reiche (1994).
These authors suggest that subsidies should not be used to assist producers in adopting soil
conservation technologies except in the case of providing seeds or seedlings for producers in
order to facilitate experimentation with new technology. A further exception to the rule
opined by these authors is in the case where off-site considerations are important. In the next
sub-section the focus shifts to the off-site goods and services provided by watersheds.
Measures for Improving Provision and Production of Off-Site Goods and Services
In discussing the externalities associated with livestock production the comparison is implicitly
made between the services provided by pasture and those provided by forest. Nonetheless,
there are various soil conservation technologies that will affect downstream hydrology without
involving reforestation. The previous sub-section suggests that these technologies are
typically less favoured by producers and, in any case, are not currently practised in the
watershed. Thus, the latter will be discussed only briefly and the primary focus will be on the
comparison of pasture versus forest. The relative magnitude and distribution of the costs and
benefits associated with off-site environmental services are listed in terms of the status quo and
a number of practical measures that can be used to minimise external costs and increase
external benefits.
The quantitative analysis conducted in Aylward et al. (1998a) concludes that the principal
externalities of livestock production would be an increase in water yield, a decrease in carbon
storage and an increase in sedimentation, in that order. Once the offsetting effects of
increased thermal power generation under a reforestation scenario are included, the carbon
benefits are likely to be considerably reduced. There is the possibility of an effect on seasonal
flows, although the direction of such an impact is ambiguous (based on the literature). It is,
however, expected that cloud forest areas will capture significant amounts of horizontal
precipitation in the dry season, in particular cloud forest fragments interspersed with pasture.
Other environmental services that are provided by forest such as biodiversity prospecting and
existence values are not expected to be significant in this case.
Under the current situation ICE captures the benefits of an increase in water yield. Action to
further increase water yield would consist of the following options: (1) cutting or clearing
additional areas of forest in non-cloud forest zones, and (2) optimising the level of
fragmentation in cloud forest areas by re-establishing forest patches and windbreaks within
pasture and cutting or clearing patches within forest. It is also assumed that increasing the
fragmentation of cloud forest areas will also lead to benefits in terms of enhancing the capture
of horizontal precipitation during the dry season. Land use change that changes water yield is,
thus, assumed to lead to corresponding changes in seasonal flows.
Efforts to re-establish forest in order to capture additional horizontal precipitation could be
accomplished by reforestation, natural regeneration or the planting of windbreaks.
Regeneration occurs relatively quickly in the rainforest life zones in which the cloud forests are
located (Bolaños and Alpízar 1995). In addition, the more complex and multi-layered the
forest surface, the more horizontal precipitation will be captured (Fallas 1996). This argues
against plantation style reforestation for the establishment of forest patches, except in the case
of severely impoverished soils, and in favour of natural regeneration. For windbreaks, planting
would probably be best undertaken with species whose leaf characteristics provide a superior
physical substrate for the condensation of horizontal precipitation.
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ICE also captures the costs of increased sedimentation. Reduction of these costs is
accomplished by re-establishing forest on lands currently devoted to pasture. Re-establishing
forest along streams and in areas especially susceptible to erosion would be particularly
effective measures to lower sediment delivery. The method of establishing forest and the
species employed would be of lesser importance than in the case of water yield. From the
standpoint of reducing erosion and sediment delivery the height and quality of the forest stand
is of much less importance than its ability to quickly colonise pasture and provide ground
cover. Re-establishing forest on erosion-prone surfaces implies a need for a substantial leaf
litter that will protect the soil from rainsplash erosion. The primary function of ground cover
in buffer strips would be to filter surface flow, storing the sediment and, hence, preventing it
from entering the stream.
Bolaños and Alpízar (1995) observe that sites in the study area subjected to severe erosion
were subject to a relatively slow and impoverished colonisation, and that the predominant
pasture in the area, African King Grass (Cynodon nlemfuensis), also impedes secondary
regrowth. Thus, reforestation and post-planting management might be required in these
conditions, with a species mix that would guarantee substantial ground cover. Alongside
streams, natural regeneration might be preferred given that such areas are likely to be
relatively fertile and that natural regeneration would potentially lead to a relatively more
complex ground cover than in the case of reforestation.
Actions that would tend to lead to increased external benefits (primarily to ICE) would then
include the following eight measures and classified by whether they take place in non-cloud
forest areas:
1.

Cutting and/or conversion of forest in areas that are not erosion-prone

2.

Reforestation of erosion-prone pasture areas

3.

Natural regeneration of buffer strips alongside streams

or in cloud-forest areas:
4.

Cutting and/or conversion of patches within large contiguous blocks of existing forest

5.

Planting of windbreaks in pasture

6.

Allowing natural regeneration of forest in large areas of pasture

7.

Reforestation of erosion-prone pasture areas

8.

Natural regeneration of buffer strips alongside streams

The benefits of carbon storage that would be associated with efforts at reforestation or
regeneration are diffuse and accrue to consumers globally.
The direct costs of reforestation and the opportunity costs of reforestation and regeneration in
terms of lost livestock production benefits are felt directly by producers. The size of the
opportunity costs are expected to vary considerably across the watershed with smallholders
typically bearing smaller per hectare opportunity costs than the owners of large holdings
(Aylward et al. 1998a). Clearing of forest for use as pasture, on the other hand, would
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generally produce net on-site benefits to producers, subject to the considerations just
mentioned. Engaging in production forestry on lands currently forested would be expected to
generate positive net benefits to producers, although the relatively poor species composition,
from a commercial viewpoint as noted by Bolaños and Alpízar (1995), might limit the
profitability of this endeavor.
On the issue of cutting versus converting forest it is worth mentioning a third possibility. The
former implicitly assumes forest production, i.e. the harvest of wood for sale or use. For the
sake of argument, given the size of the potential benefits in terms of water yield, it might even
be economical to simply cut existing forest and leave it to decompose. This would generate
water yield benefits akin to those realised under production forestry. At the same time, by
eliminating the extraction of logs this option would effectively limit the production of sediment
that would be associated with cutting and clearing of logs and subsequent livestock
production.
Incentive Compatibility and Institutional Arrangements for Off-Site Measures
The latter point raises the issue of the compatibility of the measures proposed in terms of the
trade-off that exists between water yield, sediment delivery and livestock production. To
complete the analysis it is useful to review each of the actions, taking into account this tradeoff as well as the effects of these measures on carbon storage and soil productivity. In this
manner it is possible to assess the need for new institutional arrangements aimed at the
production of environmental services under each of these actions. The four environmental
goods and services of potential significance to the measure proposed above are water yield,
carbon storage, sediment delivery and soil productivity.
Water yield and sediment delivery were classified as public goods with regard to the ex post
ability to exclude ICE from the consumption of benefits or costs associated with changes in
annual water flows and sedimentation of the reservoir. In both cases the ex ante ability to
exclude ICE is high. Thus, the classification of water flows as a private good and
sedimentation as a common-pool resource is of importance in cases where landholders are not
inclined to produce external benefits (or are inclined to land uses that produce external costs).
Carbon storage was identified as a common-pool resource that is increasingly private in
nature. Finally, soil productivity was identified as a private good with tendencies towards
being a toll good.
In cases where private incentives to landholders for the production of these environmental
benefits are compatible with incentives, as viewed from a larger economic perspective and
incorporating both land use and downstream effects, new institutional arrangements are not
strictly necessary. For instance, to the extent that current land uses are producing
approximately optimal downstream results for ICE, there is no argument for offering
compensation to upstream landholders.
Cases of incentive incompatibility, however, may argue for new arrangements subject to the
issue of the size of the transaction costs involved. The transaction costs involved and the
likely nature of institutional arrangements for solving the incentive problem surrounding the
hydrological externalities are discussed in detail in the next sub-section. At this point it is
sufficient to argue that a contractual arrangement between ICE and the landholders would
allow these hydrological services to be managed in common. The emphasis below is on
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identifying such cases of incentive incompatibility and analyzing the potential institutional
implications of including carbon storage and soil productivity into the assessment.
Each of the eight measures proposed above is examined in turn. It is important to note that
both cloud and non-cloud forest areas include production types that, on average, span the
range from negative to high private and economic profitability. Thus, in order to accurately
reflect the diversity of on-site production benefits garnered by producers in Río Chiquito, each
case is considered in light of the producers that are producing either substantial or only
marginal (or negative) economic returns to land.
Measure 1: Cutting/conversion of forest in non-erosion-prone areas. In non-cloud forest areas
the cutting or conversion of forest in non-erosion prone areas leads to both on-site production
benefits (livestock and wood products) and increased hydrological benefits. The outcome in
terms of carbon storage depends on whether the forest will be managed for forest production
or livestock production. Dedication of the land to a sustainable rotation for the production of
timber that is subsequently used in the production of durable goods should have a positive
effect on carbon storage. Conversion of forest and burning of much of the wood would
liberate carbon on net, having a negative impact. Nonetheless, it appears that even in the
negative scenario, the costs incurred in loss of carbon storage would be outweighed by the
benefits of increases in water yield.
Private incentives are, thus, largely compatible with the production of the private good
benefits of increased water inflow to the reservoir. An exception is the case of smallholder
ranchers who have large negative returns to production. In such cases, producers might be
unwilling to generate additional benefits for ICE without sharing in the hydrological value
added. Local efforts at collective action involving ICE and affected producers would then be
required subject to transaction costs. Although of a local market-driven character, this
arrangement would inevitably be polycentric given that ICE would be involved (representing
centralised interests). With regard to carbon storage, however, the incentive for landholders
to engage in forest management (instead of simply clearing forest for pasture) is not
necessarily consistent with the economic benefits generated by the former. As a result it is
possible to argue for an institutional arrangement that enables representatives of global carbon
interests to participate in influencing the decision on the part of the landholder to choose forest
management over land use change.9 Given that carbon storage is a global commons problem,
and the developing international arrangements for its management will involve at least a
degree of centralisation, a polycentric arrangement involving all three stakeholders (producers,
ICE and representatives of global interests) is likely to be preferred.
Measure 2: Reforestation of erosion-prone pasture areas. Reforestation of erosion-prone soils
in non-cloud forest areas will result in increased evapotranspiration and subsequent losses in
water yield. From an off-site perspective a purely economic definition of the term “erosionprone” would be erosion of such severity that its marginal costs in terms of sedimentation
(caused both by rainsplash erosion on the site and by surface erosion caused by run-off from
compacted soils) are just equalled by the marginal benefits generated by the higher level of

9

As mentioned earlier and discussed further below, land use change is not actually a legal option under current
legislation. In this case, the analysis happens to support the direction of this legislation (as an intervention on
behalf of the larger economy).
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water yield (under pasture). The analysis of soil productivity suggests that investing in limited
reforestation or regeneration on severely eroded soils may lead to productivity increases on
adjacent areas as well as providing an important source of fencing materials. Thus, the private
benefits of such an alternative will be positive, assuming that production benefits from such
areas are, indeed, very low (if not negative) due to the degraded conditions of the soil. In
addition, reforestation will provide larger economic benefits in terms of carbon fixation
produced by re-establishing forest. Private incentives are, thus, largely compatible with
economic efficiency.
However, this conclusion will be very site-specific. In general the magnitude of the trade-off
between water yield and sedimentation suggests that from an off-site perspective few areas
will be “erosion prone.” If, however, the private production benefits and economic benefits of
carbon storage are large, the two combined would suggest that it will be efficient to reforest
beyond this off-site margin. In part the incentive to do this may be private and in part
economic. The ideal institutional arrangement would then involve all three stakeholders:
producers, ICE and those representing global interests on carbon storage. If ICE is left out
and reforestation proceeds based solely on arrangements between the former two stakeholders
than it can be expected that too much reforestation will occur. Thus, a polycentric
arrangement amongst all three stakeholders aimed at managing this process of joint production
in common would be ideal. Central to this arrangement would be the participation of the
producers, given that they are the only participants that can accurately judge the opportunity
costs (or benefits) of replacing livestock productivity of different sites and the likely benefits of
reforestation in terms of wood products and soil productivity.
Measure 3: Natural regeneration of buffer strips. Incentive compatibility for the natural
regeneration of buffer strips alongside streams is similar to that under Measure 2. Again, a
polycentric arrangement involving producers, ICE and representatives of global stakeholders
would be ideal. The distinction might come in the relative incentives facing different parties.
Private incentives to participate would be diminished, given that the reforestation buffer strips
alongside streams would be likely to have higher opportunity costs in terms of foregone
livestock production and lower utility in terms of wood production. Carbon storage and
sedimentation effects might also be different under this scenario, although probably only
marginally so in relation to the change in private incentives. Under this measure, then, an
increased participation of the carbon storage stakeholders and ICE might be required to
motivate producer involvement.
Measure 4: Cutting/conversion of patches within cloud forest. The cutting or conversion of
patches within large contiguous blocks of cloud forest lead to increased off-site benefits in
terms of water yield is similar to Measure 1. Again, whether forest is simply cut, cut and
harvested, or converted to pasture will determine the size of the counteracting costs of
increased sediment delivery, as well as the type of private benefits (livestock and logs) and
economic impacts (carbon stored/liberated) engendered. In the case of holdings with low
profitability, participation of the primary beneficiary, ICE, would probably be required. Again,
in terms of realising an economically efficient allocation a polycentric arrangement involving
all three stakeholders would be best.
Measure 5: Planting of windbreaks in pasture. Planting of windbreaks in pasture (within cloud
forest areas) will provide direct benefits to ICE in terms of water yield and reductions in
sediment delivery, and private benefits to producers in terms of wood products and
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productivity enhancement (due to wind abatement and soil retention). The latter will be
weighed against lost livestock production. Carbon storage benefits would also be present,
although they might be marginal given the limited nature of the reforestation activity. Private
incentives would be largely compatible with the realisation of a certain level of planting and
economic efficiency where livestock productivity is low. When productivity is high, concerted
effort between ICE and the producers would be necessary. Even in the case of extreme
profitability (large mechanised dairy), windbreaks might generate net efficiency gains when
employed on less productive areas or as a means of sectioning off pasture.
In the case of marginal producers for whom incentive compatibility exists, additional net
benefits could be generated by developing a cooperative arrangement between ICE and
producers for increasing the density of windbreaks within holdings. This implies extending
windbreaks beyond the area desired by producers on their own account. From their
perspective, producers may have only a limited need for wood products. In addition, the
productivity benefits of windbreaks may argue for a relatively loose spacing of windbreaks
compared to that which would produce the optimal capture of horizontal precipitation. Thus,
although producer interest in windbreaks may be limited, both of the off-site effects are
positive in this case and may be of sufficient merit to warrant cooperative action. The
opportunity costs of lost livestock production under such an arrangement would, therefore,
need to be compensated from the production of off-site benefits. An arrangement between
producers and ICE for the provision and production of these goods and services would,
therefore, be of central importance to this measure.
Measure 6: Natural regeneration of cloud forest in large areas of pasture. The regeneration of
forest patches within large areas of pasture is a measure that in essence competes with
Measure 5, with the exception that windbreaks may be useful even in rather small expanses of
pasture. The choice of which measure to employ will revolve around two principal issues: the
degree of profitability of livestock production on the site and the relative merits of windbreaks
versus forest patches in the capture of horizontal precipitation. The implications of these for
incentive compatibility are as follows. The more profitable the livestock operation, the less
likely it is that the producer will be interested in re-establishing large patches of forest and the
more appropriate it might be for windbreaks to be established. However, if it can be
demonstrated that increasing the size of a windbreak until it truly becomes a forest patch or
fragment leads to increasing levels of moisture capture (per unit area), then the establishment
of forest patches may be the preferred option in this case. In either case efforts in this
direction would depend on the participation of ICE in a cooperative arrangement, as the
opportunity costs of reforesting larger patches would tend to lead to incentive incompatibility.
Measures 7 and 8: Reforestation of erosion-prone areas and regeneration of buffer strips. The
reforestation of erosion-prone areas and regeneration of buffer strips along streams in cloud
forest areas differs from the same measures (2 and 3) in non-cloud forest areas in one
important aspect. In cloud forest areas, the effects of these measures will have a positive, not
negative, impact on water yield. Thus, from an economic perspective the likelihood of these
measures being of interest is much greater. Thus, the constraint on the definition of erosionprone elaborated earlier, the internal trade-off between decreased sediment delivery and
decreased water yield, disappears. In cloud-forest areas, then, the measures are similar to
Measure 6 in terms of the arrangements required.
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In the case of Measure 7, assuming that high erosion rates and low productivity are correlated,
producers would prioritise the reforestation of such areas based on the private incentives
involved. The availability of a cooperative arrangement with ICE, and to a lesser extent with
global carbon stakeholders, might subsequently motivate producers to reforest areas beyond
what constitutes “erosion-prone” in purely biophysical terms. Where production levels remain
high, even on sites defined in biophysical terms as “erosion-prone”, such cooperation would be
essential. In the case of Measure 8, there may be little private incentive to leave buffer strips
for regeneration (where they already make good pasture) and a cooperative arrangement will,
therefore, be required. In both of the latter cases, where the opportunity costs of reforestation
or regeneration are relatively high, the returns from off-site benefits must be compared (either
implicitly or explicitly) with the loss in production.
The discussion above can be summarised by specifying the extent to which implementation of
the measures is either compatible with private incentives or requires an institutional
arrangement that ensures common management of the “bundle” of watershed goods and
services on the part of the three principal stakeholders. The analysis above suggests that
measure by measure the participation of different groups is of more or less importance. The
following table tries to capture this distinction by noting the relative importance of the extent
of cooperation between the principal stakeholders, as disaggregated by the relative
productivity or profitability of the site involved. In cases of incentive compatibility producers
will largely make the right choice on their own. In other cases it will be important to have
some mix of producers, ICE and carbon stakeholders involved.
Table 1. Watershed Management Measures and Stakeholder Involvement
Measures
Non-Cloud Forest Areas
1. Cut/convert forest

Degree to which these arrangements are sufficient to motivate efficiency
Producer
Carbon
ICE
All Three
Stakeholder
sufficient (high)

important to cut
vs. conversion
important
(high).
important (all)

required (low)

not important

2. Reforest erosion-prone
sufficient (low)
not important
not necessary
areas
3. Regenerate buffer strips
not sufficient
important (all)
important (all)
Cloud Forest Areas
4. Cut/convert forest
sufficient (high)
not important
important (low)
not necessary
5. Plant windbreaks
sufficient (low)
not important
required (high)
not necessary
not sufficient
not important
required (low)
not necessary
6. Regenerate forest
patchesa
7. Reforest erosion-prone
sufficient (low)
useful (high)
required (high)
useful (high)
areas
8. Regenerate buffer strips.
not sufficient
useful (all)
required (all)
useful (all)
Notes: The indication of high, low or all in parenthesis suggests the relevant group of producers in terms of
the degree of livestock profitability. aIn this case it is assumed that holdings with high levels of profitability
would only be interested in planting windbreaks.

Clearly, implementation of each of the measures alters the costs and benefits as viewed by the
three stakeholder groups. Thus, the ideal arrangement would be a polycentric arrangement
involving all three groups. However, the table shows that as the outcome of each measure is
different, in terms of the production of a “bundle” of watershed goods and services, so the
necessity of attaining such a “complete” arrangement for the implementation of the measures
changes. In order to implement the measures and capture most of the efficiency gains it is not
necessary to attain such a comprehensive arrangement. The table suggests that producers
CREED Working Paper Series No 21

36

acting on their own and in concert with ICE would be able to achieve substantial
improvements over the status quo. Adding in the participation of the global interests
surrounding carbon storage would lead to further gains. In theory, prior to implementation
these arrangements should also pass a cost-effectiveness test insofar as the expected gains
should be demonstrated to be larger than the transaction costs of engendering such collective
action vis-à-vis the current institutional arrangements.
Modifications to the Proposed Action Programme
Before turning to prospective incentives mechanisms for encouraging adoption of the physical
measures it is useful to first re-evaluate the suitability of the Action Programme. The
discussion of potential measures focused on the issues of forest management, reforestation and
forest regeneration. In other words, these measures are directly related to the first two
elements of the Action Programme which consist of conservation and regeneration of forest
and the change of land use in areas of marginal productivity. The issue of soil productivity
was judged to be a sufficiently private matter not to warrant its inclusion as a measure per se.
Thus, the third element of the Action Programme should be interpreted as a compensatory
element, rather than as a direct effort to raise productivity. In other words, investment of
public funds in this area should be undertaken only if access to technological improvement is
directly linked to participation by producers in one of the measures identified above. This
does not represent a significant change in orientation as the original intent of this part of the
Programme was to give producers a means of increasing production on remaining land, once a
portion of their pasture was committed to regeneration or reforestation.
The remaining three elements of the Action Programme - community development,
development of local ecotourism projects and inter-institutional coordination - do not have
specific impacts on land use per se. Rather, they are measures that reflect the interests of local
communities (the first two) and a basic prerequisite of establishing a participatory approach to
the implementation of a polycentric action plan (the latter). As such, community development
and ecotourism projects, strictly speaking, should also be interpreted as compensatory
mechanisms. For example, in place of improving livestock technology some producers might
be more interested in developing an ecotourism project as an alternative means of generating
revenue once pasture area is reduced. Similarly, communities as a whole might prefer
improved infrastructure as an “incentive” for engaging in changed land use practices.
Thus, it is not really necessary to alter the basic components of the Action Programme to
reflect the biophysical and economic findings produced in the companion paper by Aylward et
al. (1998a) regarding hydrological externalities and their implications for incentive
compatibility. Instead, what is required is a shift in emphasis in terms of the actual types of
measures that can be expected to produce hydrological benefits. For example, conserving
existing forest in non-cloud forest areas would be of low priority where they are not in areas
prone to erosion. Should landowners wish to avail themselves of the CCB incentives under
the new forest law in conserving those areas they are free to do so. However, given that the
expected result may be negative hydrological externalities, an action programme should not
devote resources towards this end.
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Incentives for Watershed Management
The previous sub-section explored the application of the tools of neoclassical economics (as
reported in Aylward et al. 1998a) and the IAD framework to the question of what “ought” to
be the priorities for action in Río Chiquito and what “ought” to be the institutional
arrangements for implementing such action. This sub-section explores the practical feasibility
of the different measures and the economic incentives that might be used for their
implementation. This exploration is conducted within the confines of existing or proposed
institutional arrangements as outlined above. Given the need to work, at least partially, within
the existing rules of the game, the available menu of incentives will necessarily represent
second-best solutions.
The principal arrangement that restricts the measures put forward above is that the new forest
law does not permit a change in land use in areas under forest cover. This legal imposition
effectively limits the measures (1 and 4) aimed at opening up the forest canopy to either
reduce evapotranspirative losses or increase the capture of horizontal precipitation in cloud
forest to selective logging interventions. In a sense, then, the discussion above of the potential
benefits of clearing forest serve as an indication of how the new forest law changes the
institutional framework in a less efficient direction (see Watson et al. 1998:76 for additional
criticism of this law).
In the IAD framework, pay-off rules are an element of the action situation by which benefits
and costs are assigned to actions and outcomes. Although at times a pay-off is considered as
an implicit part of an outcome, in reality it is useful to distinguish between the two. A pay-off
differs from an outcome in that the pay-off is the method for assigning positive and negative
weight to outcomes, and hence to the actions themselves. This is where the concept of
incentives arises as it is through the determination of these costs or benefits (who wins, who
loses and by how much) that institutions shape human behaviour. Ostrom and her colleagues
use a broad notion of incentives in this respect: “incentives are more than just financial
rewards and penalties. They are the positive and negative changes in outcomes that
individuals perceive as likely to result from particular actions taken within a set of rules in a
particular physical and social context” (Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne 1993: 8).
Discussion of Prospective Incentive Mechanisms
The analysis by Aylward et al. (1998a) suggests that there are no policy distortions that can be
said to be drastically affecting the production of hydrological externalities in Río Chiquito.
The need then is for a new incentive mechanism that will serve to internalise these
externalities. A number of economic incentives mechanisms exist for resolving watershed
management problems insofar as hydrological services are concerned. These include the
traditional avenues of using new regulations, taxes and subsidies, or land purchase; as well as
four more novel methods:
1.

Implementing the “polluter pays” principle

2.

Creating marketable permits
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3.

Developing legal and enforceable property rights for environmental commodities

4.

Developing contractual arrangements involving compensatory resource transfers.

Each of these traditional and novel mechanisms are examined below.
Clearly, a number of important national regulations and incentive programmes are either
already affecting conservation decisions in the watershed or have the potential to do so in the
near future. Legislation prohibiting land use change on lands with forest cover under the new
forest law represents an important regulation that, as already mentioned, impinges on land use
in the watershed, albeit in a negative fashion. Traditional approaches to subsidising
reforestation that include subsidies in cash or in kind are being used under the reforestation
incentives of the new forest law and the ICE Río Chiquito reforestation initiative, respectively.
The implementation of these programmes appears to be polycentric (i.e. polycentric in
production) although both programmes are derived from centralised initiatives (centralised in
provision). There exists the need to adapt both programmes to local needs and conditions in
order to promote the type of reforestation (as outlined in the measures above) that will
produce both productive and hydrological benefits.
Newer approaches, such as the Forest Conservation Certificates (CCB) programme, represent
a centralised approach to establishing contractual arrangements in return for compensatory
payments. Again, the limitations of a single, centralised approach (for the whole country) to
the provision of forest conservation are nowhere more evident than in Río Chiquito where it
can be argued that maximisation of the economic benefits provided by environmental services
is not consistent with maintaining uninterrupted expanses of primary forest.
Land purchase in Río Chiquito (by the state) is an unlikely prospect for both practical and
theoretical reasons. The country currently has a large backlog of lands that remain in private
hands despite having been designated as belonging to the protected area system. Second, the
area is fully colonised and is capable of producing productive benefits under livestock
production. Third, an efficient use of the land is not consonant with total reforestation; thus,
the desired land management strategy as pictured above is consistent with livestock
production and a variety of forestry activities (that are consistent with the capabilities of small
and large landowners). As land purchase for the creation of a protected area is not warranted,
there is little opportunity that land purchase for this purpose would merit consideration for
funding, particularly given the existing backlog of important projects of this nature and the
scarcity of funds for this purpose.
Purchase of the land by ICE expressly for the purposes of turning it to hydrological production
has similar limitations. Perhaps more fundamental, however, are the transaction costs that
would be required to develop the legal mandate that would enable ICE to engage in such an
activity. Given that current land use and ownership patterns are not inconsistent with
hydrological production, this solution also appears somewhat drastic solution. It would be
preferable to find an instrument that could be used to push existing practices in the desired
direction, than a wholesale disruption of the pattern of tenancy and economic production in
the watershed. Thus, land purchase is not a useful or realistic option in this case.
All of the above existing initiatives might be creatively employed within the framework of the
Action Programme or modified to better serve the purpose of the Programme. However, it is
clear that no incentive mechanism currently exists that directly tackles the issue of how to
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provide an incentive to producers to produce even larger quantities of run-off while
simultaneously attempting to limit sediment delivery. For this reason each of the four novel
approaches listed above are scrutinised to see if they have potential to serve as mechanisms for
internalising hydrological externalities. Each of these mechanisms have both their theoretical
and practical advantages and disadvantages, some of which have already been mentioned in
passing with regard to Costa Rica or Río Chiquito. In order to winnow the field it is useful to
make explicit at the outset some of the factors that limit these options.
Prospects for applying the “polluter pays” principle in Costa Rica are discussed in Annex 3
with the conclusion that while progress on this issue is being made, much remains to be done
to make this instrument an effective means for deterring environmentally inappropriate
behaviour. Meanwhile, the principal finding of the paper by Aylward et al. (1998a) is that the
crux of the hydrological externalities “problem” in Río Chiquito revolves around how to
improve existing positive externalities (i.e. to make a good situation better). This implies the
need for instruments to increase the production of goods with public good characteristics
rather than the need for instruments to limit the production of public “bads.” Thus, the
“polluter pays” principle is not the theoretically appropriate mechanism for improving
efficiency of land use in Río Chiquito.
The use of marketable permits in watershed management in Costa Rica is, albeit indirectly,
already a going concern in Costa Rica. Although yet to be formally approved by the
Conference of Parties to the Climate Convention, the idea of land use offsets for carbon
storage and fixation has taken hold in Costa Rica. Several Costa Rican offset projects have
already been approved by the US Joint Implementation Initiative and a number have received
financing. Until formal approval is awarded this activity must be regarded as speculative.
Nevertheless, it demonstrates the potential for internalising the externalities associated with
this environmental function of forests through a system of marketable permits in carbon.
The question that remains, however, is whether marketable permits might be a theoretically
interesting and practically feasible mechanism for internalising the hydrological externalities
reviewed in this report. Typically, of course, marketable permits are used to limit the
production of public “bads”, such as air pollution, or to regulate open access system of
resource collection, such as fisheries, that are subject to threshold levels of congestion at
which productivity can be expected to be adversely affected. If sedimentation were the most
serious problem, then such a system of marketable permits (to deliver sediment) might be a
theoretically pleasing option. Practical problems that would be encountered include the
measurement and monitoring both for the source of “emissions” and their accumulation, and
the means of enforcing compliance. These problems are complicated by the fact that emissions
are not fully controllable by producers but are instead subject to the vagaries of current
weather patterns (yearly rainfall intensities) and year-on-year climate patterns (wet versus dry
periods).
In the case of water yield the same limitations apply, with one additional problem: the potential
applicability of marketable permits is not clear, given that there is no discernible threshold that
can be used to define the desired quantity. When it comes to increases in dry season flow, for
example, more is almost always better. Thus, a “closed” system of permits makes little sense
when the incremental benefits of changes in water yield are fairly constant in either direction.
The potential for developing property rights over hydrological services or outputs is an
attractive one from a theoretical perspective. A differentiated market in which “units” of
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hydrological output, such as cubic metres of sediment and yearly run-off, are exchanged at
prices that equilibrate demand and supply is an attractive notion. The difficulty, of course, lies
in the feasibility of implementation. The problems of measurement and monitoring of
hydrological services to establish actual amounts produced are considerable, as noted above.
The need to assign such units to specific holdings only compounds the problem. As indicated
in Annex 3, the current legal status of many environmental resources or services in Costa Rica
is far from that envisioned in a well-functioning market with well-defined and enforceable
property rights. Such property rights are either not defined or are simply vested in the state.
Despite its theoretical appeal, therefore, the property rights approach is at best an option in the
very long term, requiring significant advances in technology to permit adequate definition and
enforcement of such rights.
The remaining option is that of contractual arrangements involving compensatory resource
flows. This approach is best compared to that of establishing property rights. Contractual
arrangements enable a number of concessions to the practical necessities of the case while
sacrificing only a degree of theoretical advantage. Most importantly, contracts may be
established for the means to the end rather than the end itself. In other words, contracts may
sidestep the measurement problem by specifying specific actions to be undertaken by
landowners in terms of changes in land use or land management. The contract then becomes
verifiable, even if the exact result remains unverifiable. Each side of the negotiation then is left
to negotiate based on the information at their disposal. Each side brings a different type of
information to the table. The users of hydrological services must base their negotiating on
their best estimates of the hydrological impact of the changes in land use that are on the table
and on their willingness to pay for these changes. The producer of hydrological services will
negotiate based on the changes in production costs and benefits that will result from
introducing different land uses or land management strategies.
In a sense then, the negotiation proceeds with asymmetries of information, not unlike those in
other markets where sellers are most informed about their supply function and buyers about
their demand function. The difference, of course, is that there will typically be few buyers and
many sellers, and probably no intermediaries. The advantage of fully establishing property
rights is that a competitive market is more assured. If there is only one buyer (or a
monopsony), then the assurance of property rights will lower the transaction costs of market
entry for those who would take advantage of the arbitrage opportunity. When rights are only
effectively established through contracts then the likelihood of a competitive market appearing
is small.
Contractual Arrangements and Compensatory Resource Transfers
If contractual arrangements appear to be the only and, therefore, most promising mechanism
for improving the production of positive hydrological externalities in Río Chiquito, they still
have their difficulties. As indicated earlier, the CCB and CPB incentive programmes have
already pioneered this approach in the Costa Rican context so the concept is not a foreign one.
However, there are clearly theoretical and practical difficulties with levying a single incentive
(with the same structure and amount) for the same objective across the entire territory of the
country. As hydrological externalities can be expected to vary in direction and magnitude
from one watershed to the next, the need for a polycentric approach that incorporates both
centralised information regarding demand (in this case for hydroelectricity) and local
socioeconomic and biophysical information regarding supply is exceedingly important.
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The difficulty that exists in the Río Chiquito case is that there is a single buyer, ICE, and a
group of sellers. The transaction costs of collective action for the latter are, therefore,
considerable. The asymmetries of information and market power in this situation are also likely
to be problematic. Other things being equal, it can be expected that ICE would be tempted to
act as a monopsonist, which would lead to an inefficient level of hydrological services. In
order to ensure a sufficient degree of adaptability to local conditions within the watershed
itself and to limit the market power of ICE, negotiations between parties (such as they are)
should be conducted within the context of the inter-institutional commission proposed by the
Action Programme. These negotiations should revolve around two issues: defining the
amount of funding or resources that would be made available annually over a set period to the
“compensation fund” and designing an auction system for the allocation of contracts. The
advantage of this approach is that it separates the issue of how much compensation will, in
principle, be available from the decision of exactly how the funds will be spent. It also
provides ICE with the opportunity to budget precise sums for the programme and to make a
gradual commitment to the Action Programme. Further, the negotiation takes place in a
public space allowing political and other non-economic incentives to play a role in guiding the
negotiation. Finally, there is no reason why ICE must be the only contributor to the fund, or
why all contributions must be made in cash.
Conceptually, the auction system for disbursement could work in a number of ways. The first
prerequisite would be the creation by the inter-institutional commission of a “compensation
committee”. This committee might function in one of two ways. In a simplified system,
producers would be responsible for submitting sealed bids reflecting what payment they would
be willing to accept for undertaking a given intervention on a particular section of their
property. The bids would be submitted to the committee, which would then apply their own
criteria in selecting a set of cost-effective bids given funding constraints. The advantage of the
auction system is that it does not require producers to organise into a single unified
negotiating force, but still permits them to participate in community groups if they so desire.
In addition, the system allows for a variety of different hydrological conditions (from the
demand side) and socioeconomic conditions (on the supply side) leading, in theory, to an
efficient microeconomic allocation of available resources.
Given that the compensation committee represents the “buying” interests it would in effect be
representing the interests of ICE. However, for reasons mentioned above, it is debatable
whether ICE should be the sole representative for the buying side of the market in such an
incentive scheme. The committee ought to be comprised of representatives of a number of
“public” institutions and interests, one of which would be ICE. Technical support to this
committee might be offered by a group of experts drawn from ICE and relevant academic
institutions and NGOs.
Alternatively, a more neutral compensation committee could be formed which would receive
bids from producers (as before), as well as a set of sealed bids from ICE suggesting buying
thresholds (maxima) for various measures according to geographic area. Depending on the
information available, these purchase bids could represent just a few categories of land use
units and measures, or a more thorough spatial overlay of biophysical, hydrological and
economic parameters.
The committee would then optimise the matching of buy and sell “orders” as follows. In an
initial round of sorting all sell offers for which the selling price exceeds the buying price would
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be identified and dropped from consideration.10 The difference between the maximum buy
price and the offer price for a given hectare could then be calculated in order to generate the
net benefit of each potential transaction. The net benefit to cost ratio would then be
calculated, where the cost refers to the selling price. The Committee could then rank all the
projects and fund as many as possible from the top of the list. Producers would, of course, be
compensated according to the amount they are willing to accept; not what ICE is willing to
pay.
Note that this simplistic methodology presupposes that there is a fixed budget constraint for
purchasing sell “orders” and that the sell offers are divisible in the sense that an offer for a
given hectareage would be accepted at a lower hectareage. If the former is not the case the
Committee would want to fund all offers that produce positive net benefits. If the latter is not
the case, the Committee will need to exercise caution in selecting the subset of available offers
that maximise net benefits subject to the budget constraint. In practice, this is likely to mean
selecting from the top of the list until funds run short at which point the most efficient subset
of projects would be chosen with the funds remaining.
A number of practical details regarding such an incentive scheme are worth mentioning in
order to clarify the idea. First, the interventions that would be accepted by the committee
would ideally reflect the spirit of the measures put forward earlier. However, the final list of
interventions would be subject to consensus of the inter-institutional commission for the
watershed. As suggested above, this commission would be a prerequisite for developing the
incentive scheme. It is intended to represent both local communities and stakeholder
organisations with a presence in the area. Thus, a process of consultation, capacity-building
(as necessary) and participatory planning would ideally precede the attempt to build a
consensus list of “fundable” interventions.
Through this process of participatory planning the types of payment to be received in
compensation would be defined. Essentially three types of payments are envisioned under the
Action Programme: cash payments to individuals; payment in kind to individuals; and payment
in kind to social groups, particularly communities. Strictly speaking, payments in kind are
generally considered by economists to be less efficient than cash payments. If it is assumed
that producers have better information regarding the costs and benefits of various uses of their
lands, than those providing the incentives, then it is better to let the producer attempt to
optimise the allocation of available resource in production.11 Even where the objectives for a
programme of environmental improvement (in terms of its scale and the allocation of benefits)
will be decided on technical information and political consensus, the implementation of the

10

Note that if producers’ sell offers are very high, there is at least the possibility that an initial matching may
not yield any matches at all. In such a case, it will be necessary to repeat the process to assess whether the
problem is strategic behaviour by producers (or colluding groups of producers) or whether there are simply few
cases where land use change will produce net economic benefits. To preclude endless repetition and an
extended bout of strategic behaviour, the number of times that the bidding process may be repeated will need to
be limited at the outset.
11

Note that different groups of producers may have differing abilities to accurately assess the costs and benefits
involved. A small programme of technical assistance may, therefore, be useful in “levelling the playing field”
amongst producers.
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programme is most efficient if the microeconomic decisions are left to those on the ground and
not to the “experts” or bureaucrats (Daly 1992).
Economic efficiency is then best accomplished by providing the producer with cash payment
rather than limiting producer choice through payment in a pre-established number of goods
and services. This argument applies whether the discussion surrounds the provision of inputs
for realising the intervention, the provision of assistance with alternative activities such as soft
credit for ecotourism projects or new genetic material for livestock production, or the
construction of community projects.
Unfortunately, theory appears at odds with experience, at least in the case of rural
smallholders in developing countries. For example, a strong recommendation emerging from
one of the oldest reforestation programmes in Central America involving small producers (the
CARE Programme in Guatemala) is never to give incentive payments in cash. In this respect it
is worth noting that there is little or no experience in Río Chiquito of cash incentives.
Although a few producers were involved in the old CPB incentive programme, confusion over
its status and the relatively short period of implementation means that no lessons can yet be
drawn from this experience. Certainly, the practical success of the ACM and ICE
reforestation programmes suggests that payment in kind does produce results. Certainly, then
the issue of what type of payment to utilise must be carefully considered. Providing that the
risk of future non-compliance in fulfilling the contract can be minimised, there is no a priori
reason for excluding either option from consideration.
Nevertheless, the possibility of three different types of compensation does suggest that the
process of matching resources to producer bids would be a multi-dimensional problem. If
flexibility is allowed in terms of the types of contributions to the compensation fund (i.e. not
just cash incentives) there will be a range of compensation types. In addition, some of these
compensation types will be specific to particular interventions and, thus, will have limited
geographic scope. There is then a trade-off between increasing the flexibility of the fund in
terms of the contributions that are accepted and the number of interventions that are
acceptable under the bidding system, and the level of complexity associated with the allocation
process for awarding contracts.
A host of other practical details would also need to be decided upon in order to establish the
“rules of the game” for the incentive scheme. These elements, and those already mentioned,
would be based on the outcome of a formal design process for the scheme directed by the
inter-institutional commission and would include (but would not be limited to) the following:
•

terms of reference for the “compensation” committee

•

types of interventions considered for funding

•

type of compensation permitted

•

maximum and minimum scale of interventions planned

•

the time horizon of the contractual arrangement

•

type of proof of land ownership required to participate in the scheme, with the intent of
accommodating holdings that are not fully titled
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•

creation, assignation or contracting of an agent, organisation or subcommittee for
administering the incentive scheme

•

development of a credible monitoring and enforcement plan

A key element of the design of the incentive scheme is to ensure that the process of bidding
and the allocation of incentives is conducted in a fashion that allows it to benefit (instead of
losing) from the iterative nature of the interaction between buyers and sellers. In other words,
it should be a learning process, but one that is not asymmetrical. For example, the bids
accepted by the “compensation” committee could be published and distributed along with the
interventions to be undertaken so as to better inform the next round of bidding and also so as
to make public the commitments made by successful bidders.
Having indicated the general guidelines for a new incentive programme focused on increasing
the hydrological returns to land use, it is important to consider how this element of the Action
Programme would relate to existing incentives for watershed management in Río Chiquito.
The justification for developing a new incentive scheme for production of hydrological
externalities that is specific to Río Chiquito is derived from the analysis demonstrating that
important opportunities to improve hydroelectric production may be missed given the current
incentive programmes. Despite their intent, the government conservation incentives, the CPB
and CCB, do not promote hydrological production per se. Rather, they might be viewed as
useful mechanisms for accessing the value of stored carbon. In any case their centralised
nature and uniformity of structure and application make them very blunt, and therefore limited,
instruments. The ICE reforestation programme has many advantages. However, it is a fairly
restricted programme in scope and method. It is essentially a payment in kind (of inputs)
scheme for reforestation. In addition to its limited scope, the principal limitation of the ICE
programme is that it is not currently directed towards the sorts of measures that will lead to
improved watershed management for hydrological production.
With respect to these ongoing programmes two suggestions can be made regarding how their
efforts might be coordinated with the Action Programme. First, the inter-institutional
commission should definitely monitor the participation of landholders in the CPB or CCB
incentive programmes and pass this information to the “funding” committee. The purpose
here is to ensure that participants do not claim a double credit for commitments already made
to the government programmes. In addition, it is expected that the inter-institutional
commission will also serve to encourage and facilitate, where appropriate, the participation of
additional landholders in these programmes. An additional consideration would be for the
CCBs to actually be administered by the funding committee, rather than by cooperatives and
other organisations located outside of the watershed. This would assist the committee to
effectively achieve its goals and would be a significant innovation: local administration of
centralised state funds.
With reference to the existing ICE programme, it would appear that the most logical strategy
would be to link this programme into the new incentive scheme as one of the options by which
participants may contract into the overall Action Programme. This would require the ICE
programme to set aside a specific amount of its annual operational budget and contribute this
amount to the compensation fund. These resources, being contributions in kind, would be
designated for allocation to sealed bids that involve reforestation and require compensation in
terms of reforestation inputs. The ICE programme would then honor these commitments

CREED Working Paper Series No 21

45

under an agreement in this regard with the inter-institutional commission. The alternative of
course, would be to subsume the entire ICE programme within the overall ICE contribution to
the Action Programme.
Similarly, opportunities to interface with existing soil conservation programmes and livestock
technology improvement programmes, such as those of MAG-FAO, the Monteverde Cheese
Factory and the Tilarán Rancher’s Association, should be exploited. In fact, should interest in
a programme of technological improvements for livestock production be important enough to
warrant a fully-fledged programme, the potential for expanding this programme beyond those
involved in the incentive scheme should also be explored. As suggested earlier, improving the
productivity of soils can be regarded as a toll or club good. Thus, consideration should be
given to establishing a club of producers who receive technical assistance in compensation for
undertaking watershed management interventions, in return for purchasing entry into the club
or in return for contributing to other community development activities initiated as forms of
compensation. Cash payments made by members could then be directed towards cost
recovery of the technology programme or be deposited into the “unrestricted” account of the
compensation fund.
The basic premise of the contractual incentive mechanism is the exchange of improved
watershed management in return for compensation in cash or improved production
opportunities. However, should the “community” development and organisational aspect of
the Action Programme take off, there is no reason why access to existing programmes for
improving production opportunities should not be exchanged for contributions to community
development projects.
Finally, the Action Programme is essentially a pilot programme, focused as it is upon the needs
and conditions of the Río Chiquito watershed. However, there is the potential for expanding
the scheme to the entire Arenal watershed once it has been tested and proven to be successful.
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Evaluation of the Action Programme
In evaluating projects, policies or institutions, economists typically apply the concept of Pareto
optimality or economic efficiency. To this set of narrow criteria, political scientists normally
add a measure of the level of equity provided. Under the IAD framework, evaluation of
institutional arrangements and incentives implies that all of the following must be evaluated:
the rules in use in an action situation (including both economic and non-economic incentives),
the interaction of the action situation and actors that leads to outcomes, and the institutional
configuration that results - whether the aim is ex ante or ex post evaluation. Within the larger
framework of the IAD approach, then, a number of additional evaluative criteria beyond
simply efficiency and equity are added based on Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne (1993) and
Blomquist (1992): compliance, efficacy, adaptability and accountability. In the ensuing
discussion, these criteria are applied to the current situation in the watershed and to that
expected under the Action Programme. The analysis is qualitative and necessarily speculative,
given its ex ante nature. The principal objective of the exercise is to assess the major
advantages and disadvantages (if such exist) of the Action Programme as versus the status quo
and, as a consequence, illustrate the potential benefits of undertaking the Programme.
For the purposes of analysing the status quo it is assumed that despite the number of
“initiatives” referred to earlier there are four institutional arrangements governing watershed
management in Río Chiquito. The first is the current differentiated market for livestock
production. The incentive to produce in this case is determined in part by the market and in
part by government regulations. The second is the centralised programme of conservation
incentives promulgated by the government (CPBs and CCBs). The incentive mechanism
employed under this programme is a centralised contractual arrangement with cash payments.
The third arrangement is the centralised regulation under the new forest law that forbids the
changing of land use on land currently in forest. Finally, there is the polycentric arrangement
under which the ICE reforestation programme provides in kind contribution (reforestation
inputs) to farmers who are interested in planting trees. The latter three items are referred to as
the existing “conservation” programme.
The Action Programme as analysed below consists of the polycentric Action Programme
presented earlier, taking into account the subsequent modifications suggested in this paper.
The first step in the Programme is the development of an inter-institutional commission which
represents the stakeholders in the watershed. The commission will coordinate the
development of the incentive mechanism that will be employed to implement the specific
components of the Action Programme. The analysis below considers the development of a
programme of contractual arrangements in which producer commitments to undertake
measures aimed at improved watershed management (principally hydrological production) are
exchanged for compensatory resource transfers.
Compliance
As suggested by Blomquist (1992), the first criterion is the degree of compliance achieved
with respect to the rules governing an institutional arrangement or incentive package. One
possible measure of this criterion is indirect in nature: how often the participants fail the
established requisites or violate the defined limitations.
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Current Situation. Livestock producers are essentially in full compliance with the current rules
governing production. The nature of the output of this production, i.e. a marketable
commodity, implies that the rules are minimal. Undoubtedly, at the margin there is some noncompliance with state and local regulations regarding fiscal requirements (e.g. taxes) and land
use (e.g. observance of buffer strips around watercourses) due to the large transaction costs
that would accompany any effort to actually enforce such regulations.
As regards the CPB and CCB incentives, it is too early to cite examples of compliance or noncompliance. However, discussions with producers suggest that they are unhappy with the size
of the monetary incentive. This suggests that given the minimal capacity of the government or
MINAE to enforce the contractual terms of these arrangements changes in market conditions,
such as an increase in beef prices, may in the future increase the incentive to engage in noncompliance. The same conclusion, only stronger, may be reached with regard to the
prohibition of land use change, as this is simply a regulation levied on land use from the centre
without any accompanying compensation.
In the case of the ICE reforestation programme it is not clear what constitutes compliance
given that recipients of assistance do not make explicit contracts in return for the assistance.
If compliance is defined as following through with the management of areas planted and replanting following harvest then the results will no doubt vary with the observed success of the
interventions. For example, if pasture productivity is improved by lessening the impact of
wind and conserving soil and if the plantings produce useful wood products a high level of
compliance is likely with windbreaks. Although the ICE programme is significantly different
from past efforts at reforestation in Río Chiquito, it should nevertheless be mentioned that past
experience with reforestation in the watershed has had a very low (if not zero) level of
compliance.
Action Programme. The Action Programme proposes to incorporate the CCB programme
and the ICE reforestation programme into the Programme and, thus, there will be similarities
in compliance in this respect. The distinction insofar as reforestation measures are concerned
is that the Action Programme will involve the signing of specific contracts for specific
measures. Making the contract explicit, increasing the transparency and clarifying the intent of
the contract should increase the level of compliance. Further, the publishing of successful bids
may serve to establish non-economic incentives (e.g. reputational incentives) for compliance
on the part of producers.
The incorporation of additional types of compensation into the Action Programme may also
result in a higher level of participation and compliance. For example, the inclusion of a
programme of livestock technology improvement alongside a “conservation” programme is
often a means of ensuring enhanced compliance with the conservation elements of a
programme. A programme in El Salvador offered a single package of incentives that
incorporated technologies for improving both conservation and productivity (Saín and Barreto
1996). The programme had a higher rate of adoption than a similar, non-unified programme.
The authors attribute this success to the existence of both economic and institutional
incentives, in particular the existence of a short-term productive benefit to compensate the
longer-term conservation benefit. Also playing an important role was the additional
requirement that the package was offered only to groups, the members of which all agreed to
adopt the entire package. This example confirms the sentiment expressed by stakeholders in
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Río Chiquito suggesting that the Action Programme may increase its compliance level to the
extent that it can involve groups of producers in the scheme and not just individual producers.
Efficacy
Efficacy refers to the achievement of stated objectives for the institutional arrangements and
incentives put in place. In many cases, the evaluation of a situation of action should be
undertaken, not according to the efficiency gained in the achievement of the planned
objectives, but according to whether the objectives were achieved at all.
Current Situation. Aylward et al. (1998a) suggest that most producers in the watershed are
deriving private returns from their livestock activities. However, there are a number of
producers who may not even be covering the opportunity cost of their labour, much less
providing a return to their use of the land. The larger objectives of the existing conservation
programme in Río Chiquito are essentially the same, being the maintenance of the
environmental services provided by forest. The problem is that the quantitative analysis
presented in Aylward et al. (1998a) suggests that the measures taken will not necessarily
achieve these objectives.
Action Programme. The Action Programme would lead to an improvement in the private
profitability of producers who are borderline profitable by enabling them to access some of the
off-site hydrological benefits they are generating for ICE. For producers who are already
achieving their objective of profitability the programme holds the potential for increasing their
profitability in certain instances by participating in the Programme. The Programme would,
therefore, increase the achievement of the respective objectives of the livestock sector.
Again, the larger objectives under the Action Programme are not dissimilar to those under the
existing conservation programme. An important difference, however, is the recognition by the
Action Programme that the key objective of the Programme should be to maximise the water
yield (while limiting sediment delivery) of a given parcel of land under the full range of uses.
In other words, the objective is both expanded and contracted: expanded to include improved
watershed management under pasture or forest; and contracted to focus on the hydrological
function.
The Action Programme promises to be more efficacious, as the interventions proposed will
target (as directly as possible) the increase of water yield. The existing conservation
programme can be interpreted to work against the achievement of its objective, given the
misinterpretation regarding the evapotranspirative role of forests in non-cloud forest areas and
the role of logging in opening up forest fragments for the capture of horizontal precipitation.
Thus, the Action Programme appears to have a definite advantage in terms of its potential for
efficacy. This evaluation is, of course, tempered by consideration that the Programme still
only a plan on paper and will face many obstacles before it can be judged to be efficacious.
Principal amongst the obstacles is the issue of the level of transaction costs that must be
incurred in achieving the inter-institutional coordination required to get the Programme
underway.
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Efficiency
In general terms, economic efficiency is determined by the magnitude of the change in the flow
of net benefits associated with the allocation or reallocation of resources. The concept is used
in different ways, two of which are of interest for the purposes of evaluation. First is
administrative efficiency, which refers to the cost-efficiency of action and administrative effort
as incurred in the achievement of desired objectives. Transaction costs (related to
coordination, the negotiation of information and the management of opportunism, and
corruption) and transformation costs (related to the transformation of product input, material
or symbolic) can be included here. Second is the level of efficiency in the use of natural
resources. Given that these resources produce a range of goods and services and require the
use of economic inputs in production, it is important to assess whether changes in use patterns
will lead to an increase in economic efficiency. This is, of course, analogous to traditional
concepts of economic efficiency, absent transaction or transformation costs.
Current Situation. The current conservation programme can be regarded as administratively
efficient, as the ICE reforestation programme and the CCB programme build on a range of
initiatives underway in the area surrounding Río Chiquito, substantially lowering transaction
costs. Economically, however, the programme must be regarded as inefficient in the use of
natural resources. The prohibition against change in land use is clearly contrary to economic
efficiency in Río Chiquito. Opening up of areas in cloud forest areas would provide important
hydrological inputs to ARCOSA in the dry period. However, such action is effectively ruled
out under the forest law.
Action Programme. Given the quantitative analysis provided in Aylward et al. (1998a), it is
clear that the chief advantage of the Action Programme is that it represents an attempt to
target interventions in the watershed that will raise economic efficiency in the use of natural
resources. Given the current forest law this improvement is likely to come principally in the
improvement of hydroelectric production. However, given the possibility that this law will be
modified in the future, there also exists the possibility of realising win-win scenarios in with
gains in both livestock and hydroelectric production. At the same time, the Action
Programme does entail significant transaction costs and, thus, is probably administratively less
efficient than existing programmes. Before proceeding with the Action Programme it would
be useful to have an idea of what these transactions will cost and to compare them with the
expected benefits from improving efficiency in the use of natural resources.
Equity
Under the IAD framework equity is divided into fiscal and distributive equity. Fiscal equity
refers to the extent that administrative costs are made in a form correspondent to the received
benefits. Distributive equity refers to whether the benefits of an institutional arrangement
under analysis are distributed in an equitable manner between the participants, taking into
account their respective ability to pay. These two criteria pertain to equity of outcomes in
terms of resulting costs and benefits. However, equity in terms of the process that is followed
in arriving at outcomes is also of importance. This could be termed participatory equity. It
involves at least three elements: (1) the ability of all stakeholders to express their opinions
during the process (equity of voice), (2) the ability of all stakeholders to access information
regarding the process (equity in access to information) and (3) the degree of equity in
decision-making (equity in power).
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Current Situation. The historical pattern of the development of the livestock industry in Costa
Rica and the larger regulatory framework under which it falls cannot be said to have been
equitable either in terms of distribution or participation. Large landowners have typically had
a disproportionate influence on national politics, ensuring that they capture a disproportionate
share of the benefits of policies and regulations enacted, such as credit for livestock
development. And even though Costa Rica has a long history of democratic government, the
highly centralised and bureaucratic history of the welfare state in Costa Rica has not
engendered an equitable participation of rural smallholders in policy and decision-making
processes. Thus, on grounds of equity it would appear that ensuring that small producers
participate and benefit from new opportunities would be a priority.
Within Río Chiquito more specifically, fiscal and distributive equity with regard to
hydrological services provided by lands under production can be regarded as inequitable. ICE
is not bearing administrative costs related to land management in the watershed (with the
exception of the new reforestation programme). Nor has ICE gone out of its way to extend
basic services or infrastructure into the watershed. In terms of distributive equity, outside of
the limited options under the ICE reforestation programme and the CCB incentives, producers
have no way of sharing in the hydrological benefits generated by their use of the land.
The prohibition on land use change under the new forest law would have to be regarded as
equitable in the sense that the law applies to all lands, effectively expropriating use rights from
all landholders. The extent to which the process by which this resolution was reached
involved equitable participation of all sectors was, however, probably limited, given that it
fulfills a radical environmentalist agenda with little concession to the needs of rural
landowners.
As for the CCB programme it is too early to tell whether it will be equitable. Certainly, the
previous CPB programme was not equitably distributed across the country, with most of the
certificates going to the Guanacaste province. Another limitation of the CPB was that
MINAE required that land be fully titled in order for access to CPBs to be granted. This
regulation implicitly excludes the lower socioeconomic bracket of the population from this
programme. Nevertheless, the CCB incentives may represent a degree of fiscal and
distributive equity given that producers signing up for the CCB will be accessing carbon
benefits and that directly or indirectly, carbon consumers will be contributing to the
administrative costs of the programme. For example, if the CCB programme is actually able
to access funds from the new gasoline tax, carbon consumers within Costa Rica (not just
global consumers) will be contributing to the programme.
The ICE reforestation programme, on the other hand, appears to be available to those evincing
an interest in participating regardless of their antecedents, which suggests a reasonable level of
distributive equity. As ICE is shouldering the administrative costs of the programme, it can
also be considered to be fiscally equitable. The programme could be faulted on grounds of
low participatory equity, given that the process of defining the programme was likely to have
been dealt with at headquarters level and not discussed publicly (however, see below under
adaptability).
Action Programme. Under the Action Programme fiscal equity can be expected to improve,
as the off-site users of environmental services will be expected to bear the administrative costs
of the incentive programme. Distributive equity will also be improved, as landowners,
particularly smallholders, will have the opportunity to share in the benefits of increases in
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hydroelectric production. As indicated, the process of pulling together the inter-institutional
commission and the subsequent design of the incentive mechanism is intended to be, to the
extent possible, a participatory process. The opinions of the community and other
stakeholders will be heard and all of these groups will share in the decision-making. Further,
the aim of the programme will be to divulge relevant information to all concerned regarding
the bidding process, its outcome and the status of contracts reached (as evidenced by the
monitoring function). This will ensure that all involved in the initial process may continue to
stay informed and participate in a knowledgeable fashion as the programme is refined. Thus,
participatory equity should also improve under the Action Programme.
Adaptability
A key criterion, and one that is often overlooked, is the capacity of an institutional
arrangement to adapt itself to changing circumstances and to exploit new ideas as they
emerge.
Current Situation. The differentiated market that governs livestock production can be seen to
have a limited degree of adaptability insofar as producers may switch amongst the different
production types and the concentration of land-ownership may rise or fall. However, in terms
of developing better production methods, the sector has shown little in the way of advances
for some time. Most producers use the same pasture, and the main type of technical assistance
obtained is for artificial insemination.
In fact, the idea of planting windbreaks is probably the most innovative development in recent
years. In this respect the ICE programme is likely to have a high degree of adaptability. As it
does not require firm contracts with users, the programme is free from the typical bureaucracy
of government programmes. It can also be expected that the techniques employed will be
adapted to local needs and the programme will learn from its experiences, given its emphasis
on dialogue with producers and its nature as an on-farm laboratory of sorts. In a more general
sense the ICE programme reflects the larger trend in Río Chiquito and the surrounding area
from centralised to polycentric arrangements, the latter implicitly being more responsive and,
hence, adaptive to local conditions.
This sort of flexibility is totally absent from the provisions of the new forestry law, which
represents a step backwards into a centralised regulatory framework. Under the Costa Rican
constitution, government programmes must be non-discriminatory. Unfortunately, this has
been interpreted to mean that incentives for forest conservation offered by law in one section
of the country must be the same as those offered in another part of the country, albeit under
completely different biophysical and socioeconomic conditions. Thus, the CCB and Forestry
Law demonstrate little to no adaptability.
Action Programme. Adaptability should be a key feature of the Action Programme, which will
attempt to capitalise on the growing emphasis on polycentric institutional arrangements in the
area. A key factor enhancing the adaptability of the Programme is that it is a pilot project and,
thus, should be continually reviewed for means of improving performance. If anything, the
proposed design for the contractual arrangements will need to be rendered less flexible as it
moves towards implementation. The potential to incorporate different sources of funds and to
develop a variety of interventions with a number of forms of compensation suggests that the
initial problem to be faced will be limiting the choices involved in order to control the
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complexity of the programme. In addition, it can be expected that the participatory planning
process and subsequent monitoring and dissemination of information about the progress of the
programme should enable the programme to profit from observations made by producers and
the local communities themselves as to how to improve the programme.
Accountability
An essential element for the adaptability of an institutional arrangement is the presence of
mechanisms through which those responsible for certain tasks can be held accountable for
successfully (or not) completing these tasks.
Current Situation. Users and beneficiaries of current institutional arrangements in Río
Chiquito have typically had little means of control over the programmes that target them.
Even when programmes such as the CCB and ICE’s reforestation programme are well
intentioned, reasonably effective and polycentric in nature, the fact remains that local
participants are generally not able to hold these programmes accountable for their actions.
This is at least in part due to the preponderance of centralised bureaucratic power that still
exists within MINAE and ICE. For example, despite the decentralisation of executing
authority to organisations in the regions (e.g. AGUADEFOR) the ministry remains heavily
involved in assigning the incentives across the regions and in setting the administrative
procedures for implementation. The ministry in turn is heavily influenced by national party
politics, with local and regional interests having little political power at this level. Authority
then remains in the centre with the political elite despite the decentralisation of operations.
Action Programme. To the extent that the proposed Programme will be lodged within a
transparent and participatory process of design and implementation, it is expected that the
Programme will lead to a higher degree of local accountability. At the same time, it is not the
intention to completely divorce the Programme from national accountability. Rather, it is
intended that ICE be the principal national stakeholder in the process, a stakeholder with a
significant interest in monitoring the level of compliance of producers with their contractual
obligations. Thus, there will remain the need to account for the Programme to the nation as a
whole, given that the funds flow from the centre. The key questions to be answered at this
level are as follows: how were the resources used, to what extent were the promised
interventions undertaken, and how effective were the interventions? Thus, national
accountability should function at the level of monitoring and serve as an ultimate backstop for
enforcement should things get out of control.
However, it would be ideal, if not a necessary component of success, if the Programme could
generate a consciousness amongst the local programme that those running the programme and
those participating in it are, in the first instance, accountable to the local community. This is
related to the concept that for such a programme to really be sustainable in the long term it
must be “owned” by the local population. There is no better indicator of ownership than the
exercise of the power of accountability by local communities.
In sum, the evaluation reveals that the institutional arrangements and incentives proposed
under the Action Programme are likely to perform better across all six of the criteria
investigated. The existing conservation programmes fall considerably short of what can be
expected from the Action Programme on the criteria of efficacy, efficiency and fiscal and
distributive equity. This is not unexpected, given that the Action Programme emerges from a
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process of in-depth biophysical and economic analysis, whilst the other programmes represent
more of a political agenda, albeit a technocratic one. It is also likely that under the Action
Programme the livestock sector will also perform better on these two substantive criteria.
With regard to the more process-related criteria of participatory equity, adaptability and
accountability, the ability to plan for a participatory process involving all relevant stakeholders
also leads to superior performance for the Action Programme on these criteria. As an attempt
to create a truly polycentric institutional arrangement, the Action Programme will benefit
greatly from empowering local communities to take an active role in steering the process of
institutional change and design of incentive mechanisms.

CREED Working Paper Series No 21

54

Conclusions
This paper presents an Action Programme including objectives, institutional arrangements and
incentives for improved watershed management in Río Chiquito. The Programme is grounded
in the original version of the Action Programme, developed through a participatorystakeholder process initiated by the CREED project. Modifications and extensions to the
ideas presented in the original Programme are based on integration of the quantitative
environmental-economic analysis contained in the companion paper of Aylward et al. (1998a)
and the application of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, as developed in
this paper. Proposed extensions to the original Action Programme include the identification of
specific watershed management measures and proposals for new institutional arrangements
and incentive mechanisms to govern the provision and production of the “bundle” of goods
and services produced in the Río Chiquito watershed. Finally, a preliminary evaluation of the
modified Action Programme is undertaken employing the IAD evaluative criteria.
Examination of stakeholder views suggests that much work remains to be done on developing
a consensus view regarding the principal environmental problems experienced in Río Chiquito
under current watershed management practices. The environmental-economic analysis
provided by the CREED project may succeed in bringing stakeholders closer together insofar
as an assessment of the threat of sedimentation of Lake Arenal is concerned. However, the
suggestion that both pasture and fragmented cloud forest provide large gains in hydroelectric
production by means of an increase in annual water yield will be controversial, though good
news to producers who are often criticised by conservationists. Certainly, the participatory
process engendered under the current process has at least opened up a stakeholder dialogue,
one that may eventually enable a consensus to be reached.
Review of local and national trends in watershed management within Costa Rica and Río
Chiquito suggests that a transition is underway from market and centralised arrangements
towards polycentric arrangements, with a mixture of market and non-market incentives being
employed in the provision and production of environmental services. Pasture management,
soil conservation and forestry initiatives are produced largely by private actors operating under
market incentives, yet there are also a host of public agencies and NGOs that are either
supporting these activities or considering initiatives in this area.
With regard to the point of central interest to the study - the existence of hydrological
externalities - the analysis suggests that the substantial transaction costs implicit in moving
forward to tackle these externalities has probably led to inaction in the past. This problem
may have been exacerbated by the poor quality of internal ICE information on the extent of
the sedimentation problem and apparent ignorance of the linkage between land use and water
yield. However, changes in organisational abilities and attitudes at both national and local
levels suggest that the transaction costs of actually producing improved watershed
management have been lowered dramatically in the last decade. Indeed, both the technical
aspects of the CREED project and the participatory-stakeholder approach, and resulting
Action Programme for Río Chiquito, may be interpreted as efforts aimed at reducing
uncertainty regarding the benefits of watershed management and stimulating efforts to
improve watershed management through collective action.
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The Action Programme, as put together at a stakeholder workshop, proposes to focus efforts
on six objectives: (1) forest conservation and regeneration, (2) land use change in marginal
pasture areas, (3) improving livestock technology, (4) community development, (5)
development of local ecotourism and (6) creation of inter-institutional coordination. This
paper examines in great detail the justification for items 1-3, based on an integration of
information on the relative benefits provided by different watershed goods and services in Río
Chiquito with a discussion of the public good nature of these goods and services. The
practical measures for improving watershed management that emerge from the technical
analysis are then examined in terms of their incentive compatibility and the consistency of
existing institutional arrangements and incentives. From there, recommendations emerge for
changes to these arrangements and specific ideas for the incentives mechanism in order to alter
producer behaviour and turn land use towards more economically efficient watershed
management practices.
Not surprisingly, the findings suggest that the public good characteristics of a number of the
watershed goods and services produced in Río Chiquito imply the need for institutional
arrangements beyond that represented by markets. However, the results suggest that simply
labelling such goods and services as public goods is too simplistic an approach. In the Arenal
case, although upstream landholders may find it difficult to exclude others from consuming the
downstream benefits of land use decisions already made, the possibility remains that they may
retain rights of exclusion over future land use decisions. Given the private good
characteristics of downstream hydrological products this suggests that there does exist a basis
for a market-driven, polycentric arrangement between upstream producers and downstream
consumers. Thus, the advantage of investigating the public good natures of the myriad of
goods and services produced by watersheds is that it provides an analytical basis for the
suggestions of the types of institutional arrangements that might be most appropriate for the
management of these goods and services. In addition, the analysis suggests that the public
good nature of these goods and services must be placed in a historical context and take
account of current trends affecting levels of exclusion and rivalry.
Generalising on results from such an analysis is complicated by the inescapable fact that the
classification (and value) of these goods and services is site specific and that the goods are
jointly produced. In the case of off-site hydrological services the discussion highlights the
variability that may exist from site to site, and from one downstream use to another, in terms
of the degree of exclusion and rivalry that exists. At the same time the “bundle” of goods and
services and their relative economic importance will vary from one site to the next. As a
result, it is likely that centralised arrangements for the public production and provision of these
goods and services will generally be inappropriate. Instead, decentralised or, better still,
polycentric arrangements are required. Under such arrangements the identification of an
appropriate mix of market, bureaucratic and collective action incentives must be made in a
pragmatic, almost ad hoc fashion that permits both local and national stakeholders to inform
the process.
In light of these findings, the original Action Programme is reviewed, modifying the relative
emphasis placed on the different objectives of the Programme. Analysis of on-site goods and
services yields the conclusion that there is little cause for investing public funds in soil
conservation measures in Río Chiquito for the express purpose of enhancing on-site
productivity. Such measures, however, may be appropriate if conditional upon the provision
of positive off-site externalities. Specific measures for improving the provision and production
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of off-site benefits are differentiated by whether they pertain to non-cloud or cloud forest
areas. In both areas these include the reforestation of erosion-prone, marginal pasture areas
and natural regeneration of buffer strips alongside streams. In non-cloud forest areas the
cutting or conversion of forest in areas that are not prone to erosion would increase water
inputs to the reservoir. Measures in cloud forest that would similarly promote water
production by increasing the capture of horizontal precipitation are highly recommended.
These include cutting and/or conversion of patches within large contiguous forest areas,
natural regeneration of forest in large areas of pasture and planting of windbreaks in pasture
areas.
Given reduced transaction costs of providing the technical assistance required to initiate such
measures, it is expected that the economic interest of the three principal stakeholders (ICE,
livestock producers and international/carbon stakeholders) should drive the development of a
polycentric institutional arrangement coordinated by the inter-institutional commission for the
watershed. Existing conservation arrangements are only loosely polycentric. Despite the
devolution of operating authority to local agencies, planning and decision-making authority
remain vested in the centre. Critical to the success of the polycentric arrangement is that ICE
and international stakeholders allow local communities to have a more effective say in
establishing the rules for the Action Programme.
As an input to this process, an incentive mechanism suitable to Río Chiquito is proposed based
on a technical review of the suitability of a number of traditional and novel mechanisms for
resolving externality problems of this nature. It is recommended that the inter-institutional
commission called for under the Action Programme develop a two-way sealed bid auction
system of allocating contractual arrangements under which producers agree to undertake
management improvements in return for compensatory resource transfers (or projects).
External stakeholders wishing to obtain off-site services would not only contribute funds but
assist in establishing priorities for the awarding of contracts, up to and including establishing
their willingness to pay for specific measures in specific geographic areas. Ideally, producers
would likewise set their offer price for specific measures in specific geographic areas. The
respective sealed bids would be sorted and matched in a cost-effective, optimising manner by
an independent committee organised under the commission. The hydrological and economic
information developed in the CREED project could be used to establish both hydrological and
carbon storage priorities, while the offer price for the measures would be best left to the
individual producers to decide.
As a preliminary means of validating the Action Programme, the proposed institutional
arrangements and incentive mechanisms are compared to those already in existence according
to the criteria developed under the IAD framework: compliance, efficacy, efficiency, equity,
adaptability and accountability. Not surprisingly, given the degree of consultation and analysis
involved in its preparation, the Action Programme appears to represent an important
improvement over the existing situation. From a purely economic standpoint of efficiency,
further research should consider whether the incremental net benefits that would be realised
under this Programme would, in fact, be greater than the transaction costs implicit in its
development. However, given the potential that the approach may have as a pilot project for
the entire Arenal watershed and other sites, such a condition may be overly restrictive given
the substantial transaction costs inherent in any novel yet replicable institutional innovation.
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Annex 1. Institutional Arrangements12
An “institution” is a set of norms or effective rules used by a group of people in order to
organise a certain sphere of their collective activities. In action situations it is possible to
identify a number of institutional arrangements including market, centralised, decentralised or
polycentric arrangements. Three types of market arrangements exist: simple markets,
differentiated markets and user groups. Markets are generally regarded as appropriate
institutional arrangements for the production of private goods.13 Non-market arrangements,
including centralised, decentralised and polycentric arrangements, are necessary when society
faces the problem of administering goods with public goods characteristics.
A simple market is one in which each consumer is individually responsible for the process of
providing the required goods and services, articulating their demand directly to producers
(also individuals) of those goods and services. In a differentiated market, there are provider
organisations that orchestrate the production required to meet the final demand of the
consumer individuals. As a result, the costs of coordination are less than in the simple market.
User groups, operating within a differentiated market, can function as provider organisations
made up of final consumers who orchestrate the production of required goods and services
either through individual producers or through organisations of producers. For example an
irrigation association consists of a group that bands together to produce the good in question
(irrigation) and simultaneously consumes the final product. As compared to production under
a differentiated market (by individual producer units) the scheme results in a reduction of
transaction costs because there is better control of opportunistic behaviour (rule-breakers may
be effectively excluded by the group). Such conclusions are subject to user groups that are
relatively small and well defined.
A centralised institutional arrangement has, as distinct from the three situations indicated
above, specialised groups of public functionaries - some elected, others not - that take national
decisions as much for the provision as for the production of the goods and services required
by the consumers. The future career of these full-time functionaries depends to a greater or
lesser degree (according to the level of influence or pressure the consumers are able to
exercise) on their superiors, increasing strategic costs (of corruption and shirking) and the
costs of coordination and development of local information. There is evidence that these
problems could be overcome through local participation in processes of decision-making and
implementation; however the existing incentives for public functionaries in this sense are weak.
Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne (1993) argue that the predomination of centralised schemes for
the provision and production of development infrastructure is based on a “truncated” analysis,
centred on three performance criteria: economies of scale; access to technical knowledge and

12

This sub-section is based on Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne (1993).

13

See Annex 4 for an explanation of this argument.
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control of opportunist behaviour. Such an approach does not take into consideration all the
implicit costs (excluding the operational costs and those of maintenance, coordination,
information and strategies) nor all the possible institutional options (excluding those of a
decentralised or polycentric character). In certain cases, a more comprehensive analysis might
favour the option of mixed arrangements. Examples include centralised provision with
decentralised production (this might be in private hands or enacted through public agencies,
not only on a national level but also on a local one) or non-centralised arrangements of
provision and production with lower intermediate costs and better global performance.
With regard to the analysis of decentralised arrangements, Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne
(1994) clarify that they mean the concept of administrative decentralisation or
deconcentration. This involves the transference of authority held by national government
functionaries in metropolitan areas to national government functionaries based in dispersed
localities. This approach can reduce the costs of acquiring locally relevant information but the
information that is produced is not always used effectively, given the existing incentives for
local functionaries to put metropolitan mandates over and above local interests. The key to
radical and effective decentralisation is in the transference of authority and responsibility to the
local functionaries, citizens and users.14
A final option consists of non-centralised or polycentric institutional arrangements which
“distribute circumscribed but independent rule-making and rule-enforcing authority among
numerous jurisdictions. All public authorities have official standing, and no individual or
group serves as the final, all-purpose authority that stands above the law” (Ostrom, Schroeder
and Wynne: 177-178). A polycentric government structure offers its citizens the opportunity
of organizing not one but many governing authorities. Each authority is primarily a unit for
the provision of goods and services, capable of producing for itself or contracting the required
production, thus, attaining available economies of scale in the design, construction,
maintenance and operation of services. Some of these government offices have general
authority, providing a wide range of services, but others have one unique or specific aim. The
functionaries of each government office are selected independently from those of other
jurisdictions, so that hierarchical relationships that exist inside one government office do not
exist inside the others. Disputes over jurisdiction are resolved outside the administrative
hierarchy, in courts or other places designated for the resolution of conflicts.
The Chhattis Mauja, a large-scale, farmer-managed irrigation system in Nepal provides an
example of a polycentric arrangement (Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne: 188-189). The system
is self-organised and involves a nested system of governing authorities that has four levels:
1.

Village committees and a chairperson that set distribution rules and organise
maintenance work

2.

Regional committees made up of village chairs that coordinate village work on the
diversion structure and main canal, and solve intra-village disputes

3.

A central committee made up of regional chairs, that organises development, operation
and maintenance of the main canal and diversion structure,

14

Thus, the distinction between administrative decentralization and the decentralization of decision-making.
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4.

The Tinau Committee on which the central committee chair sits, that allocates water to
the Chhattis Mauja and four other irrigation systems

Each of these governing bodies exercise independent authority within their respective area of
authority and geographical area and, thus, the entire arrangement is polycentric, i.e. it has
many centres.
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Annex 2. Participatory-Stakeholder Process
The participatory-stakeholder process began with consultation of the principal institutional
actors or stakeholders involved in the management of Lake Arenal, with a specific emphasis
on those actors involved in Río Chiquito. The actors can be divided into nine groups as
follows:
1.

Livestock producers, including both large and small producers, with considerable
participation by the local Livestock Producers Association.

2.

Other producers, mainly small coffee growers, affiliated to a regional coffee
cooperative (which is also linked to a regional foresters association, AGUADEFOR)
and small-and-medium foresters, some of whom are currently experimenting with soil
conservation technologies (primarily reforestation and windbreaks).

3.

The Monteverde Conservation League (ACM), which protects a large expanse of
forest, including cloud forest (called the “Children’s Eternal Rainforest”) and operates
a set of incentive and technical assistance programmes for soil conservation and
reforestation in the area adjacent to Río Chiquito.

4.

The local municipality (Tilarán), which has in the past tried to negotiate arrangements
with ICE to ensure that the local people share in the benefits of the Lake Arenal
hydropower scheme.

5.

The Arenal Conservation Area (ACA), the government agency responsible for the
large conservation area which includes all of the Arenal watershed and Río Chiquito.
ACA functions with the support of WWF-Canada and the Canadian International
Development Agency, and its activities include small pilot projects aimed at protecting
the Río Chiquito watershed.

6.

The Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE), responsible for the national electricity and
communications monopolies and, consequently, the operation of Lake Arenal and its
power complex (ARCOSA).

7.

The national water and irrigation service, SENARA, the end-user of water from Lake
Arenal for the PRAT irrigation project in the Guanacaste province.

8.

Two FAO programmes with pilot soil conservation projects in the area (one with the
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAG) and another with the Agrarian
Development Institute (IDA)).

9.

Two national environmental NGOs (CEDARENA and AMBIO) concerned with legal
innovations that are required to empower national efforts in conservation with
development.

Three rounds of consultations were undertaken with these actors over a three-month period
(March-May 1996). The first round of consultations consisted of semi-structured interviews
with some thirty-four key informants selected to represent the different stakeholder groups.
Each interview focused on the following areas:
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•

existing land uses and alternatives in the watershed, particularly in Río Chiquito

•

stakeholder criteria for evaluating these uses and alternatives

•

relevant incentives and institutional arrangements which, on the one hand, underlie
current land uses and, on the other, would serve to promote other alternatives.

The second round of consultations consisted of interviews with the original contacts in order
to validate and correct a transcript of the first interview and to obtain feedback on a
preliminary systematisation of results gathered in the first round (current uses and alternatives;
evaluation criteria; incentives and arrangements). Although this second interview was also
semi-structured, the interviewees were given a closed-end questionnaire in order to evaluate
the proposed systematisation according to the criteria of efficiency, equity, adaptability and
accountability.
The final round of consultations was a one-day workshop, held on 1 June, 1997 in which 40
representatives of the stakeholder groups were brought together to discuss a second
systematisation of results under the general heading of an action programme for watershed
management in Río Chiquito. The first session of the workshop consisted of a plenary
presentation and group discussion of the underlying problems of the watershed. Two
subsequent rounds of plenary, group discussion and reports back to plenary were then held on
two themes: actions for resolving these problems and plans for taking the agenda forward,
particularly with regard to inter-institutional development within the watershed. The
workshop’s principal objective was to initiate a long-overdue dialogue between stakeholders
aimed at producing a common understanding of existing action proposals and the respective
criteria of the different stakeholders. The product of the workshop was an initial consensus
agenda for further discussion and action.
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Annex 3. Existing Institutional Arrangements and
Incentives for Watershed Management
In this Annex the historical tendencies towards centralisation and their implications for the
incentives and institutional arrangements that govern resource and environmental management
in Costa Rica and in Río Chiquito are described and analysed. At both national and local
levels, however, the trend is towards decentralisation. This transition is subsequently explored
in terms of fundamental changes in national level processes and the initiatives in the area
surrounding Río Chiquito that are beginning to be promoted in the watershed.
Centralised Institutional Arrangements and the Environment in Costa Rica
Historically, policies governing the management of natural resources and the environment in
Costa Rica have had their origin in top-down, centralised arrangements. Five centralised
arrangements that have had an important impact on the environment are summarised below.
1.

Land colonisation policies, including the Family Providers Law of 1934 and Land
Tenancy Information Law of 1941, established an initial legal (and cultural) framework
in which ownership of land was accomplished by demonstrating that the land was in
“use,” evidence of which was produced by clearing the land (Segura and Solórzano
1995; Watson et al. 1998).

2.

State provision of subsidised credit for the development of the ranching industry began
in the 1950s (Segura and Solórzano 1995).

3.

The internal organisation of state institutions and the relationships of these institutions
with the public they are designed to serve are characterised by a bureaucratic,
centralised and top-down mind-set.

4.

Legal principles ensured that “the polluted paid” instead of the “polluter paid” as the
rights associated with the use and management of private property held sway over
collective rights to environmental quality and other goods of public nature.

5.

Property rights over environmental goods and services (typically vested in the state)
have excluded the local population from participating in their management and sharing
in the benefits of these services, particularly as relates to protected areas.

Notwithstanding historical tendencies, recent trends suggest that the biases towards
centralisation is changing, or at least is under sustained pressure to reform. Increasing
recognition of the importance of forests as a provider of natural resources and environmental
quality has led to important changes in the elements mentioned above in recent years. No
longer is clearing of land required to demonstrate ownership, although the general lack of any
remaining areas for colonisation makes this a moot point. The availability of soft credit for
ranching has been drastically reduced in the 1990s. Pressure on forests and the environment,
led by the expansion of the traditional agro-livestock export model may, therefore, be said to
have diminished considerably. However, it can be argued that while these symptoms of a
development model based on state-led and financed export promotion have disappeared, the
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underlying model still has life left in it. Export industries currently enjoying centralised
support include ecotourism and the production of non-traditional agricultural exports.
Developments in the forestry sector from the 1980s onwards, however, presage the beginning
of a less centralised approach to natural resource management. The origins of a more
polycentric approach may be seen in the implementation phase, from 1979, of the first forestry
law, with the creation of a series of direct incentives for reforestation and forest management
(Segura and Solórzano 1995). It is within this larger framework that the experience of the
Guanacaste Forestry Development Association (AGUADEFOR) as a regional intermediary
organisation in the allocation of these forestry incentives and the role of two local
intermediaries, COOPETILA and COOPELDOS (Coffee Producers Cooperatives of Tilarán
and El Dos, respectively) were developed in Guanacaste province.
Two important institutional innovations also suggest the desire to change the traditionally
centralised and hierarchical internal organisation of state agencies and their relationships
towards their “clients.” The National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC) originated in
the late 1980s, receiving formal legal standing only in the mid-1990s. SINAC has as its aim
the creation of regional conservation areas centred around existing protected areas (parks,
wildlife reserves, forestry reserves, etc) and including buffer zones (areas targeted for
conservation activities) and zones of “influence.” Recent modifications to the system have
essentially led to the division of the entire country into these Areas. More importantly, in
1996 the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE) began a process of administrative
decentralisation, transferring bureaucratic authority that was previously held in San José to
conservation area headquarters located in the field. This was accompanied by the merging of
the wildlife, forestry and park service into a single body charged with a broader conservation
agenda. In addition, some areas have engaged in limited efforts to transfer administrative
authority to local government and regional environmental commissions.
A second initiative is the strengthening of municipalities, heretofore relatively weak and
inefficient actors. Changes in 1996 to the law governing property taxes now assign authority
for the collection of these taxes to local government. In the short-term this will greatly
increase the power of municipalities to execute development and infrastructure projects. In
the longer-term it is possible that the interest of local authorities in regulating the process of
local development by means of planning regulations at the municipal level will lead to
important changes in environmental regulations. Accompanying this increase in the resource
base available to local authorities is a proposal to further democratise local authority by
requiring that Municipal Directors be elected, as well as other measures aimed at increasing
participation and accountability of local government.
Progress in sensitising basic legal principles and legislation to environmental concerns has also
been made in recent years. Reform of Article 50 of the Constitution of the Republic of 1994
and the new Organic Environmental Law (No. 7554) suggest the potential for limiting the
exercise of private property rights, stipulating that environmental health and the conservation
of natural resources constitute basic rights of citizens. Under these reforms it is increasingly
likely that citizens or groups acting on behalf of the state (and for the public good) will be able
to seek legal vindication and compensation for environmental “crimes.” There is currently no
precedent for such action in Costa Rica, nor indeed in Central America. A court case
currently underway seeking damages from the local subsidiary of an international banana
producer for a variety of irregularities in the clearing of primary and secondary forest on the
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Atlantic coast suggests, however, that environmental groups will quickly avail themselves of
this avenue to make “polluters pay.”
Progress in opening up property rights to environmental resources is more difficult to gauge.
Typically, government ministries or parastatal institutions are endowed with property rights to
the resources they manage, or state monopolies to markets in which such resources are traded.
National Parks remain off-limits for any use by local people; indeed they must pay an entrance
fee to visit. The Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) and National Water, Irrigation and
Sewage Service (SENARA) command a large degree of centralised power over the
hydrological resources (rivers, lakes, reservoirs and waterways) of the country. This pattern of
centralised control extends to private property. Wildlife remains national patrimony
irrespective of its location. The new forest law (N° 7575) established in 1996, effectively
expropriates the use rights of landholders by forbidding a change in land use on land that is
defined as forest land.
In sum, a number of initiatives and movements aimed at limiting the traditional pattern of
centralised control and governance over natural resources and the environment are currently
underway in Costa Rica. Nevertheless, much remains to be done. In part the difficulty lies in
moving towards political processes that are participatory rather than hierarchical and topdown in nature and that are truly democratic rather than autocratic. In other words, moving
towards a culture that is polycentric rather than centralised.
The Influence of Centralisation in Río Chiquito
The tendency towards centralisation that is found in Río Chiquito is a result of a polarised
model of accumulation and development based on centre-periphery relationships that
historically prevailed in the country. The socio-demographic and economic origins of the
human settlements formed in the area are, thus, founded on this model. The arrival of the first
migrants to the area in the 1920s and 1930s formed part of a centrifugal movement of coffee
workers that were expelled form the Central Valley during the economic crisis of those years.
Compelled by national legislation, these campesinos cleared forest land in order to prove that
they had made “improvements” to the land and would thereby be eligible to obtain legal title to
the land. Faced with uncertainty over the prospects of agricultural markets, poor
infrastructure and a difficult climate these campesinos opted for extensive ranching as a means
of capital accumulation, with little regard for the environmental impacts of their action. Cattle
effectively privatised the natural resource base (turning grass into meat) and did not require
roads to reach local markets. In this manner, large areas of forest were converted to pasture
in the space of a few decades. The government’s desire to fund the expansion of ranching in
the country only added additional support and legitimacy to the general productive focus of
the local population.
A second factor influencing the degree of centralisation in the area is the state’s dominance of
the provision and production of hydroelectricity and irrigation, manifested through the
creation of state-run monopolies in each area by ICE in 1949 and SENARA in the 1970s.
These trends ultimately led to the insertion of the state and its centralised power into the
Arenal area with the development of the dam that greatly enlarged Lake Arenal, the Arenal
hydropower complex (ARCOSA) and the Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project (PRAT). This
centralisation undoubtedly constituted an advance in terms of national development. In effect,
first electricity and later irrigation were transformed into goods of public interest. As a result,
these goods became more widely available and more equitably distributed than would have
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occurred had their provision and production been left in private hands, where purely
commercial motives rule.
The deadweight of centralised provision and production is demonstrated, however, in the
problems state institutions have encountered in developing an adequate vision with regard to
local-periphery relationships, particularly in taking into account the peculiarities of
environmental problems. Three examples of this phenomenon are explained below based on
interviews conducted during the study.
Deadweight Example: The Ministry for Agriculture and Livestock (MAG). MAG has shown
an interest over the years in accommodating local conditions and interests. Nevertheless the
bureaucratic and centralised structure of the institutions operates as a perverse incentive
preventing the achievement of these goals. Two types of such problem exist: the first is the
centralised definition of functions and activities, which disregards local opportunities for
employing institutional resources in a more productive fashion; the second is the absence of
adequate internal procedures for evaluating objectives, functions and actions. New objectives,
roles or tasks often go unannounced, or are simply ignored by staff because the evaluation
process is unlikely to reward compliance with new policies, and the policies may quickly be
reversed. Such new initiatives may also be at loggerheads with the interests of the local
office’s “clients.”
A case in point is the proposal initiated by the Tilarán Ranching Association to develop
demonstration projects for “sustainable” ranching in the Arenal area. For the Tilarán office
this proposal represented an important opportunity to study patterns of livestock technology
that would be appropriate to the local area. At the same time as this proposal was circulating,
however, the Figueres Olsen administration, was pushing MAG towards a new institutional
focus on the establishment of basic agricultural centres in local communities. The lack of
flexibility of central management in accommodating this local agenda and the uncertainty as to
how their performance would be assessed in relation to these two very different agendas
prevented local MAG technicians from fully involving themselves in the Ranching Association
project. As a result the project has been shelved and an excellent opportunity has been missed.
Deadweight Example: SENARA/PRAT. Interviews with SENARA personnel employed on
the PRAT project reveal a significant difference of opinion between these personnel and the
working policy of the institution. The latter is set in SENARA headquarters in San José. For
example, under the pricing policy on the PRAT project, water users are charged a token fee on
a per hectare basis. The technicians on the project state that this policy simply encourages
users to ignore the real value of the water they receive and gives them no intrinsic incentive to
consider where the water comes from or who produces it, much less to participate in any
effort to internalise externalities should they exist. This set of circumstances reflects the
centralised bureaucratic mindset of an institution that is nurtured by the dependence on the
government purse without regard to the level of service or “income” being produced in the
field. The preoccupation with short-term issues in the central office and the lack of incentives
that would lead field staff to suggest institutional changes does not bode well for the long term
maintenance of the project, given the difficulties that will arise once the “token fee” period
ends.
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Notwithstanding these problems, a proposal for subsequent phases of the PRAT project did
include a transfer aimed at “improving” watershed management in Arenal.15 The exact
motivation for this intervention is not clear; however, it does reveal that process is one thing
and substance another. For example, the sustainable development strategy announced by the
Figueres Olsen administration upon taking office in 1994 was very much a centralised,
technocratic effort, although it did receive support from some environmentalists. The ripple
effects of such a strong emphasis on a particular theme are likely to be widespread in a
strongly hierarchical, centralised system. Furthermore, the efforts of a given agency to be
perceived as supporting the president’s agenda may often be hasty and ill considered, despite
their strategic justification. For example, SENARA is the institution that sponsored the
studies that clearly show that the offtake from Lake Arenal will be more than sufficient to
satisfy demand, even if the project is fully completed. Thus, based on the agency’s own
planning documents, SENARA’s intention of altering watershed management in Arenal has no
logic.
Deadweight Example: ICE. The third example is that of ICE which, until very recently, has
shown very little appreciation for the development needs of local people in the Arenal
watershed. In theory, the development of state monopolies in energy and telecommunications
was, as stated above, intended to ensure that these services reached all areas of the country in
an equitable fashion. While tourists may find a telephone and electricity in the most remote
coastal towns of Costa Rica, the people living in the upper Arenal watershed have access to
neither. This is ironic given that the watershed is a major source of water for the single largest
power plant complex in the country. It could be argued therefore, that the antagonism of the
community towards ICE is justified. ICE came to the watershed and, based on its centralised
mandate, expropriated the people’s land and expropriated the water (once the watershed
became part of an ICE project legal control over the rivers came under the domain of ICE). In
return, the people expected a reinvestment in the socio-economic development of the
community, but received none.
The weight of centralism as described above manifests itself in the difficulties faced in efforts
to ensure an adequate administration of natural resources in general, and for the management
of Río Chiquito in particular. The most important problems in this respect are the existence of
large transaction costs for the coordination of institutional policy and the absence of a
differentiated market (for supply and demand) of the provision and production of
environmental services. However, as discussed in the next two sub-sections it is precisely with
respect to these two difficulties that the situation has been improving in recent years. At
national level, the movement from centralised to polycentric institutional arrangements may
well be an important component of solutions to environmental problems more generally. This
change in the arrangements governing environmental management responds to the suggestion
that until local people are able to participate in the provision and production of environmental
services, and to benefit in an equitable fashion from this production, sustainability will be an
elusive goal for the country.

15

Unfortunately, the analysis by Aylward et al. (1998a) suggests that such an intervention is unwarranted.
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Incentives and Institutional Arrangements in Río Chiquito and its Environs
In this sub-section the existing incentives and institutional arrangements governing the
environmental services produced by improved watershed management in Río Chiquito and
neighbouring localities are described. Inclusion of initiatives from outside the watershed is
very important as the pattern of movement suggests that many of these initiatives have begun
outside the watershed in response to local concerns and, once proven, are being extended into
the Río Chiquito watershed. Principally, these efforts consist of water and soil conservation
by means of reforestation and conservation of existing forest. Instances of arrangements more
specific to livestock production and ecotourism are identified as well.
Reforestation and Forest Conservation
The first programme aimed at watershed management in Río Chiquito was the diffusion of
reforestation incentives supported by funds from international donors and the government.
These initiatives began in 1988-89 and were pushed by COOPETILA, COOPELDOS, the
Monteverde Conservation League (ACM) and ICE.
Interest in reforestation in this area may be assumed to be a direct consequence of the
difficulties experienced by the ranching industry in this period. However, as compared with
other areas in Costa Rica the interest has not been to replace pasture with forest plantations,
but to introduce limited reforestation in order to improve livestock productivity.
Reforestation efforts are typically limited to the establishment of windbreaks that protect the
soils, pasture and animals from the wind and to a lesser degree from erosion. As noted earlier,
the interesting aspect of windbreaks is that they are likely to have an important effect on
sediment delivery and, therefore, generate downstream benefits as well.
Initial efforts focused simply on the protection from wind, with subsequent efforts attempting
to introduce species with commercial uses, particularly as fenceposts. Species introduced
initially were exotic, including cypress (Cuppresus mexicana) and eucalyptus (Eucaliptus
saligna). In the 1990s efforts have been made to experiment with native species, principally
colpachí (Croton sp.) and manzana rosa (Eugenia jambos). Much of this reforestation has
been accomplished under government incentive programmes, particularly the Fund for
Forestry Development (FDF). The advantage of the FDF is its ability to finance activities in
situations of informal land tenure such as those that exist amongst smallholders in the study
area. Although the funds were intended to finance plantation forestry, the ACM was able to
adapt the FDF to their programme entitled “Forests in Farms”, which emphasised windbreaks,
“live” fences and the interspersing of groups of trees within farms. The inhabitants of the
upper Arenal watershed easily accepted the idea of windbreaks (“live” fencing already being
popular) but have not responded to the idea of reforesting small patches within their pasture as
proposed by the ACM. The difficulty with the latter is that it reduces the area in pasture and
shades pasture.
While precise data for Río Chiquito do not exist, figures provided by ACM for the
Monteverde and Santa Elena area (which includes the upper regions of the Río Chiquito
watershed) suggest that 265 landholders are involved in reforestation. Approximately 80% of
those involved are dairy farmers. The remaining 20% are foreign nationals who are interested
in forest regeneration, ecotourism or simply improving the local landscape. These efforts have
reached 13 different communities and have resulted in the reforestation of roughly 500
hectares. Under the ACM programme 95% of species employed are native in origin. In the
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COOPELDOS area of influence, further to the north, it is estimated that 80 hectares of
pasture have been replanted in coffee.
In the lower watershed of Río Chiquito reforestation policies have not been successful. The
principal reason for the lack of interest may be the structure of land tenancy. Large
landholders living in Tilarán or San José have little direct contact with the community and little
attachment to local problems. Meanwhile, the attraction of forestry or forest incentives is
likely to be marginal given the productivity of large-scale ranching or dairy operations. In
addition, it is important to mention the cultural weight attached to being a rancher. Ranching
is synonymous with economic power and social prestige in the local culture, whereas being a
forest producer has no such attributes.
The principal programmes that have been implemented, are underway or are under
consideration are reviewed in order of the implementing agency.
Agriculture and Livestock Ministry (MAG). The Tilarán office of MAG has, in conjunction
with the Agriculture Centre of the Canton, developed its own tree nurseries and attempted to
implement reforestation activities since 1985. These activities have by and large failed.
Reasons for the failure include the established culture of best practice in which a “good” field
is a clean field (i.e. no trees), the inevitable trade-off in productive terms between trees and
pasture, the costs of reforestation and the uncertainty over future harvests and revenues.
More recent efforts include the MAG-FAO project in the Tilarán area in which subsidised
credits were made available to fund conservation practices. As part of a larger national effort
at watershed management, this project has developed programmes aimed at promoting the use
of “live” fences, improved pasture management and the mixture of pasture species.
ACM. The “Forests in Farms” programmes developed by this NGO are reported above. A
variety of technical assistance and inputs is offered under these programmes including advice
on woodfuel consumption, forest management and propagation; the provision of transport,
subsidised seedlings, barbed wire, fertilisers, equipment and payment for labour inputs. These
programmes are by far the largest and most successful efforts at reforestation underway in the
area (that surrounds Río Chiquito). The ACM is also responsible for the purchase and
conservation of large tracts of property in the adjoining watersheds of Caño Negro and Aguas
Gatas as part of the Children’s Eternal Rainforest, supported by donations from children’s
groups around the world and other international donors. The ACM also has an environmental
education programme that works with local schools, teaching principles of environmental and
watershed management.
Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE). Since the late 1970s MINAE has legally
provided for a range of reforestation incentives including income tax deductions, tax credits
and subsidised credit under several different programmes (Segura and Solórzano 1995). At
the national level the success of these programmes has been mixed, with roughly 170,000
hectares reforested by the end of 1995 (Watson et al. 1998). In the case of Río Chiquito there
is no evidence that local producers availed themselves of these incentives. In 1996 MINAE
began a pilot programme of Forest Protection Certificates (CPB) in Guanacaste province.
AGUADEFOR and the Tempisque Conservation Area (ACT) were chosen to develop this
programme. Implementing agencies in the Río Chiquito area include COOPETILA and
COOPELDOS.
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The Río Chiquito watershed was designated as a priority recipient of CPBs by MINAE and
ACT under the pilot programme. Six parcels with a total of 185 hectares of forest located in
the lower and mid-watershed area were registered under the programme by COOPETILA.
COOPELDOS signed up five parcels for a total of 183 hectares in the upper watershed. The
CPB provides participants with a certificate worth approximately $50/ha/year for five years.
Participants are responsible in return for conserving these parcels. The new forest law
effectively ended the CPB, substituting in its place the Forest Conservation Certificate (CCB).
Regulations governing the CCB were published in early 1997 (following completion of the
participatory fieldwork) and are discussed in the text section on the Action Programme for Río
Chiquito.
ICE. Efforts at reforestation by ICE may be divided into two phases. In the 1980s ICE
attempted to reforest areas around Lake Arenal, particularly the strip of land owned by ICE.
These efforts were not very successful. In some cases poor management and intense
competition from established pasture and other plants prevented the seedlings from thriving.
In other cases, locals had been using these lands as pasture prior to expropriation and simply
continued to use the lands, seasonal burning being sufficient to eliminate the seedlings.
A much more recent second phase corresponds to a specific proposal to develop a programme
of reforestation in the Río Chiquito area based on the ACM experiences with the “Forests in
Farms” programme in Monteverde and Santa Elena.16 This proposal is part of a larger effort
by ICE that is to be financed by the institution, with the aim of seeking additional support from
the developing international market for carbon storage.17 The package to be offered to
ranchers would also try to improve productive practices so as to liberate areas for
reforestation. Research into native species and other conservation technologies is also
supported.
Work began in earnest in 1994 with the creation of the Programme for Watershed
Management and Recuperation and the Programme for Biological Corridors and
Reforestation. By the end of 1996 a total of 32 participants had joined the programme
including 25 in the upper watershed, five in the mid-watershed and two in the lower
watershed. Approximately 60 hectares and 60,000 trees had been planted (given the emphasis
on windbreaks, the estimate of trees is a more useful measure of activity than the estimate of
hectares). The trees are actually provided under contract by COOPELDOS and are roughly

16

The coordinator of this programme previously worked for ACM’s reforestation programme and, thus, is
familiar with their methods and with the producers in Río Chiquito.
17

This initiative had only reached the stage of a two page draft proposal for Río Chiquito when the SubDivision for Sustainable Development was eliminated in an ICE re-organization. It is interesting to note that
the proposal suggested that trees planted in Río Chiquito should receive two types of carbon credits. The first
credit was to be earned by storing carbon in the trees. The second credit was to have originated from the
reduction in sediment delivery that would accompany reforestation, leading to more hydroelectricity and a
saving in the burning of fossil fuels for thermal power. In light of the analysis contained in Aylward et al.
(1998a) this approach should be reformulated. A single credit may be earned for carbon storage in the case of
windbreaks and fragments planted in areas of cloud forest, as increased water stripping is compensated for by
higher evaporation and transpiration effects. No (or opposing) credits are earned in the case of non-cloud
forest areas where reforestation will lower water yield, requiring an increase in fossil fuel burning. At the
same time, the increase in thermal power generation that would be necessary to cover the loss in water yield
due to reforestation would clearly reduce this credit.
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50% native and 50% exotic species. The landholders choose the species to plant and are given
seedlings to plant. In return for technical assistance (and replacement seedlings should any
die) the landholder promises to follow a strict management regime for the first four years.
Technical assistance on improving pasture selection and pasture management is offered to
participants by means of an agreement between ICE and the Dos Pinos Dairy Producers
Cooperative in Tilarán.
Institute for Agrarian Development (IDA). Another programme, silvipastoral in nature, is that
of the IDA-FAO project in Arenal. IDA is a parastatal organisation charged with the
resettlement of landless peasants onto smallholdings. The project has promoted reforestation
with fruit trees, windbreaks for family gardens and small plantations on the smallholdings.
Private Initiatives. As suggested by data from a survey undertaken in the Río Chiquito
watershed, slightly less than half of the respondents indicated that they were engaging in some
form of reforestation or soil conservation (Aylward et al. 1998b). The fieldwork conducted by
CINPE identified the various programmes of public or private nature (as listed above) that
support such efforts. A rough estimate suggests that perhaps a quarter of the holders in the
watershed are involved in some form in one of these programmes. This suggests that the
remaining quarter is engaged in conservation activities on their own, without external support.
Many of these activities are fairly minor in nature and oriented as much towards alleviating
systemic problems (such as weeds and wind) as problems caused by land use itself. Whatever
the actual intention of such efforts, the level of participation may signal that the benefits of
such investments are sufficiently private in nature as to enable their development under purely
market forces, i.e. without outside intervention.
Other Initiatives
Arenal Conservation Area (ACA). Since 1993, the Arenal Conservation and Development
Project (PCDA) has supported a range of different management alternatives in the buffer zone
areas of ACA. PCDA is the result of an agreement between MINAE, ACA, the Canadian
Agency for International Development and WWF-Canada. Subsidised finance and technical
support is provided for activities such as animal nurseries, organic agriculture, tree nurseries,
agroforestry systems, soil and water conservation, and ecotourism/forest management. In the
upper watershed area of Río Chiquito there are projects in El Dos (a nursery of native tree
species), Cabeceras (sugar mill, arts and crafts derived from cane, organic vegetables) and
Monte de los Olivos (an ecotourism project). The latter project is actually located within the
Río Chiquito watershed and consists of the construction of an ecotourist lodge (and
accompanying restaurant) by a local association made up mostly of small dairy producers.
Monteverde Cheese Factory. The Monteverde Cheese Factory carries out a number of actions
and initiatives that are aimed at intensifying dairy production whilst conserving the natural
environment. Elements supporting conservation include provision of technical assistance on
soil management, awarding of prizes for “sustainability” of production and refusal to accept
new producers whose areas are not suited to dairy production.
Tilarán Ranchers Association. In 1994 the Association, in cooperation with local MAG and
ACA officials and the Central American School of Livestock Production, began developing a
proposal to identify, study and disseminate local practices that supported “sustainable
ranching.” The proposal was linked to the idea of developing a “green” niche in the local or
export markets for beef. The initiative is important in signalling a move on the part of
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traditional ranchers towards a more proactive stance on environmental issues. It also marked
an important change in relations between ACA and local ranchers, the latter group feeling that
the pro-environment stance of ACA had led them to ignore the ranching community. Despite
the initial interest by all concerned and the selection of a number of farms to serve as
demonstration sites, the project has since faltered and little headway has been made. The
inherent difficulties felt by MAG in making this effort work were discussed earlier as an
example of the restrictions placed on the institution by its centralised, bureaucratic nature.
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Annex 4. Exclusion and Rivalry of Watershed Goods and
Services
“Watershed management” in its largest sense produces a vast range of environmental and
productive goods and services. Typically, productive goods are private in nature and
environmental goods have public good characteristics. In this annex a review of the public
good nature of all of the watershed goods and services relevant to the Río Chiquito context is
presented. The goods and services are grouped according to whether they are on-site or offsite goods and services and, for those off-site elements, according to whether or not they are
hydrological in nature. As with the rest of the study, the focus is on hydrological impacts,
particularly externalities, with a secondary focus on other externalities and values consistent
with watershed management.
Exclusion and Rivalry
The attributes of these goods and services are discussed according to the two defining
characteristics of public goods. The first characteristic is excludability, that is whether it is
easy or costly to exclude or limit consumption by potential users or beneficiaries once a good
is provided, either by nature or through the activity of other individuals. The exclusion could
be achieved through means of physical barriers, but this is likely to be effective only if property
rights are established which can be defended (economically and legally) within the legal
framework available in a determined jurisdiction (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker 1994). It
could be concluded from this, furthermore, that the ease of exclusion is dependent not only on
the physical attributes of goods and services but also on the institutions that function in that
particular jurisdiction.
The second characteristic is rivalry: the degree to which the use of goods or services by an
individual reduces, or not, the potential for use of the same goods or services by others. This
depends a great deal on whether the consumption of a particular good or service is of a
collective or separable nature. For instance, consumption of a food item by one individual
prevents it from being consumed by others, while on the other hand it is possible for many
people to simultaneously access and consume information without that information losing the
potential of being consumed by others.
These two characteristics permit the classification of products and services into four major
categories. In a simplified manner the interpretation of the combination of these two attributes
proves to be a powerful method for understanding the incentives that different actors may
have for the provision or production of different goods and services.
Private goods and services are subject to exclusion, making them easy to confine or control.
Those who want to consume them are excluded from their consumption, unless they pay the
price the producers set for the goods and services. The consumption of these goods and
services by consumers is also rival, or separable. Once the consumer has purchased the good
it can be consumed at leisure, and once the quantity purchased is consumed, it is no longer
available to the consumer (or other consumers). Because of this, if a demand exists, the
producers have incentives to satisfy it, given that they can expect to cover production costs
and even make a profit. Private goods and services are generally produced and distributed in
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the most efficient matter through competitive and private markets; provided that an institution
(typically government) exists that provides a stable framework for transactions and allows for
the resolution of disputes and the fulfillment of contracts.
On the contrary, public goods and services do not lend themselves easily to exclusion, and are
non-rival. Once produced, everyone has access to them (within certain limits, geographic or
political). These attributes allow those who do not contribute equally to the costs of
production to be able to consume them (free-riding). Hence, the provision of public goods
requires collective action and is typically considered to be the province of government.
Common-pool resources, like public goods and services, do not lend themselves easily to
exclusion either, but their consumption is separable: they have a degree of rivalry. As long as
total demand does not exceed the productive capacity of the resource, individual users can
consume the goods or services without impeding their consumption by others. When demand
exceeds availability, congestion occurs and users operating on an exclusively voluntary basis
have a strong incentive to continue appropriating the goods or services as fast as possible;
those that abstain from consumption simply favour the consumption by those who do not.
Typically, common-pool resources are considered to be allocated in one of two ways. In the
absence of any definition of property rights or usufruct over common-pool resources, they are
left to open access; all users are at liberty to consume the resource. Economists typically
presume that this leads to an inefficient level of production of these resources as the wellknown “Tragedy of the Commons” ensues. Alternatively, a common property management
regime may exist (or evolve) if there is a societal group that has recognised property or use
rights and is able by a variety of mechanisms (not necessarily economic in character) to control
access to the resource. Viewed from afar (or from a national perspective), common-pool
resources often appear to be left unmanaged in a state of open access, but in practice there is
often a local group of traditional users that exercises control over access to the resource. That
said, it is likely that the potential for sustainable development based on community-based
solutions is rather less than that generally supposed (Leach, Mearns and Scoones 1997).
Finally, toll (or club) goods and services are non-rival in consumption, but are subject to
exclusion. Typically, these are goods and services that are consumed collectively by members
of a group. This same group is capable of excluding others by means of mechanisms that
exclude others at a reasonable cost. Clubs may assume a range of institutional forms
according to the desires of their owners: the members themselves, a firm or the government
(Cornes and Sandler 1986).
Despite the generalisations that emerge from the literature regarding the optimal forms of
management of each type of good, in reality there is not necessarily a one-to-one relationship
between the type of good and a particular type of institution. It is not inconceivable, for
example, that a common-pool resource could be managed effectively by government or a large
corporation. Rather, each case must be considered in light of existing relationships and in the
context of an evaluation of potential alternatives. The analysis of public good characteristics is,
however, an important step in this process and serves to identify likely alternatives.
In the following sub-sections the degree of rivalry and exclusion of watershed goods and
services is analysed in the Río Chiquito context. The conclusions drawn relate to whether the
good is public, private, a common-pool resource or a toll good.

CREED Working Paper Series No 21

76

Exclusion and Rivalry of On-Site Goods and Services
In Río Chiquito three on-site goods and services are produced: livestock, extractive uses of
biodiversity and soil productivity. Each is considered in turn.
Livestock Production. As livestock production results in sales of milk and cattle to purchasers
in a market environment these goods are considered to be subject to a high degree of
exclusion and rivalry, making them private goods.18
Extractive Use of Biodiversity. Additional on-site harvesting occurs in the case of the
extraction of other natural or biodiversity products. These include wood products and wildlife
(hunting), with the former probably being of primary importance in Río Chiquito. Trees and
brush are stationary, rooted objects while wildlife is mobile. This implies that wildlife, through
time, will be only partially subject to exclusion. However, as the act of harvesting is assumed
to occur at a given point in time on the landholder’s property the user does have the ability to
exclude others from harvesting the same physical units. These products are rival, given that
once the game is eaten, or the wood is used in construction, there can be no subsequent
consumption of these goods by others. In general, therefore, on-site extractive uses may be
considered as private goods.
Soil Productivity. In its natural state the soil’s productivity is a classic case of a common-pool
resource. Exclusion of others from a given land area is difficult and costly. Agricultural and
livestock production effectively consumes the product of the soil, transforming the soil
resource into a marketable product. In the case livestock production, for example, congestion
effects occur as stocking rates rise, effectively consuming the resource in the present period
and, eventually, degrading its ability to produce in future periods.
The means of excluding others from access to the soil productivity held on one landholding are
both de jure (legal) and de facto (practical ability) in nature. De jure rights stem from the
concept of private property rights in land as enforceable under Costa Rican law. These would
apply in the case of one producer attempting to use another’s land and soil in a more-or-less
permanent way, for example in agriculture or housing. De facto rights exist due to fencing
and supervision of the property by those administering the property. This applies in the case
of what might be an intermittent use, such as one producer grazing stock on another’s
property.19 By either route landholders in Río Chiquito can attain a high degree of exclusion.
Given the prevalence of livestock production as a land use, however, this exclusion comes at a
significant cost.20

18

Though note the close relationship with soil productivity, which does display some public good
characteristics.
19

Interestingly, the benefits of fencing are themselves in a way a public good. Once a fence separating two
properties is built, the landholder who did not build the fence cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits of
the fence, nor are the benefits rival. The benefits may be construed as both limiting access of others and not
losing one’s own stock. The costs are the direct cost of fencing plus the loss of the ability to steal another’s soil
productivity. However, the structure of the resulting collective action problem, one producer and one
consumer, suggests that Coasian bargains may be easily struck. The degree to which each party invests will
depend on the relative level of perceived benefits and costs.
20

Fencing is a significant element of fixed costs on most properties (Aylward et al. 1998).
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Soil productivity in Río Chiquito also appears to be rival as the benefits of its consumption are
fully realised through beef and dairy production, which are private goods. An intertemporal
examination of rivalry, however, suggests that soil productivity may be non-rival to a minor
degree. The crux of the issue is the extent to which a landholder can appropriate the value of
soil, and therefore of soil-conserving technologies or production methods, upon sale of the
property. It is generally recognised that markets for agricultural land often do not adequately
account for the state of soil on the land in the US, and this trend probably extends to Costa
Rica (Barrows and Gardner 1987; McConnell 1983). As a result, although soil productivity
should be generally regarded as a private good, it is often considered to be a toll good as well.
Exclusion and Rivalry of Off-Site Hydrological Services
In this sub-section hydrological services are classified according to their public good nature.
Given that these services generate off-site impacts and are considered to be “externalities” the
conventional classification would typically label these services as public goods. However,
given the lack of precedents in this regard and the wide range of downstream uses of
hydrological services, this analysis attempts to explore the validity, and applicability, of this
claim.
The application of the concept of exclusion to the provision of upstream services is generally
straightforward, depending on the extent to which landholders can control access to changes
in hydrological services that result from changes in land use. Rivalry is more difficult to
interpret given that downstream users do not directly consume the upstream service (i.e. an
increase in run-off from pasture) but rather a downstream “product” (i.e. an increase in
downstream annual flow).21 Nor, it is assumed, do upstream landholders compete with
downstream users for the consumption of the water. This is tantamount to assuming that
existing run-off represents the surplus “supply” once on-site needs are met. Given the lack of
upstream consumption, discussing the rivalry in consumption of the upstream service makes
little sense.
Intuitively, however, it is clear that the degree of rivalry and exclusion in consumption that
exists with regard to the downstream products may affect the ability of upstream landholders
to access the economic rent that may be derived from these services. If landholders could
exclude downstream users from consumption of a change in hydrological services and the
downstream product is a private good, then, by extension, the landholders would be well
positioned to capture the associated rent. Under the same circumstances, if the downstream
product were instead a public good, rent collection would be more problematic. If, on the
other hand, landholders cannot exercise exclusion over the upstream service the characteristics
of the downstream product would appear to be irrelevant. There is simply no way for the
upstream landholder to exercise a claim over the economic rent.
In other words, the absence of upstream exclusion implies that the change in hydrological
service is a public good from the perspective of the landholder. If upstream exclusion is
feasible it then becomes necessary to determine the public good nature of the downstream

21

The examples used here relate to water quantity although they could equally well relate to water quality.
Note that erosion, the on-site aspect of sediment delivery, is discussed above under soil productivity.
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service in order to understand the incentives for provision and production of the hydrological
service.
It is also worth noting that exclusion over the provision of the upstream service and,
subsequently, the downstream products may be exercised by the upstream landholder in either
an ex post or ex ante fashion. Given that a particular land use change is desired by the
landholder for its level of net on-site benefits, exclusion can be defined in terms of potential
means of exclusion following the land use change. These means are typically physical in
nature, but are also potentially legal in nature. Ex ante exclusion occurs when the landholder
may choose to avoid an investment in land use change in order to exclude downstream users
from prospective hydrological benefits. In theory, this would occur only when the land use
change is not profitable on its own terms for the landholder. Both types of exclusion are
considered, but more attention is given to ex post exclusion, as ex ante exclusion is, as a rule,
feasible by definition. That ex ante exclusion is feasible underscores the importance of
exploring the public good nature of the downstream products.
Thus, the spatial nature of production (upstream by landholders) and consumption
(downstream by a range of different users) make it useful to distinguish between the status of
the services as produced by the landholders and the disposition of the downstream (or
instream) product as seen from the perspective of potential users. The discussion below,
therefore, makes a distinction between (1) sediment delivery rates and sedimentation, (2)
water yield and annual flows, and (3) water regulation, and seasonal flows and flooding. As
suggested above, this distinction is most relevant in the case of exclusion, that is, the extent to
which upstream landholders can exclude downstream consumers from the upstream service
and the degree to which downstream consumers can exclude each other from access to the
instream resource. Rivalry is discussed only as a characteristic of the downstream product.
The presentation in each case contains a brief description of the general case in an effort to
identify crucial factors in the classification, and then the specific application to the situation in
Río Chiquito and Arenal. The pairs of upstream service and downstream service are presented
in reverse order (downstream first) in order to facilitate conclusions regarding the public good
nature of the hydrological services.
Sedimentation/Suspended Sediment. The downstream products of a change in sediment
delivery rates are changes in instream suspended sediment levels and sedimentation of
downstream waterways and reservoirs. Each of these three cases is considered below.
The location and method by which the sediment is precipitated from run-off is of great
importance in determining levels of exclusion and rivalry. Natural precipitation of sediment is,
of course, determined by various factors, including the nature of the suspended sediment and
the topography through which a river flows. Precipitation of sediment can be increased by
building ponds or reservoirs and may, in unusual cases, be reduced by an increase in the rate of
flow. Both actions are expensive propositions. Once precipitated, the sediment may lead to a
variety of economic impacts including changes in water navigation, changes in reservoir
operation, potential extraction of fertile sediments for use, clogging of irrigation canals, etc. It
is also worth noting that suspended sediment (i.e., sediment that is not precipitated) may also
have an economic impact. For example, the concentration of suspended sediment may affect
maintenance and capital replacement requirements of turbines used in run-of-stream
hydroelectric plants or the treatment costs of water supply facilities.
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Construction of settling ponds or reservoirs would be the principal mechanism by which one
consumer might seek to exclude another from access to the suspended sediment, or increments
thereof, in a given waterway. Typically, this will be extremely costly for a single consumer to
undertake. However, such an option may not be feasible given that waterways are often
publicly owned. Moreover, as suggested below, reservoir construction does not exclude
downstream users from water quantity effects of reservoir sedimentation. Thus, the degree of
exclusion will be low in the case of instream suspended sediment.
As access to river bottoms is typically not limited or controlled, either by legal mechanisms or
practical means, sedimentation would appear to be subject to a low degree of exclusion in
free-flowing streams. Much depends, however, on the use to which the sediment and river are
put (if any). Clearly, it is difficult to exclude those who would use a waterway for navigation
purposes from the benefits created by lowering sediment delivery and deposition. On the
other hand, if sediment is of high fertility and has subsequent use as a fertiliser, then the act of
dredging by one farmer will effectively exclude others from the consumption of that same
fertility. Thus, generalisation in the case of free-flowing streams is difficult.
Where reservoirs are already in place, a change in the level of sedimentation will affect
reservoir operation and it will be difficult to exclude any downstream users from associated
costs or benefits related to water flows from the reservoir. As a dam’s storage capacity is lost
this will affect the timeliness of downstream flows as well as economic production at the level
of the reservoir (e.g. hydroelectricity or recreation). Thus, the level of exclusion may be
characterised as low in the case of installed reservoirs.
If water containing suspended sediment is utilised in economic activity without precipitating
the sediment, a change in sediment delivery may be “consumed” by many different users. For
example, run-of-stream hydroelectric plants typically have sediment ponds designed to trap a
portion of the sediment. However, sediment not trapped by these ponds will pass through the
generators and on to the next downstream use. Both the hydroelectric plant and the
downstream users will, thus, feel the beneficial effect of lowering sediment levels. Instream
suspended sediment is, therefore, non-rival in nature.
The degree of rivalry for instream sedimentation is more variable; depending not only on
topography, but also on the type of economic activity located downstream, the technology
employed to utilise downstream flows and the institutional arrangements governing
downstream production. The effects of sedimentation on navigation are non-rival in that the
costs of siltation are consumed by all that navigate through an affected area. The extraction of
sediment, on the other hand, will be a largely rival use as it adds to soil productivity on
farmland.
Large hydroelectric reservoirs (such as Arenal) trap practically all the sediment. However, the
actual economic consumption of these effects is not necessarily limited to one use. As
discussed earlier, the possibility exists that sediment arriving in a reservoir may affect both
hydroelectricity and irrigation. It might also affect recreation and fishing in the reservoir.
Thus, in addition to the issues of deposition and leakage, there are potentially a number of
consumers of the effects of sediment deposited in a single location. A complication here is
that deposited sediment may subsequently be dredged or flushed from a reservoir, leading to
further knock-on effects.
Consequently, the degree of rivalry associated with the
sedimentation of reservoirs appears to be fairly low (i.e. non-rival).
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The discussion above suggests that it is difficult to generalise about the public good nature of
instream sedimentation. It may be either a public or a private good depending on the uses to
which it is put or the activities upon which it impinges. The lack of institutionalised rules or
regulations governing the allocation of sediment suggest that its status will depend also on
practical considerations regarding when and were it is deposited and what infrastructure is
installed on the waterway. Nonetheless, the general impression is that instream suspended
sediment and the sedimentation of reservoirs are public goods.
In the case of Arenal, the reservoir effectively precipitates all the sediment and essentially
excludes others from a direct physical use of the sediment for its fertility. As noted above,
however, any change to sediment delivery rates will affect dam operation and downstream
flows. As a result, the degree of exclusion is mixed. Nonetheless, the observation that
downstream users in Costa Rica extract water but not sediment from streams implies that
exclusion from water flows would be the more important aspect of the problem. On this basis,
therefore, the Arenal case matches the general expectation that the degree to which other
potential consumers are excluded from the costs or benefits of a change in sedimentation from
Río Chiquito is low.
However, sedimentation of the dam does not appear to actually affect the operations of the
downstream irrigation project (PRAT) given current levels of demand for water (Aylward et
al. 1998b). In addition, it is unlikely that sedimentation affects the minor economic use of the
lake itself for fishing and boating given that such uses are relatively minor. For all practical
purposes, therefore, a change in sedimentation is rival insofar as the ARCOSA hydroelectricity
complex is the sole consumer. With low excludability and a high degree of rivalry this
suggests that in the Arenal case, sedimentation is a common-pool resource. By implication,
were downstream demand for water to increase sufficiently in the future to toggle the
classification to non-rival, sedimentation would be characterised as a public good.
Sediment Delivery. In general, landholders will be interested only in excluding downstream
users from benefits, not costs, incurred by changes in sediment delivery that will result from
intended changes in land use. In this regard it must be acknowledged that an increase in
sediment delivery may lead to either downstream costs or benefits.22 Similarly, the reverse
applies. A decrease in sediment delivery might, therefore, also lead to costs or benefits. As a
result, it is necessary to consider how landholders might exercise exclusion over both increases
and decreases in sediment delivery.
As sediment (in its suspended form) is transported by water flows, the landholder would need
to have a physical or legal basis for either controlling downstream users’ access to water flows
that carry the suspended sediment or changing the level of sediment actually suspended and
delivered downstream. One way to limit access to increases in sediment delivery would be
ponds or canals for settling sediment at property boundaries. However, the trap efficiency of
such a pond would be proportional to its size. Large ponds, relative to the size of the holding,
would therefore be necessary to ensure that there is no leakage of sediment. Furthermore,
depending on the drainage density and topography, water storage becomes either more or less
feasible given the costs of damming the waterway. The ability to exclude others from a

22

See Enters (1995) for a description of how sedimentation is extracted from streams in Thailand for use on
fields.
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decrease in sediment delivery would face the same problem of excluding downstream users
from access to the water flows.
As for legal mechanisms for exclusion, there is little precedent with the potential exception of
the application of the “polluter pays” principle. However, this principle represents a sanction
on landholders for generating costs for downstream users and is imposed by others (or
society) on upstream users. Legal mechanisms by which landholders might benefit from
improvements in downstream conditions are a different matter. Clearly, establishment and
monitoring of the rate of pollution (sediment delivery) would be particularly problematic,
depending on the complexity of the terrain, number of holdings, etc. In general, therefore, the
degree of exclusion governing changes in sediment delivery is likely to be very low.
In the case of Río Chiquito and Arenal, off-site benefits are associated with a decrease in
sediment delivery. Given the topography of Río Chiquito, water storage for the purposes of
excluding others from changes in sediment delivery would be very costly, if at all feasible in a
physical sense. In other words downstream users are free to consume the off-site benefits of
reductions in sediment delivery that are associated with reforestation. As a result the
classification of sedimentation as a common-pool resource is not relevant to the classification
of the upstream hydrological service, which must be regarded as a public good.
It is also the case that downstream users in Arenal have no physical or legal means of either
preventing landholders from increasing sediment delivery or of encouraging them to reduce
sediment delivery. This underscores the point made at the outset of this discussion: that the
landholder may effectively exclude downstream users from the hydrological effects of land use
change by controlling land use itself (ex ante exclusion). This is true regardless of the ability
of the landholder to physically alter hydrological processes once land use change has occurred.
The landholder may always “exclude” downstream users by not changing to what is viewed as
an “improved” land use from the downstream perspective or by threatening to change to a
“worse” land use. In the Arenal case, then, the potential to garner economic rent would be
relatively good given the nature of sedimentation as a common-pool resource and the
existence of a single, large user of the downstream product.
Annual Flows. In this analysis, water yield is assumed to represent a general increase in water
flows over the course of a year. As a result the discussion here is limited to a discussion of
simply increasing or decreasing water availability. Later, the discussion extends to consider
seasonal flows and flooding, i.e. the effects of having more or less water at particular times
(i.e. in the dry season or immediately following a storm event). Given that water has an
almost infinite number of uses, just a few uses are selected in order to illustrate the concepts
under discussion. Water has a very obvious function as an essential compound for sustaining
organic life, whether human or otherwise. The potential energy attached to a unit of water
may also have a significant function in terms of generating hydroelectricity, providing
transport services or performing work in a more direct function. Water is also useful as a
“sink” with which to dissipate heat or to lower nutrient or chemical concentrations at
industrial or agricultural sites.
Defining what constitutes the “consumption” of water is not an easy task, but is central to the
understanding of the public good nature of water flows. Water is often said to be “consumed”
when it is flushed down a toilet, imbibed by humans, embedded in marketable products, used
to irrigate crops, etc. In the case of hydroelectric power and navigation, “consumed” water is
simply passed on further downstream. Given its mass, fluidity and the presence of gravity
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many of these uses do not completely “consume” a given quantity of water. In fact, given the
cyclical nature of hydrological processes the “consumption” of water is very much a “chicken
and egg” problem. Nonetheless, two types of water “consumption” may be defined. First,
consumption when the natural hydrological cycle is cut short, as in when water use results in
evaporation and, second, when water use reduces the useful attributes associated with a unit
of water (such as its potential energy or heat “sink” potential). As with sedimentation, the use
to which water is put, by whom and under what institutional circumstances will, thus, largely
determine its public good nature.
Free-flowing water is inherently mobile but (unlike wildlife or fish) extremely predictable in the
course it will take. Depending on the prospective use, potential “consumers” have devised any
number of ways to exclude another from a given unit of water. Typically, by investing in
extracting or routing water into containers, reservoirs or onto fields, “consumers” attempt to
exclude others from the use of a given unit of water for purposes of hydration, of use as a heat
sink or extraction of potential energy. An increase in water availability may be controlled in a
similar fashion. However, it is worth noting that the fixed costs of these initiatives are
considerable. Perhaps more importantly, standing water and canals are accessible to other
interested parties, even once diverted. As a consequence, full exclusion requires an investment
in monitoring and enforcement. This is particularly the case when demand is high enough to
provoke “congestion” effects. To counter this problem such diversions of free-flowing water
are often legitimised by systems of usufruct (i.e. doctrines of prior appropriation or riparian
use rights). Many uses of water must therefore be regarded as having a high degree of
exclusion.
Use of water for navigation or recreation would appear to be exceptions to the general rule,
given that there is often little practical means of limiting access. Legal restrictions or
concessions over certain areas may lower the costs of controlling access and make exclusion
possible. In most cases, however, the importance of an increase or decrease in the flow of
water to these uses is debatable.
In general, therefore, changes in annual flows are likely to be subject to exclusion where water
is a valued commodity.
The ability to predict with certainty the degree of rivalry associated with water flows is more
variable, depending on whether the use in question consumes water and/or its attributes, and
whether the use of water demonstrates susceptibility to congestion. As suggested earlier a
number of uses of water do not actually result in its “consumption”, instead resulting in the
reduction of the attributes of water or its partial “consumption.” Ostrom, Schroeder and
Wynne (1993: 89) note that water used for hydroelectricity can be “used” again downstream
and suggest that this demonstrates that the flow is not fully rival. While this is true, it is worth
noting that if the only “valued” attribute of a water flow at a given geographical point is its
potential energy, then the flow may be considered as rival at that point, even if it is not really
“consumed” at that point.
An example of partial “consumption” of water flows is wasteful irrigation, in which “wasted”
water will percolate through to groundwater only to be once again available from wells or
streams that are located “downstream.” Where evaporation due to use is not complete, the
remaining water will continue to flow towards other prospective users. This said, most uses
do tend at least to reduce the water flow quantity that is available or its desired attribute. For
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example, upstream use of water for irrigation effectively reduces the availability of river flows
downstream for hydroelectricity.
As more users crowd in to use (in different ways) particular water flows, congestion effects
will develop. Irrigation is typically considered to be a toll good and, thus, non-rival in nature.
Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne (1993: 89) comment that this reflects a failure to distinguish
between the rivalry of the facility and the flow. Although many may use the same facility
without impinging on the ability of others to use the facility, the authors point out that when it
comes to a given unit of water flow the potential for congestion effects and rivalry do exist.
For this reason, irrigation flows may in fact be rival making them private, not toll goods.
The tendency to “consume” water or its desired attributes (at a given instream point), as well
as the problem of congestion, suggests that changes in water flows will exhibit a high degree
of rivalry. The exception again would be navigation and recreation.
The general expectation, therefore, is that water flows are subject to a high degree of
exclusion and rivalry and, therefore are frequently appropriable as private goods. Exceptions
to this rule must be considered on a case by case basis. For example, navigation may be either
a public or a toll good. In the latter case, a concession over a waterway may enable the
concessionaire to exclude customers that do not pay a toll from access to a non-rival service.
Irrigation may also be considered a toll good at low levels of demand, but is probably
congestible and hence a private good at higher levels of demand (and particularly in the dry
season).
In the case of Arenal, the reservoir and ICE’s legal mandate from the state permits ICE to
exclude others from access to the potential energy attribute of the annual flows arriving from
the Río Chiquito watershed. With regard to the water flows themselves, the nature of the
Arenal reservoir as an inter-annual regulation reservoir suggests that ICE and ARCOSA may
even be able to exclude other potential downstream consumers of water from small changes in
annual flows. The reservoir also makes other attributes of water available to others in the
form of boating and recreation, as well as providing water supply to the dry Guanacaste plains
on the Pacific side of the continental divide. However, a change in the absolute level of annual
yield is unlikely to significantly affect the level of consumption on the part of other consumers.
In sum, changes to downstream annual flows appear to be subject to exclusion, insofar as the
major use of such flows would be related to their potential energy.
It is also clear that a very large portion of the potential energy that was associated with the
water as held in Lake Arenal is consumed by ARCOSA once the water passes through the
turbines. The potential energy attribute of consumption is clearly rival. The PRAT irrigation
project that subsequently receives the water effectively turns water into a toll or private good
as the sequence of canals enables SENARA to exclude non-paying consumers from access to
water. ARCOSA and PRAT’s uses of water are essentially compatible and complementary.
These, as irrigation and hydroelectric uses of the water from Lake Arenal, rely on maximum
offtake during the dry season, with much less demand during the wet season. Thus, these two
principal uses of water are non-rival in consumption. However, as noted above, changes in
water production from the dam are unlikely to affect consumption by the PRAT project for a
long time. Thus, the principal use of changes in annual water flows in the case of Arenal
would be for their potential energy, a use that must be considered as rival in nature.
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Given current infrastructure and the institutional arrangements governing the use of water
from Lake Arenal, water flows appear to be exclusive and rival, suggesting characteristics of a
private good.
Water Yield. It is even less likely that landholders will be able to exclude downstream users
from access to changes in water yield using water storage mechanisms than is the case for
sediment delivery. Landholders might be able to construct barriers or reservoirs to limit
downstream sediment delivery, but even water storage projects have limited ability to limit the
annual flow of run-off to downstream users. Implicitly, an inter-annual reservoir would be
required for this. The exception, of course, is the construction of a set of canals by which
water is routed past other users. In this case the degree of exclusion would be quite high. The
feasibility of such an option would be low in general, given the problems and cost of diverting
drainage from high in a watershed past prospective downstream users. In addition, property
rights regimes governing water use rights might make such an endeavor impossible. Thus,
exclusion is highly unlikely in most cases of upstream changes in water yield.
Water yield is in general, therefore, a public good. Given conditions in Arenal, this assessment
applies equally to landholders in the Río Chiquito watershed. As in the case of sedimentation,
the exception, would be in the case where downstream benefits would be created (or costs
avoided) by a change in land use. If such a change is not already in the interest of the
landholder (who would, thus, require an ex-post exclusion mechanism) then the potential does
exist to extract rent from ARCOSA and ICE, given that the downstream use of annual flows is
a private good.
Seasonal Flows and Flooding. In the case of seasonal flows, typically, the most relevant
benefits derived from the water regulation impacts of land use change would be those derived
by downstream users from having higher dry season baseflow (the minimum flow level during
non-rain periods) and lower flood risk due to reduced peakflows (during storm events). As
noted earlier, the biophysical basis for the existence of these benefits is more limited than
commonly believed. Dry season baseflow cannot be said to be unequivocally higher under
forest and the benefits of flood control are very localised in nature.
The public good characteristics of dry season baseflow are likely to be very similar to the case
of annual water flows. In the dry season, the degree of rivalry may be expected to be even
more significant, as evaporative demand and agricultural and livestock demand for water are
high, and water supply and soil moisture are low. Dry season baseflow can be expected to
become increasingly congested and, therefore, more rival as the dry season progresses. Thus,
it is easy to conclude that such flows would be even more likely to be private goods than in the
case of annual flows. This essentially suggests that annual flows might be broken down into
dry and wet season flows with the former being more likely to be a private good and the latter
more likely to be a public good.
In the case of peakflows it is reasonable to assume that it would be difficult for a downstream
property owner to exclude others from sharing in the benefits of efforts to protect property
from flooding. It is also difficult to conceive of how the same property owner might exclude
another consumer from the benefits of a reduction in flooding or flood risk. This would
appear to be a particularly perverse result if flooding is non-rival in nature. Certainly, it would
seem that in the case of floodwaters the degree of rivalry is low as all “consumers” in the path
of the floodwaters will feel the effects of the flood. Floods are not so much “consumed” as
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dissipated by topography. Thus, changes in flood risk that occur as a result of changes in land
use may be considered as public goods (or bads).
In the case of Arenal there seems little reason to deviate from the general rule and, hence, dry
season baseflow is considered a private good while (any) change in flood risk would be a
public good.
Water Regulation. As stated above it is highly unlikely that upstream landholders would be
able to exclude downstream consumers from the consumption of changes in annual water
yield. In general, it could be assumed that the shorter the relevant time period over which land
users would need to exercise exclusion, the more feasible this might become. The installation
of small dams might give landholders some ability to regulate water flows. In other words by
being able to store run-off and release it at a later point, the landholder can exclude others
from access to the short-run changes in water regulation that may be caused by changes in
land use. The shorter the period required for storage and the smaller the volume of water to
be contained, the more feasible this becomes.
The literature suggests that the effects of land use change are a priori ambiguous with respect
to dry season baseflow (Bruijnzeel 1990). If, for the sake of the discussion, it is assumed that
conversion of pasture back to forest would increase dry season baseflow, then the relevant
question becomes whether or not landholders could exclude others from these flows.23
Clearly, this depends on the vagaries of the site in question. Generally speaking, it would be
difficult, as it is the increase in infiltration that will raise baseflow. This implies that
landholders would need to control access at the point where subsurface flow from their
property enters stream channels. Should this be possible, landholders could effectively store
the increment in dry season flow for release at their discretion. Much, of course, would
depend on the size of inflows relative to storage capacity, as well as the schedule of needs of
downstream users. If flows are low relative to storage and downstream needs are fixed, it is at
least possible to conceive of upstream landholders denying crucial dry season baseflow to
downstream users at crucial periods.
In the case of peakflows, it is likely that the compression of the relevant time and the reduction
of the storage volume required to influence such flows could exercise even greater control.
Release prior to severe storms from small dams may permit storage of significant amounts of
stream water. In addition, it should be noted that flood risk is derived during the most severe
storm events, when infiltration rates are typically exceeded and much overland flow towards
the stream channel is observed. At such times it is not just the storage of subsurface flows
after they enter stream channels that is important, but what happens to this overland flow. For
example, small dams or natural hollows that are typically dry may serve as extra storage during
severe events. Clearly, then the possibility of reducing the impact of water flows is greatly
enhanced when the discussion turns to consideration of peakflows.
However, the issue is not so much one of landholders’ ability to exclude others from enjoying
a positive externality associated with reduced peakflows, but rather their ability to lessen the
effects of increased peakflows when infiltration is reduced by land use change. Conversion of
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Note that this assumption reflects conventional wisdom more than it does empirical evidence, as most
experimental work suggests that baseflow diminishes upon reforestation or afforestation.
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pasture to forest should increase infiltration leading to a reduction in peak flows, which in turn
should lessen the localised effect of potential flooding. Given that the on-site effect is a
lowering of flows, it is not clear how a landholder could exclude others from this benefit, short
of actually increasing release of dammed water during a storm event. This option is ignored
given its perverse nature. Instead, it is more useful to consider that in the case where land is
being converted from forest to pasture, thus raising peakflows, landholders may effectively
buffer the downstream effect by the use of water storage facilities.
However, this is analogous to the case where land use change operates as a mechanism for
exclusion. In the case where the potential change (whether in land use or construction of
water storage) brings no direct benefit to the landholder, exclusion of downstream users from
potential benefits is simply enforced by not undertaking the change (i.e. not building the dam).
In the case of Río Chiquito the feasibility of exercising exclusion over water regulation either
during a single storm event (for flooding) or over the course of the seasons appears remote
and probably very costly. Water regulation can, therefore, be considered as a public good
from the upstream perspective. As noted more generally, there is at least the possibility that a
limited degree of exclusion may be possible the shorter the duration of water storage required.
In such cases the analysis of dry season baseflow and flooding suggests that water regulation
would produce downstream private and public goods respectively. Likewise, the potential for
exclusion through avoiding land use change (ex ante exclusion) would probably yield the
potential for rent collection in the case of seasonal flows but not with respect to flood
reduction.
Off-Site Environmental Goods and Services Produced by Forests
The three goods and services mentioned below are considered to be off-site in the sense that
these particular services offered by forest are consumed at a great distance from the forest
concerned, even if they are produced and harvested locally. Generally speaking, each of these
is considered to be a public good with low levels of rivalry and exclusion. Nevertheless, as
argued below, in the last few years an increase in the degree of private good characteristics
demonstrated by these goods and services have emerged alongside new institutional
arrangements for their provision and production. In the Costa Rican case, it is worth noting
that a number of new incentive programmes for forest conservation and reforestation make
allowances for a Payment for Environmental Services, under the new Forestry Law. This
facility may prove to be a useful mechanism for the sharing of benefits that can be captured by
the government abroad, with local communities and smallholders.
Biodiversity Prospecting. Biodiversity prospecting is the extraction of small samples of
biodiversity for use in the research and development of new pharmaceutical, biotechnological
and genetic products, typically at a great distance from the forest. Prospecting is often
considered to be a public good due to the difficulty of excluding collectors from large
expanses of protected areas and due to the nature of the good as a source of information (a
perfect example of a non-rival good). Practical steps taken by countries such as Costa Rica to,
on the one hand, limit access to biodiversity and, on the other, to market samples are quickly
establishing a degree of excludability over these samples (Aylward 1992; Aylward 1993;
Aylward 1996). At the local landholder level within Costa Rica the de jure case for exclusion
is poor. The 1992 Wildlife Law (N° 7317) establishes that species are national patrimony and
that landholders cannot exclude others from using species found on their holdings. The de
facto case for exclusion is not as weak, as in order to harvest samples collectors must trespass
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on private property. In the Río Chiquito context, therefore, exclusion is probably low at
present. The potential for gaining access to the Payments for Environmental Services and
Costa Rica’s strong position in the international market suggest, however, that movement is
being made toward a higher degree of excludability.
The status of biodiversity prospecting samples as non-rival remains unchanged. Only in the
case of endangered species or species of a very limited geographic distribution might there be
congestion effects and, therefore, a higher level of rivalry due to the difficulty of restocking
the R&D process with additional raw material (Aylward 1993). Biodiversity prospecting in
Río Chiquito must, therefore, be classified as a public good, with a tendency towards
becoming a toll good.
Carbon Storage. At first glance, carbon storage has a very low degree of excludability.
Having improved the global carbon balance by growing trees the landholder has no way to
exclude others around the world from consuming this improvement. At the same time, the
degree of rivalry must be regarded as high, given that the consumption of the carbon stored by
the landholder (through emissions of carbon or deforestation) can occur only once. Carbon
storage, therefore, starts from a position as a common-pool resource. The development of
pilot carbon offset projects under the Convention on Climatic Change, may, however, presage
the ability to effectively exclude others from taking “credit” for the carbon stored. If this is so,
then carbon storage would be subject to both exclusion and rivalry and be considered as a
private good. The institutional arrangements (at the national and international levels) that are
required to make this fully operational are still in progress. The regulations governing the
participation of Costa Rican landholders in the Payment for Environmental Services schemes
stated that in return for these payments, the landholder would cede all rights to the carbon
storage credits to the government. Such a regulation would effectively link national efforts at
exclusion to the local level.
Existence Value. It is generally suspected that people care about the existence of forests and
biodiversity regardless of intentions to actually use it (in the widest sense) and that they are
willing to pay to conserve these areas on this basis. Donations routed through conservation
organisations arriving in Costa Rica as conservation projects are indicative of this global value.
Nevertheless, it is clear that local landholders in Río Chiquito are incapable of excluding such
existence value “holders” from obtaining satisfaction based on conservation activities
undertaken in the watershed. Nor is it possible to control how many foreigners (or even
nationals) enjoy the continued existence of forests and species in Río Chiquito. As a result,
existence value must be considered to have low levels of exclusion and rivalry, and be
considered a public good (Aylward 1992).
In Figure 1 (page 23) the classification of watershed goods and services according to their
status in Río Chiquito is summarised.
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